The dramatic ousting of Sheikh Hasina on 5 August 2024 marked not merely the conclusion of the Awami League’s uninterrupted 15-year tenure, but also served as an unflattering mirror, reflecting the deeper fractures within Bangladesh’s political architecture. To attribute the entirety of Bangladesh’s democratic malaise to the Awami League alone would, however, be both historically myopic and analytically inadequate.

The systemic malaise afflicting the country’s polity is, after all, the cumulative consequence of governance choices made by successive regimes since the restoration of civilian rule in the 1990s. Each political formation has, in its own way, contributed to the calcification of a political culture marinated in corruption, entrenched party favouritism, and unabashed nepotism.

It is precisely this historical baggage that the interim government, ushered in after the League’s dramatic fall from grace, has resolved to address through a comprehensive agenda of institutional reform. At the heart of this ambitious reform package lies the judiciary, the very custodian of constitutional morality and the ultimate arbiter of justice.

The focus on judicial reform is far from incidental, for the judicial system’s credibility has long been compromised by its subjugation to the vagaries of partisan politics. Among the institutions under particular scrutiny is the Bangladesh Bar Council, an autonomous regulatory body originally conceived to ensure the smooth functioning of the legal profession and, by extension, the judiciary itself.

On paper, Bangladesh’s legal framework guarantees the independence and autonomy of the judiciary. Yet, the distance between legal theory and institutional practice could scarcely be greater. The judiciary faces a plethora of challenges—foremost among them being a chronic paucity of resources. This resource deficit is not merely financial but extends to infrastructure, technological modernisation, and the woeful inadequacy of trained legal personnel.

These operational........

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