Andrey Baklanov: “Iranians want to live normally like all other countries” |
Andrey Baklanov: “Iranians want to live normally like all other countries”
Professor Andrey Baklanov, Head of the Middle East and North Africa Studies Section at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Deputy Chairman of the Association of Russian Diplomats, and former Russian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, shared many interesting and highly relevant things in this interview. Some of his assessments were unexpected for us. We touched upon various aspects of the situation in the Middle East and tried – as far as possible – to understand what is happening.
– During the Iran-Israel conflict in October 2024, some experts supposed that the various actors in the Middle East did not want a full-scale war. One and a half years have passed since then; what is the situation like today?
–They were right. Regional actors still do not want a full-scale war today. On the contrary, they need an environment in the region that would promote dynamic economic development and attract investors to the cutting-edge technology sector. The wealthy Gulf monarchies have ambitious plans to build “cities of the future,” something that would be impossible during wartime.
But strictly speaking, for now, a full-scale war is not yet underway; the region is only just being drawn into one. There are medium-intensity military operations taking place, and they are mostly carried out at quite a distance.
Let us try to analyze the approaches of the parties involved.
We shall begin with Iran. I have visited Iran and know Ali Larijani and other leaders well. The delegations I was part of held substantive and frank negotiations with them. I also had the opportunity to speak with senior religious authorities, in particular during a visit to the holy city of Qom.
I got the impression that the Iranians truly do not want war. Moreover, they want something completely different, namely to make peace with the West and to live normally, like all other countries, despite the initially very harsh and, to be honest, not entirely justified assessments and key ideas from 1979.
Currently, they still verbally adhere to these key ideas, but in reality, the regime has undergone a very long process of modification, adapting its policy to the situation regionally and internationally.
This, by the way, also applies to relations with Moscow.
These relations started off poorly by sending the Soviet Foreign Ministry a very impolite, pressuring note containing various claims and demands. Iranian politicians at that time publicly asserted that Iran had two adversaries: “Satan in the West,” being the USA, and “Satan in the East,” being the USSR.
Moscow responded wisely, demonstrating its firm policy combined with a readiness for dialogue and a will to explain to the new leaders the importance of developing ties with our country and the real foundations of Moscow’s foreign policy. This approach bore fruit. The idea of “Satan in the East” became a thing of the past. First normal, and then advanced, partnership-based, good-neighborly relations emerged.
Now, for the most part, these individuals remain in power, and they have indeed managed to overcome certain psychological obstacles and make significant compromises. Today, they are interested in reaching agreements with the USA and the West in general, but Washington and the Collective West take such a tough and disrespectful stance that Tehran cannot agree to a deal without Iranian public opinion unequivocally deeming the terms humiliating. It’s important to note that Israel largely eggs the Americans on.
But the Iranians do not want to fight. Of course, their potential has grown significantly, and in some areas, for example, drones and cutting-edge missile technology, they have surpassed other countries in the region (incidentally, the most farsighted military specialists in the Middle East in terms of identifying promising military technologies are Türkiye and Iran). At the same time, the Iranians understand that their potential is not great enough to start a military campaign themselves. Besides, there isn’t really any strong motivation for it either.
Regarding accusations of their “hyperactive foreign activities” and reliance on Shia organizations and groups, this issue is artificially inflated by external forces. Tehran, under pressure and sanctions, is forced to resort to supporting and, to a certain extent, using foreign, so-called Shi’a structures. It must be admitted, though, that these structures operate rather independently, as Iran is not capable of fully controlling and directing their activities. So there is a great deal of exaggeration here. What conclusions can be drawn?
Iran does not want war, but the development of the current situation repeatedly pushes it in that direction. When you start to get bombed, a response must follow.
Now for the United States of America…Their actions in the Middle East are an integral part of a global strategy. Thus, the military operations we are witnessing in the Iranian and other Middle Eastern theaters are testing military equipment and technologies in real combat conditions. The plans drawn up by specialists from the American General Staff are, from a professional point of view, quite sound, though the troops show poor training and a lack of ability to effectively implement these theoretical concepts. Hence the high-profile strikes on erroneous targets and so on. In my opinion, the Americans should not run wild militarily and politically, as this will not lead to anything positive. It is telling that they withdrew from Afghanistan so disgracefully, and they haven’t learned to fight any better since then.
It seems that the US military is aware of its own shortcomings seeing as it is not eager to rush into battle. These orders are coming from the political leadership, from Donald Trump, who is sometimes eccentric – a quality that is unacceptable in military affairs.
Now, let us move on to Israel. I think that Israel is actually not interested in completely eliminating the Iranian regime. An external bogeyman must exist to ensure domestic political consolidation and to gain public approval for a hardline policy.
But for the Americans, too, it is necessary that the regime in Iran, i.e. the embodiment of the “threat to peace in the region”, does not collapse completely. They need someone to frighten MENA countries with in order to sell their weapons. And they are doing quite well at this; the Americans supply 51% of the region’s arms. In the Middle East, this figure is higher than in any other region of the world.
