Iran and How (Not) to do Regime Change |
It’s now clear that the conflict in Iran is a war of regime change. The scale and diversity of the United States buildup in the Middle East created multiple strategic options, from limited coercive strikes to weaken Iran’s negotiating position to full-scale efforts aimed at regime change. President Trump’s own statements on US objectives have been inconsistent and contradictory. US air strikes have, for the most part, targeted Iranian military assets, which is compatible with various objectives. However, Israeli strikes have given more consistent attention to key personnel and leadership structures, suggesting a settled aim of regime change, which the mercurial Trump seems to have accepted, at least for now.
In recent decades, Israeli security doctrine has been shaped by the concept of “mowing the grass”, periodically degrading the military capabilities of adversaries (primarily, though not exclusively, non-state actors) to render them less threatening and deter aggression. While this avoids the risks and costs of protracted operations, as critics note, it merely manages conflicts rather than resolving them. However, the 7 October attacks of 2023 showed how high were the risks of such a strategy if one wrongly judged an enemy to be deterred. Through its proximity to nuclear weapons and sponsorship of aggressive proxies such as Hamas, the Houthis, Hezbollah, and the now-departed Assad regime in Syria, Iran has been both the gravest threat to Israel and the most disruptive regional actor in the Middle East. Since last summer, with Iran’s regional proxies weakened or destroyed, its........