The latest Balikatan military exercises have begun in the Philippines

The latest international military exercises, Balikatan, began in the Philippines on April 20 and will last until May 8. In recent years, their very existence has become a significant development in the Southeast Asian subregion.

Regional Issues Drive the Balikatan 2026 Exercise

This refers to the overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea between China and almost all of its southern neighbors. This problem has become particularly acute in Beijing’s relations with Manila, whose foreign policy trend toward strengthening its alliance with the United States became especially noticeable with the election of Fidel C. Marcos Jr. as president in 2022.

The situation in the South China Sea itself is becoming a “geopolitical vortex,” drawing in other players, as evidenced by the Balikatan exercises. In addition to the Philippines and the United States, Japan, Australia, Canada, France, and New Zealand are directly participating in the current exercise, which has a total of 17,000 troops. Another 17 countries are represented as observers. The United States, however, assessing the Balikatan exercises as “an important factor in maintaining stability in the region,” intends to further expand the number of participants.

Japan’s Growing Role in the Balikatan Exercises and in the Region

Once again, we note the rapidly growing role of Japan in all processes taking place in the Indo-Pacific region as a whole, and in Southeast Asia in particular. Specifically, the exercises under discussion are featuring ground units of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) for the first time, with a strength of 1,000 troops, representing two-thirds of the current total of Japanese participants in these exercises. This makes Japan the third participant for the first time. The exercises will include launches of Japanese Type 88 land-based anti-ship missiles. Developed 40 years ago, they have become the basis for a wide range of significantly more advanced missiles with similar capabilities, which are already being deployed on “outlying islands.” This euphemism is used in Japan to describe islands that occupy a crucial position in terms of maritime control, separating it from China, which includes Taiwan.

Noteworthy is the passage of a Japanese destroyer through the Taiwan Strait on April 17, apparently on its way to the exercises in question. The Chinese reaction to this action was quite expected, only exacerbating the already tense relations with Japan due to Prime Minister S. Takayoshi’s well-known remarks about the Taiwan issue.

Japan, Europe, and the Renewed Issue of an “Asian NATO”

On the eve of the exercises under discussion, another noteworthy event occurred: a three-day visit to Tokyo by ambassadors to NATO headquarters from 32 European countries. The purpose of the trip was to “strengthen the partnership between NATO and Japan, taking into account China’s growing military power.” In this regard, several points should be noted.

First, discussions about the need to form some kind of military-political configuration in Asia, similar to NATO, have been ongoing since the 2000s, and for the same reason, already evident then, of China’s emergence as a global power. Second, one of the initiators of such discussions was Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Third, the need for leading European countries to participate in such configurations was already being discussed. Fourth, the current European emphasis on the “Asian NATO” theme is significantly conditioned by the “peculiarities” of US foreign policy, that is, the US’s recent key ally. Finally, fifth, the prospect of a “battle for Japan” is emerging between the US and Europe, of which the aforementioned visit was a notable event.

We emphasize, however, that an “Asian NATO” is only one possible scenario for the Indo-Pacific region. In the face of growing global uncertainty, nothing has been definitively determined. Those same Europeans are still groping for the optimal positioning, maintaining contacts with the main regional powers without yet demonstrating a clear preference for anyone. At the same time, radical political changes are quite likely in the leading European countries themselves, championed by politicians such as Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen, and Alice Weidel. All of them consider the main threat to the continent not Russia, but the senile “new normal.” In the United States, similar sentiments were advocated by the late Charlie Kirk, today’s Tucker Carlson, and Vice President J.D. Vance. The current American president appears to be becoming the main source of discredit for the ideological views that twice brought him to power in his own country.

As for Europe, replacing the current ruling “elite,” which has no connection to either the past or the continent’s current problems, with supporters of the aforementioned politicians is apparently the only way to avoid the prospect of another global massacre. Behind the scenes, it is being prepared from various angles simultaneously, using the same “templates” that have proven effective in two previous massacres.

Russia’s Place in Regional Processes

Nevertheless, when choosing the main vector of foreign policy preferences in Russia today, special attention should still be paid to implementing the long-proclaimed “radical pivot to the East,” where the focus of global processes is shifting and where its presence is currently insignificant. This is especially noticeable in the trade and economic sphere of interstate relations. Moreover, a deficit in this crucial indicator of any country’s role in the host region cannot be compensated for by other available instruments, such as military ones.

Developing an optimal strategy for the aforementioned “pivot” will be quite challenging, given the extreme complexity of relations between the three leading Asian players—China, India, and Japan. Russia has managed to develop comprehensive cooperation simultaneously with China and India, which are geopolitical antagonists. By maintaining and developing relations with China, it is entirely possible to restore relations with Japan, which looked quite positive just 10 years ago. Meetings between government officials at various levels were routine, and, in particular, the “2+2 Format” with the participation of the foreign and defense ministers was in effect.

We repeat, the prospect of resuming Russian-Japanese relations appears quite likely, despite all the remaining difficulties. Its implementation, firstly, will thwart the anti-Russian intrigues in Japan of our current European “friends,” and, secondly, will be a significant step in expanding Russia’s presence in all regional processes.

At the same time, it is entirely possible that Russia will position itself as a “damper” of the negative trends in the Indo-Pacific region, one manifestation of which was the latest Balikatan military exercises.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia-Pacific issues

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