Alexander Maryasov: “ Iran not only has no intention of surrendering but is also intensifying retaliatory strikes ” |
Alexander Maryasov: “ Iran not only has no intention of surrendering but is also intensifying retaliatory strikes ”
Today’s guest is a highly experienced diplomat and orientalist who worked for many years as Consul General and Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Iran. Given his unique expertise, we have had a look at the current critical situation in the Middle East.
– Mr. Maryasov, you are a highly experienced diplomat and orientalist who worked for many years in Iran in various capacities; you were Consul General headed the Russian embassy in Tehran. How has Iran changed over the years you have known it, from your work in Isfahan in the 90s to the present day?
– I began working in Iran during the Shah’s regime, as a secretary at the Soviet consulate in Rasht, which reopened in 1969. During my next assignment, this time at the USSR Embassy in Tehran, I witnessed the final years of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s rule.
Under him, Iran was a secular and relatively successful state. However, the entire political life of the country revolved around the Shah. He was considered an enlightened monarch, but he banned the activities of any opposition parties and organizations, except for one hand-picked party he created himself, the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) Party. The Shah promoted Western values and imposed a Western, primarily American, way of life. He was eagerly followed by comprador business circles, government officials, members of the intelligentsia, and cultural figures, with whom the Shah shared the vast revenues from the multiple increases in oil prices. But the overwhelming majority of the traditionalist population, which continued to live in poverty, did not accept these trends and preferred Islamic spiritual values and ideals.
After the 1979 revolution, rapid Islamization of all aspects of Iranian society began, ranging from the structure of the state to the norms of social and cultural life. For quite a long time, while the revolutionary enthusiasm of the population still persisted, these norms were observed. However, amidst the growing Western sanctions pressure and the authorities’ inability to resolve pressing socio-economic problems, protest sentiments began to rise in Iran. They were particularly strong among urban youth, who demanded the abolition of religious restrictions in public and cultural life. In recent years, these sentiments have begun to escalate into anti-government protests.
– There is a lot of talk now about Iran being disappointed with Moscow. Allegedly, during the current escalation (the “2026 war”), Russia limited itself to general statements in the UN Security Council and did not provide the support that Tehran expected. You headed the embassy during difficult years and know the Iranian elite. Is this genuine resentment and a crisis of trust, or does Tehran understand Moscow’s pragmatism and is simply bargaining for better terms in a future peace treaty?
– The Russian-Iranian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership does not provide for military assistance to one of the parties in the event of external aggression. Besides, the Iranians did not ask for it. They are very sensitive to any violations of their sovereignty. If such reproaches were voiced, they did not come from representatives of the Iranian leadership. However, military-technical cooperation with Iran is developing successfully. There are old contracts in place, and new ones are being signed. Their implementation strengthens Iran’s defense capability.
– After the events in Syria and Moscow’s, let’s say, restrained reaction to the strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, people in the Middle East have started talking about Russia being “tired” or even “ceding its positions.” The Global South is watching closely to see who can guarantee security and who cannot. In your opinion, is the role of the chief negotiator and defender of Iranian interests in the international arena shifting from Russia to China? And if so, should Moscow try to reclaim the initiative?
– Russia condemned the US-Israeli aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The resolution submitted by Moscow to the UN Security Council, which condemned this aggression and demanded its immediate cessation and the use of political and diplomatic methods of settlement, was blocked by the United States and its allies.
The Russian leadership maintains contacts with all parties to the conflict and is ready to undertake a mediation mission to resolve the conflict with the consent of all parties. As for China, according to Western media reports, it is providing military assistance to Tehran, although overall Beijing is being very cautious regarding the conflict.
– You believe that even the Iranian opposition has fallen silent, rallying around the current Rahbar. This is the classic besieged fortress effect. But any orientalist knows that in Iran, besides the political opposition, there is a huge layer of social discontent stemming from the economy, the hijab, and the 2022 protests. Can we currently speak of unity? If the war drags on or if there are further strikes on infrastructure, will the patriotic surge turn into fatigue and new social unrest against the government?
