In 2009, Canada described Russia as a pragmatic partner in addressing shared Arctic challenges. By 2024, Ottawa presented Russia as a principal challenge to Canada’s Arctic security. This transformation reflects more than the deterioration of Canada-Russia relations. It demonstrates how governments construct security through the narratives they use to interpret a changing world.

The Arctic’s Changing Security Environment

In 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev first proposed transitioning the Arctic into a “zone of peace”, a vision largely realised following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as interstate relations in the region became more cooperative and relatively insulated from broader geopolitical tensions. However, by the mid-2000s, debates began to emerge over whether the Arctic was entering a period of renewed geopolitical competition. These questions were primarily motivated by the effects of climate change, as accelerating sea ice melt began to enhance the navigability of regional maritime routes and the feasibility of resource extraction.

From 1968 to 2024, summer sea ice area in Northern Canadian Waters declined by approximately 7.2 per cent per decade. The decline has increased the seasonal navigability of the Northwest Passage, which connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Correspondingly, from 2011 to 2024, ship traffic in Canadian Arctic waters increased by over 46 per cent, driven primarily by an increase in freighters transporting natural resources.

Heightened interest in the Arctic’s potential as a shipping route and site of resource extraction has prompted two decades of growing attention to the military capabilities of Arctic and non-Arctic states. This interest extends to Russia, which has significantly expanded its Arctic military capabilities since 2010, illegally annexed Crimea in 2014, and launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Four Canadian Arctic policy documents, published between 2009 and 2024 by the Harper and Trudeau governments, provide insight into Ottawa’s evolving discourse on the Arctic and Russia’s role in the region. Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future (CNS) was published by the Harper government in 2009, and the Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy (SAFP) followed in 2010. In 2019, the Trudeau government released the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (ANPF) to replace the CNS, and later published Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy (CAFP) in 2024.

Although Prime Minister Mark Carney has not released a comprehensive Arctic foreign policy document of his own, despite placing significant emphasis on Arctic security and infrastructure, these four documents remain the clearest record of Ottawa’s evolving Arctic narrative. Examining their evolution is significant because it reveals how Ottawa has used discourse to redefine national priorities, justify policy shifts, and shape Canada’s broader approach to Arctic governance.

The Cooperative Tone of Canada’s Early Arctic Strategies

In 2009, the Harper government released the CNS, structured around four priority areas, of which only “exercising Arctic sovereignty” is explicitly security-related. The remaining priorities emphasise measures aimed at enhancing the well-being of Canada’s northern communities, thereby positioning the Arctic as a space for policy engagement. Further, while the notion of exercising Arctic sovereignty could have securitising implications, it is primarily framed in the CNS as an ongoing governmental function rather than as a response to any specific threat.

Threat construction is largely absent in the CNS, aside from references to growing international interest........

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