Sixth Circuit
Jonathan H. Adler | 9.23.2024 4:18 PM
Today, in Holman v. Vilsack, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit split over whether the federal government was "substantially justified" in defending race-based debt relief for "socially disadvantaged" farmers and ranchers und the American Rescue Plan Act. The question matters because prevailing plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys fees where the federal government's position was "substantially justified."
Judge Stranch wrote the majority opinion, joined by Judge Davis. She summarized the case as follows:
This appeal concerns a litigant's petition for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Plaintiff Robert Holman successfully obtained a preliminary injunction freezing a debt-relief program that used racial categories to remedy prior discrimination against farmers and ranchers. Following additional proceedings, but before final judgment, Congress repealed the challenged program. Holman now seeks fees associated with the litigation. The district court denied that request because, in its view, Holman was not a "prevailing party" under the EAJA. We neither adopt nor definitively reject that conclusion. Instead, we find that the Government's position during the litigation was "substantially justified" within the EAJA's meaning.
As Judge Stranch explains, prevailing parties under the EAJA are not entitled to fees if "the position of the United States was substantially justified." While rejecting the federal government's argument that courts should presume the standard is satisfied where (as here) the government, the court concluded that the government was sufficiently justified in defending the program's race-based classifications, even though such programs are subject to strict scrutiny.
the Government provided evidence of intentional USDA discrimination against socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers generally, and buttressed that evidence with specific examples of intentional discrimination against nearly every group included in the socially disadvantaged category. That is categorically distinct from the evidentiary presentation in Vitolo, which did "not identify specific incidents of past discrimination" and relied entirely on "general social disparities." Id. at 361-62. Nor is this a case........