India’s third energy front lies in the Arctic, and Russia holds the key to it
For decades, India’s engagement with the Arctic was framed primarily through scientific curiosity, focused on climate research, cryosphere dynamics, and polar expeditions. The summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin this December marks a qualitative shift.
Behind the formal words of the Joint Statement lies a clear and important shift. New Delhi is working to make the Arctic a key arena for its economic strategy. By committing to multi-faceted cooperation on the Northern Sea Route (NSR), intensifying trade and investment in the Russian Far East and Arctic, and holding regular bilateral consultations on Arctic issues, India is signaling that it no longer views the polar region merely as a geographic outpost, but as an integrated industrial corridor where it intends to be a rule-shaper rather than a passive observer.
This ‘Arctic turn’ fits logically into India’s broader quest for strategic autonomy in the energy transition. India has committed to reaching 500 GW of non‑fossil electricity capacity by 2030 and has already deployed over 220 GW of such capacity by 2025, putting it broadly on track to meet this goal. Existing diversification efforts, from Australia to Latin America and Africa, have reduced but not eliminated exposure to single-country or single-corridor risks, especially where transport still hinges on vulnerable choke points such as the Suez-Red Sea axis.
Against this backdrop, the Arctic offers a third vector of connectivity, a northern axis that complements the Indo-Pacific and the © RT.com





















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