The Israelis also need some kind of regional idol to whip up psychosis within the country and restrict democratic rights. Netanyahu needs this for his political survival and to avoid prosecution.
In sum, the US and Israel are interested in weakening the regime in Tehran and discrediting attempts to resist Washington’s diktat. Therefore, they resort to both political and military pressure. Currently, the intensity of the armed conflict has risen several levels, but it has not yet reached its peak. The whole situation looks very, very taxing.
The militaries are forced to fight under the pressure of circumstance and under pressure from politicians. But they don’t really like it, I think. And each side fears high-profile, unexpected, large-scale strikes that would result in heavy criticism of the military and political leadership on both sides.
– To what degree do US and Israeli interests align in this campaign? Is there a possibility that Washington will retire from this game before Tel Aviv reaches all its objectives?
– That’s a great question…Back in the 1970s, President of Egypt Anwar Sadat, an adversary of the USSR, though, one must admit, a shrewd and decisive politician, characterized the ties between Washington and Tel Aviv very accurately. He said that Israeli-American relations are not a relationship of cooperation or friendship, but an “organic relationship,” in which both sides seem to form a single organism.
This was correct in 1971 when Sadat said it, and it remains correct today. Therefore, what we are talking about here is that this organism must somehow regulate itself, balancing the special interests of both the USA and Israel. This is a very deep integration, and it works regardless of which party is in power in the US or which forces come to power in Israel.
– Considering the IAEA’s statement about Iran not having a nuclear weapons program and the organization’s acknowledgement of the rocket strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in Natanz, is there an actual nuclear threat in the region? Iran could also strike the nuclear installation in Dimona in response. Could nuclear materials potentially fall into the hands of non-state actors if Tehran’s power is eroded?
– I dealt with this issue for many years, and my point of view does not coincide with generally accepted assessments. Often, experts who take it upon themselves to make such assessments have never worked in this region, have not felt the pulse of the Middle East, and have not talked to people who were closely connected with MENA countries.
I would like to cite in this context the authoritative opinion of a true expert on this issue. This is Professor Mark Khrustalev, a former military officer who was my instructor in military translation. He was one of the few foreign experts who were ever allowed into some of Israel’s nuclear facilities as part of a UN mission.
As I understood it, Khrustalev believed that Israel has the high technology sufficient to start producing nuclear weapons, but that the Israelis do not actually have the weapons themselves. This is due to the great risks associated with possessing such a type of weaponry. Even storing such weapons is an ambiguous, potentially dangerous thing. In his opinion, which I fully share, Israel pursues a policy of creating uncertainty in the international community regarding whether or not Israel possesses weapons of mass destruction. In some cases, they seek to exert psychological pressure on opponents, hinting that they could use WMD to destroy their adversary. In other cases, they speak of supporting non-proliferation regimes.
I do not think that Israel has nuclear weapons. Why? Because in the Middle East, nuclear weapons cannot be used; the operational space is too small there. Could Iran even theoretically strike Israel with nuclear weapons? Of course not. That would cause enormous ecological damage to the entire region, primarily to the Palestinians. Millions of non-Israelis would suffer. That’s impossible!
And an Israeli nuclear strike on Iran also seems unrealistic for the same reasons. We need to look at these things soberly. I believe that the problem of possessing nuclear weapons in the Middle Eastern context is speculative and artificial in nature.
To reduce the risk of being accused of possessing WMD, all politicians’ statements should be restrained and responsible, including Israeli and Iranian ones. It should be noted that the Israelis carefully monitor and record all statements by Iranian public and political figures that could be interpreted as a threat against Israel or as a desire to possess WMD.
– Following the death of multiple figures in the Iranian leadership and strikes on the Assembly of Experts, how feasible is the current model of government? Are the Iranian Army and intelligence services a “head without a body”? What is the actual role of the Interim Leadership Council?
– I think the Iranians have thoroughly hedged their bets in case politicians and representatives of their security forces were to be eliminated. Of course, the loss of certain scientists or military figures with outstanding personal qualities, whom Israel has been targeting with precision strikes, is a serious loss for Iran.
However, the Iranians had already prepared a pool of potential leadership candidates in advance. The replacement process was simply accelerated by the criminal act carried out by Israel with the help of the United States of America. But we are not observing any kind of collapse, either in terms of personnel or organization.
At the same time, judging by some data, the country needs to adapt the regime to the 21st century and the expectations of the youth.
Are strict rulings regarding clothing and other purely external attributes of the traditional way of life necessary? It would be appropriate for the Iranians to take a closer look at the processes occurring in this context in the region, including in the theocratic monarchy of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other countries.
I previously told the Saudis that the adaptation of the population’s behavioral norms should occur based on the recommendations of religious authorities, not liberally minded intellectuals or students. They are now following that path. Perhaps Iran, too, should carry out adaptive reforms aimed at removing certain non-essential elements that irritate some segments of the population. External unfriendly forces must not be allowed to exploit these issues.
