Vulnerabilities of Missile Defense Systems in the US-Israel and Iran War |
US anti-missile systems that have been used during the recent US-Israel and Iran conflict have incurred high costs in intercepting Iran’s aerial attacks. A single interceptor of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile systems costs around $15.5 million, while that of a Patriot PAC-3 MSE system costs around $3.9 million. The cost buildup for using these interceptors since 28th February has reached $1.31bn to $2.61bn in the UAE, $800m to $1.5bn in Kuwait, and $600m to $900m in Qatar. In contrast, aerial objects such as the Shahed-136 drone used by Iran cost approximately $20,000 to $50,000, creating a scenario in which the cost of intercepting such objects is 10 times or more than their manufacturing cost.
Missile defense systems comprise a satellite sensor and a ground or sea-based sensor, an interceptor, and a command and control system that incorporates all available data to launch orders to intercept an incoming threat. To ensure the proper functioning of a missile defense system, every component of the system must perform its function accurately, making each component a possible target in case of a conflict. Iran has used exactly this strategy and targeted radar bases in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar to blind the US defense systems. The AN/TPY-2 radar system, which costs around $500 million, was targeted in Jordan and reportedly destroyed as of March 2. Similarly, an AN/FPS-132 early warning radar in Qatar was targeted, which is valued at around $1.1 billion.
Therefore, Iran is using asymmetrical strategies to counter much more powerful adversaries. Asymmetrical strategies are used when accounting for a conventional inferiority and exploiting the weakness of the stronger adversary. Iran, in this case, has used low-cost drones, ballistic, and cruise missiles to deplete the US inventory of interceptor stockpiles. Similarly, hypersonic missiles such as the Fateh series are impossible to intercept due to their speed reaching up to 12 to 14 Mach, and missile defense systems are vulnerable to such attacks.
The question arises as to why states spend millions of dollars on creating systems that are bound to face such failures. The successful interception rate of defense systems has given states a sense of security, in the case of the Iron Dome, Iron Beam, and Arrow systems in Israel, along with the US THAAD, Patriot, and Aegis systems deployed in the Gulf states. As of 10 March, according to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) of the UAE, out of 1475 drones, 1385 have been intercepted, a total of 8 cruise missiles were intercepted, and out of 262 ballistic missiles, 21 impacted while the rest were intercepted. Similarly, during the initial Operation True Promise launched by Iran against Israel, Israel alleged sources concluded that a 90% successful interception rate had been established using integrated US-Israel systems. However, these reasons do not account for the “financial attrition” that Iran is using against much more powerful regimes such as the US. The ability of weaker states to target and damage million-dollar defense systems using loitering munitions creates a large cost gap, forcing states to avoid long, protracted conflicts.
This cost may be tackled by states that are rather stable in terms of their economy and hold a strong geopolitical position on the global stage. However, at the initiation of the February 2026 conflict, Pete Hegseth commented on the current war being different from the 2003 Iraq war and would cease in four to five weeks. This statement indicates that even the US cannot engage in a protracted conflict with a state that uses modern forms of combat tactics and strategies. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict indicates that counter-strategies for these low-cost strategies have been developed. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has confirmed that the US, along with other Gulf States, has requested Ukraine’s expertise in countering Iranian tactics, and in exchange, the Ukrainian President has requested the Patriot system. Ukrainian counter-drone technology has allowed the state to develop multiple models, such as “The Sting,” costing $2000 per drone, which reaches speeds of 315km to 343km and can cruise up to 10,000ft. Other models include Bullet (AI guidance system), P1-Sun, and ODIN Win_Hit, all developed by indigenous Ukrainian companies, and could be part of an arrangement between the US and Ukraine.
Another cost-effective strategy that can be equipped by states is the Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs). The most prominent manifestation of this technology is Israel’s Iron Beam technology, which uses highly concentrated energy to heat up its target and costs only $3.5 per shot, making it a highly cost-effective technology to counter aerial targets. However, its absence during the prevailing conflict showcases that it has not matured enough to be used against Iran’s modern Shahed drones. High and constant investments of major states in this technology through companies such as the RTX Corporation in the US and the Qinetiq in the UK showcase the future effectiveness of such designs in replacing costly missile defense systems in countering low-cost munitions.
This concludes that modern missile defense systems, which were primarily developed to establish deterrence against counterforce weapons and intercept ballistic missiles, are at the mercy of low-cost loitering munitions. This creates an asymmetry in terms of the cost-to-kill ratio of the interceptors being used as compared to the munitions being targeted, therefore, providing Iran with an edge to prolong the war, which could prove dreadful for the US due to high costs in the long run. Every new technology that is acquired by states and used in a live conflict would soon face the development of a counter technology, in this case, being low-cost drones or laser weapons to counter loitering drones. However, this would require a detailed understanding of Iranian strategies and counter-strategies, and as a result, become a prolonged conflict, which would be counterproductive to US ambitions and rhetoric.
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The views and opinions expressed in this article/paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Paradigm Shift.
I am a project coordinator at the Institute of Policy Studies with a focus on strategic and political affairs. I have written numerous opinion pieces on changing geopolitical security landscapes and would welcome the opportunity to have this latest article considered for publication.