Donald J. Trump won a clear victory in the 2024 United States presidential election, including winning each of the seven battleground states – in order of closeness: Wisconsin (margin of 0.9 percent), Michigan (1.4 percent), the tipping point state of Pennsylvania, that is, the state that gave the winner their 270th electoral college vote (1.7 percent), Georgia (2.2 percent), Nevada (3.1 percent, and a state Trump had not won before), North Carolina (3.2 percent), and Arizona (5.5 percent). Kamala Harris’ closest win was in New Hampshire, at 2.8 percent.

Not only did Trump win the presidential election in terms of the Electoral College, but this time he also won the popular vote – the first for a Republican since George W. Bush won his second term in 2004. Of course, 2004 was followed by a massive Democratic win in 2008. Could history repeat itself? That is unlikely. The 2008 election followed major mistakes by the Bush administration such as its poor response to Hurricane Katrina, global economic collapse, and a unique, charismatic Democratic candidate in Barack Obama. In 2008, Obama would go on to win the popular vote by 7.3 percent (the only time this century the margin has been over five percent, but hardly an historical blowout), and over two-thirds of the electoral college. Yet a decades-long political realignment based on education in which the college-educated and non-college-educated have switched parties has worked against the Democrats as there are still more non-college educated voters. Moreover, this realignment has become defined by Trump, including as of 2024 in terms of the (male) Latino vote.

With this in mind, the future default electoral map for the Democrats is at best a narrow presidential win in 2028 and their fortunes likely shifting further away from them with redistribution in 2030, whereby representation in the lower house of Congress (and by extension Electoral College votes) are reapportioned every decade following the completion of the decennial census.

The 2024 Presidential Campaign

In terms of the 2024 campaign itself, this involved the controversial nature of Trump set against voter unhappiness with the state of the country. Though “Why is this close?” was a common cry of Democrats, it was actually better to have asked why it was close in the sense of why Trump was not running away with it. The issues of the economy (especially continuing high prices even if inflation in an economics sense had come down) and the government failing to deal with illegal immigration strongly favoured Trump. In contrast, Kamala Harris focussed more on access to abortion, democracy, and Trump’s personal failings. For many voters, those issues were much more abstract than going to the grocery store for basics and having to pay higher and higher prices. And the issue of access to abortion across the country was undercut by a localization of the issue, which did favour pro-choice Democratic House candidates and saw referenda on access pass in most states where these were held including battleground Arizona, while in Florida there was a clear majority but not the necessary 60 percent. Moreover, voters saw the Democrats and Harris herself as excessively liberal in the sense of “woke”. Republicans played into this feeling with a heavily used anti-transgender ad, demonstrating that divisive social issues can move the electoral needle.

More generally, Harris had a steep hill to climb as she was Joe Biden’s vice-president, and Biden was quite unpopular (his disapproval rating was 59 percent). Generally, it is hard for a sitting vice-president to win the presidency. Indeed, Democratic Vice-Presidents Al Gore and Hubert M. Humphrey lost in 2000 and 1968 respectively, as did Republican Richard M. Nixon in 1960, as they carried the problems of their administration with them. Yes, George H.W. Bush did win in 1988, but that amounted to voters choosing a “third term” for Ronald Reagan, who was still popular with majority approval. Prior to Bush senior, the last sitting vice-president to be elected president was Martin Van Buren back in 1836!

To have been elected, Harris would have needed a much sharper break with the Biden legacy – her response that she could not think of anything she would have done differently than Biden was fatal, a self-inflicted wound her campaign immediately recognized but did not treat – and no doubt the 107 days she had to establish her own agenda was not enough. Nor did she get the Democratic nomination via a competitive primary and thus vetting; instead, the party rallied around her after Biden dropped out. Her campaign poured its considerable financial resources into the ground game (door knocking in battleground states), but it was outflanked by the Trump campaign’s use of social media and podcasts.

Compared to 2020, Trump gained vote share in every single state (with the largest shifts being in New York and New Jersey) and across almost all groups. His clearest gains demographically were amongst Latino voters (especially men, a majority of whom voted for Trump), voters under 30 (still won by the Democrats, but last this close in 2004), and working-class voters (defined in the United States as those without a college degree). Indeed, these patterns are even starker when compared to 2012 (the last presidential election pre-Trump). Gender and education were an interactive demographic division in 2024, with the polar voting groups being women with college education or higher (pro-Democratic) and men without college education (pro-Republican). This latter group reflected a successful Republican mobilization of young men (a focus of their campaign), who are not as liberal as young women have become. And as in 2016, Trump won the so-called “double-haters”, that is, those voters with an unfavourable view of both candidates.

The Impact of Education and Policy Shifts on Voter Realignment

Education levels are central to an ongoing realignment of American voters that started, according to Kuziemko, Longuet-Marx, and Naidu, in the late 1970s for hitherto-Democratic voters and in 1992 for hitherto-Republican voters. The Democrats were previously the party of the working class, going back to FDR’s New Deal. For example, in 1960 John F. Kennedy won a majority of voters without a college degree, but only about a third of those with one. However, starting in the 1970s centrist “new Democrats” rose who were much more oriented to deregulation, free markets, and globalization, and who chose to compensate the losers from this rather than undertake preventative policies (tariffs, high minimum wages) as the party had before. Central to this realignment was the approval of NAFTA by Bill Clinton over union opposition. Of course, Republicans first pushed for NAFTA, so the fallout from this did not immediately benefit that party. Indeed, Clinton in 1996 still did very well with White working-class voters, better than with White college graduates – a difference that would vanish with Al Gore in 2000 and then turn into a deficit. While Obama’s decisive win in 2008 involved increased voter support across all income levels, this increased most amongst those of high income. Obama also received record high support from youth and ethnic minorities, and was able to split the White vote outside the South.

