It was bound to happen in one form or another. The AUKUS arrangements were a guarantee of it. The ‘it’ in question is the alleged discovery and lamentation that, possibly, “Australia has one of the weakest research security frameworks in the developed world.” Redress is demanded and of a draconian character; not to do so is to contemplate consequences “too terrifying to contemplate.”

The specific genesis of this outburst is a report which, as part of a broader push to tighten security, contains a proposal by science funders in the US, UK and Canada to set up a network to share information about security risks – potentially those posed by espionage imputed to China, Iran, and Russia in the main affecting international research projects.

This is hardly a revolutionary initiative. The intent is to share unclassified information that can help each region’s research performers – key science agencies and their ministries, universities, and small businesses – avoid security risks when operating internationally. NB: these proposed arrangements relate to unclassified research and information in the fields of science and technology.

The wider context and scope of it all are supplied by the Republican-controlled House of Representatives which is advocating increasing restrictions in collaborative research with foreign partners – including projects with US allies.

One measure under the aegis of the US arrangements and which will become operational later in 2024 is the creation of a new clearing house for what is defined as “research-security information” which will “advise” on the security risks attached to specific projects. Although it will take different forms in different countries, their ambit requires the national security agencies to have access to research grant applications.

In Canada, this has resulted in certain projects being vetoed. In the EU, a “security toolkit” has been published for the “advice” of research organisations.

At this point there is a need to consider what is underway and where it might be going. First, the information in question is unclassified (that status being undefined), and thus presumably available on the public record. If the arrangements above have been accurately reported, then the intention seems to be restrict it on the grounds of national security.

Second, and by extension, the intention is to render porous the distinction between classified and unclassified – the latter being subsumed by the former according to the dictates of the national security agencies given access to research funding applications.

Third, though the information in question relates to science and technology, how tenable will be the suggestion that the research in........

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