Boeing cleaned house amid its last big aviation crisis. Now its latest safety debacle is raising questions about whether the company’s overhauled lobbying team can help it withstand government scrutiny any better than an old guard that was more steeped in aviation policy.
The aerospace and defense giant is still rebuilding its lobbying operation and relationships with lawmakers after the fatal crashes of two 737 MAX 8 jets in 2018 and 2019 — twin disasters that provoked doubts about Boeing’s safety practices and the Federal Aviation Administration’s oversight.
The reshuffling of Boeing’s D.C. influence team, including more than a third of its registered federal lobbyists since 2019, will add an additional level of difficulty as the company responds to this month’s blowout of a door plug in a 737 MAX 9 over Oregon, according to seven people who have either interacted with or worked for Boeing or its top lobbyists. The seven were granted anonymity to speak freely about the company’s lobbying approach.
Some who spoke to POLITICO defended the new team. One person working in government affairs in the aviation industry noted that Ziad Ojakli, the top lobbyist who joined Boeing in 2021, did not take over a fully formed team and that the rebuilding would take time.
Much of the new registered lobbying crew, including Ojakli, has extensive backgrounds with associations or companies such as Ford rather than with airlines, plane manufacturers or the FAA. While some of these people still have “strong ties” to Congress, a large chunk of the company’s talent was lost in the recent turnover, said one former Boeing lobbyist who left the company during the purge.
“They weren’t brought in as issue experts or with ties to the committees and members of jurisdiction, but as generalists, relying on outside consultants for expertise and access,” the person said of the new team. “It’s a different model and one that could definitely leave them flat footed in a recurring crisis.”
Boeing’s new lobbying team will have to navigate tough questions from officials across the government that oversee aviation — including, in particular, the intricacies and mechanics of the company’s business practices. Understanding those agencies and their regulations, and having relationships with the people inside of them, can be beneficial when trying to influence the outcome.
“There's no doubt that you're hurt by not having … the group that’s been through this before, so this will be their first crisis,” said one lobbyist in the aviation industry, who conceded that some may have faced previous crises at other jobs. “They would benefit if they had that entire team that was there for the first grounding.”
The turnover in Boeing’s lobbying shop has been significant in the five years since the MAX 8 crashes, in which a flight-control function gone haywire killed a total of 346 people in Ethiopia and near Indonesia. Since 2019, at least ten of roughly 30 registered in-house lobbyists have left for other companies — including Boeing’s former top lobbyist, Tim Keating, who was........