However, in 2016 Donald Trump, running as a populist and protectionist, was able to win Midwestern (“Rust Belt”) White workers and thus the presidency (a regional realignment). Biden defeated him in 2020 not by regaining working-class areas (Biden flipped very few of the counties that voted for Obama twice and then switched to Trump), but by running up the score in middle-class suburbs that had voted for Hillary Clinton. In 2020 Trump gained amongst Latino voters, and this time in 2024 his working-class support was more multinational, including a majority of Latino men (as noted) and a greater share of Black men. This voting realignment was reinforced by the reality that ethnic minorities are nowhere near as socially liberal / “woke” as educated white progressives. Race itself is thus now less of a voter cleavage in the United States, though a sharp voter cleavage remains about whether there is structural racialism. Overall, the past decade has seen the Democrats’ longstanding image as the party of the working class change to, in Burn-Murdoch’s words, being “seen primarily as the party of minority advocacy”. This current (perceived) focus on identity politics and social justice contrasts with the moderate position Obama took on many issues, especially social ones.

In contrast to the presidential outcome, Democratic Senate candidates did win in almost all of the battleground states (Arizona, Michigan, Nevada, and Wisconsin, with a very narrow loss of 0.2 percent in Pennsylvania where outside group spending was heavily in favour of the Republican challenger), but, crucially, these candidates stressed economic issues and went everywhere in their states including rural areas. Harris, on the other hand, held rallies mostly in the big cities. Going forward, if the Democratic Party wishes to reverse the class realignment and be seen as less elitist, they should listen to their rare elected officials of working-class background, both in the Senate and the House, though their victories are likely hard to repeat.

Turning specifically to the political geography effects of electoral realignment, it is useful to contrast the 2004 and 2024 elections. In 2004, Democrat John Kerry won the three Great Lakes states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, and he came close in Ohio (which would have been sufficient to win the electoral college) and Iowa. In 2024, Trump won all these states, and Iowa and Ohio were not even battlegrounds. In contrast, in 2024 Harris won Colorado, New Mexico, and Virginia, which were all won by Bush in 2004, but which have been Democratic since Obama in 2008. These shifts basically reflect the divide between more-educated and less-educated states in terms of share of the population with (four-year) college degrees. The most educated states now vote Democratic, the least educated ones vote Republican, and the battleground states fall in the middle. This is not a perfect divide of course, as there are also non-battleground states in the middle.

More Safe States – Less Competition

Prior to this educational divide, and sorting where people move to states that vote like they do, many more states were competitive. For example, Kentucky voted twice for Bill Clinton, but then in 2000 Bush won it by double-digits and in 2024 Trump won it by some 30 percent. By the 2020 presidential election campaign, only a quarter of U.S. voters lived in states targeted by the two main parties. With the number of battleground states shrinking, most presidential voters are ‘by-standers’ in terms of campaigning as they live in states safe for one side or the other.

Importantly, the Republicans have more safe states than the Democrats. Yes, the largest state of California is (still) very safe for the Democrats but conversely Texas and Florida now look quite safe for the Republicans (Trump won these by 13.8 and 13.1 percent respectively), reflecting the realignment of Latino voters (recall that Obama won Florida both times). Going forward, Republicans could pick off some additional states that are no longer safe or at least much less safe for the Democrats. Indeed, in the final days of the 2024 campaign, Trump went to New Mexico and Virginia – two states which the Cook Political Report considered likely (but not solid) Democratic. And there were no states classified just leaning Democratic, or just leaning Republican for that matter. Of these likely Democratic states, New Mexico would be the more logical future Republican pickup given that it is less educated and has the highest Latino share of the population of any state.

The Next Presidential Election

In 2028, the Republicans will be the incumbent party. Trump will not be their candidate again, but the popularity or unpopularity of his presidency will be key for that election. Assuming a “neutral case”, that is, no major administration mistakes, global economic downturns, or major conflict, the electoral map will continue shifting in the Republicans’ favour if minority workers continue to shift. One thinks here not just of New Mexico but even New Jersey, with its above-average share of Latinos and huge shift to Trump in 2024.

Of course, the Democrats will still have a chance in 2028, especially if their candidate is a Midwesterner like Governor Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania or Governor Gretchen Whitmer of Michigan. And as mentioned, the Trump administration could trip up on any number of issues. However, come 2032 there will also be a new Electoral College map, as the decennial census in 2030 will affect the number of House members in each state and thus their electoral college votes. Specifically, in terms of population shifts it is likely that California, New York, and Illinois (all Democratic states) will be the main losers, and Texas and Florida the main gainers. That will give the Republicans even more long-term dominance in presidential elections, and begs the question whether or at least when the Democrats will ever dominate again?

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