– Foreign aggression has indeed united Iranians around the flag, awakening strong patriotic and nationalistic feelings in them. The war has pushed their growing dissatisfaction with serious socio-economic and other problems into the background. But as long as the mortal danger to the country and bombing persists, the majority of Iranians will support the authorities’ efforts to repel the aggressor.
At the same time, the potential for protest remains, and when the war ends – and it will end sooner or later – Iranians will demand from the authorities, as a price for their support in repelling foreign aggression and maintaining civil peace, that measures be taken to solve the accumulated socio-economic and other problems.
– Iran has always been renowned for its ability to fight by proxy and use unconventional methods, including regional proxy forces, drones, and missiles. Now, amid strikes on its territory, the Iranians have closed the Strait of Hormuz. In your opinion, is the closure of the strait a red line, beyond which a US military operation to reopen it could follow? What specific actions might Washington take to this end, and will the Americans be able to achieve such a result?
– The Iranians have indeed blocked the Strait of Hormuz, but they are allowing ships from friendly countries, such as India and China, to pass. The Americans are vowing to unblock the strait by escorting tankers with warships and are calling on their allies to join a corresponding naval operation. For now, they are hesitating, well aware that the Iranians would likely respond with missile and drone strikes and the launch of explosive-laden kamikaze boats.
– Footage of US bases burning around the world has caused colossal reputational damage to both the Trump administration and the US military-industrial complex as a whole. What steps might America take to restore its reputation? Should we expect the US to exit the conflict in the coming weeks? And if this happens, how might the situation in the Middle East change overall?
– The US is indeed suffering serious reputational losses due to its inability to suppress Iranian resistance. In response to US-Israeli bombings, Iran is upping the intensity of its missile and drone strikes. It appears that the Americans are beginning to contemplate an exit strategy from the war, as the continuation of hostilities without significant success leads not only to reputational but also material and human losses, fuels anti-war sentiment in the US, and increases the chances of the Democrats winning the upcoming November midterm elections for the US Congress. But even if the Americans do cease military operations, the situation in the region is unlikely to stabilize if Israel, with US support, continues to fight Iran.
– You headed the Russian embassy in Iran during the presidency of Khatami, who is considered the first reformist president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and before that you worked as the Russian Consul General in Isfahan. You saw the country before the strict sanctions. Now Iran is living under conditions of total war. Tell me, how has the average Iranian citizen changed over these 20 years? What drives the ordinary Tehran student or bazaar trader now: religion, nationalism, fear, or simply a weary desire for this nightmare to end at any cost?
– Due to constant inflation, rising prices, unemployment, and the devaluation of the national currency, the standard of living for the majority of Iranians has been in rapid decline recently. The once fairly numerous middle class has visibly begun to grow poorer. The war has further exacerbated all existing problems and brought new ones. All of this greatly affects the psychology, mood, and behavior of Iranians. Usually cheerful and optimistic by nature, they are now becoming withdrawn, nervous, and focused primarily on how to survive.
– To conclude our conversation, let us touch upon the post-war order. What sort of Middle East is beneficial for Russia? American experts are discussing that even after powerful strikes, they failed to overthrow the regime in Iran, and it has consolidated. The war will, one way or another, end in negotiations. What future balance of power do you and Moscow envision? What is a priority for Russia: to preserve a weakened but grateful Iran, or to participate in creating a new security system in the Gulf that takes into account the interests of all (including the US and the Arabs), even if it comes at the expense of Tehran’s monopolistic influence?
– Indeed, today even the Americans doubt that they will be able to overthrow the Iranian regime. They may continue bombing Iran and committing other acts of aggression for some time, but Iran not only has no intention of surrendering but is also intensifying retaliatory strikes. US military capabilities are being depleted, and losses are growing. I think President Trump is already preparing a statement about the victorious conclusion of the war. Russia is interested in the swiftest end to military actions in the Middle East and the stabilization of the situation in this region. The best path to achieving peace here would be the creation of a collective security system with the participation of all regional states.
– Mr. Maryasov, we thank you for an interesting talk!
Interviewed by Yulia NOVITSKAYA,writer, journalist, and correspondent for New Eastern Outlook
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