– Today, Iran is striking not only US military bases, but also civilian infrastructure in the Gulf. In your opinion, is this a military necessity or a lever of economic influence to force the Arab monarchies to put pressure on Washington?
– In recent days, we have simultaneously been contacting the Iranians and the Saudis, and I was surprised at how deeply they have become embroiled in internal squabbles. Instead of discussing the issue of American aggression, they are enthusiastically detailing who among the regional players is to blame for what, who started it, and so on. A Saudi colleague, addressing the Iranians, said, “Why did you start striking US facilities located on our territory? Why didn’t you start, for example, with Azerbaijan, which has closer ties with Israel? It supplies weapons to Israel, while we do not; we just have bases on our soil.”
Unfortunately, regional actors have become drawn into a real mutual altercation, to the great satisfaction of the Israelis and Americans.
The basis for analyzing this situation must be the recognition of the fact that the current outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East began precisely with American and Israeli aggression.
I would particularly like to emphasize that none of this might have happened if the countries in the region had accepted our proposals regarding the creation of a regional security system in the Persian Gulf area, which would include systems for monitoring and verifying matters of concern and apprehensions among the parties.
Recently, the Russian-Arab Group for Strategic Interaction and Analysis, the “Hakimov Club,” was formed.
The other day, we prepared a package of proposals for defusing the current dangerous situation in the Persian Gulf zone and the Middle East. We handed it over to the ambassadors of the Middle Eastern countries. The text was posted on the Telegram channel of the Russian Foreign Ministry. There, we propose specific measures, including those that would remove this artificial tension between the Iranians and the Saudis. They need to be brought closer together; among other things, this is a matter of strengthening and preserving the potential of BRICS.
– The White House worries that the new leadership will be no better than the previous. Can we predict which forces could come to power in Iran if the regime falls: pro-Western liberals, an IRGC military dictatorship, or chaos like we saw in Libya?
– As a diplomat holding certain positions within the diplomatic community, it is not very convenient for me to answer a question about “regime change.” It’s probably not very tactful. Imagine if our partners started talking about regime change in the Russian Federation? We wouldn’t like that. Moreover, we would find a reason to react negatively to such speculation.
Therefore, right now it’s more important for us to think about and discuss two issues: first, how to prevent further degradation of the situation in the region and save people, and second, how to form a system of regional security and cooperation in the region. This is precisely what we are currently prioritizing.
– Is it fair to say that Operation Epic Fury has decisively killed the international law system that was formed after 1945, and that preemptive regime change strikes could become the norm for the West?
– You know, history both before 1945 and after 1945 is a history of roughly the same actions by the West. The only difference is that at times they hid their true intentions more, and at times less. That’s all.
Take 1945. We still had allied relations, but the British and Americans were already preparing a possible aggression against us, moreover, even using reformatted fascist troops that were on the territory of Germany occupied by Western countries. Plans for the destruction of the USSR – Operation Unthinkable and others – were being developed secretly. There were forceful methods used against us and our allies. There were attempts at regime change, for example, the Hungarian events of 1956.
In 1953, there was an attempt at regime change in the GDR, but Marshal Andrey Grechko, who commanded the troops in East Germany, put our tank units on combat alert and moved them up to the line of contact with American and British troops. They got very scared; the Americans disgracefully abandoned their rear units and retreated 150 kilometers. What does this tell us? It tells us that even at that time they were preparing for all sorts of subversive actions far from international law. And this requires a firm rebuff, including a forceful one.
Today, we still encounter people who have an extremely naive approach to this. They believe the tall tales of the Americans. Of course, it is important and necessary to use any available negotiating formats, but we must proceed with the understanding that the West always seeks to outplay and deceive us. They were colonial powers, and they remain so. And they consider us partners only to the extent that it is opportunistically necessary. International law was never a holy scripture for them that they intended to adhere to. They never intended to adhere to it.
The West has not shrunk from the political or even physical elimination of politicians they dislike. In 1953, they forced the Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mosaddegh, to resign. He was punished for attempting to nationalize Iranian oil and transfer it from the control of Western companies to the benefit of the Iranian state.
Today, they have openly physically eliminated the spiritual leader of a state that is a member of the UN. I see nothing fundamentally new here. It’s just that, perhaps, they have become so emboldened that they no longer consider it necessary to hide anything.
I believe that two things are needed to stop this kind of practice. First, demonstrating greater firmness in defending the national interests of the countries of the “global majority.” Second, uniting the potential of countries that resist Western pressure.
As for the current situation in the Middle East, our expert community hopes for progress on the concrete proposals developed by the Russian-Arab Group for Strategic Interaction and Analysis, the “Hakimov Club.” We also plan to continue expert work in this area during the First Strategic Middle East Conference, scheduled for April 2, 2026, which will be held at the HSE University. We invite colleagues to a joint discussion of these issues.
– Mr. Baklanov, we thank you for this captivating interview.
Interview by Yulia NOVITSKAYA, writer, journalist, and correspondent for New Eastern Outlook
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