Bab el-Mandeb: The Gate of Tears

Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq, and, most visibly, the Houthi movement in Yemen have all publicly stated their support for Iran and have signaled their willingness to open new fronts.

What began as a direct confrontation between state actors has drawn in Iran’s network of proxies forces –the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq and, most visibly, the Houthi movement in Yemen have all publicly stated their support for Iran and have signaled their willingness to open new fronts. For global markets, the stakes are immediate and severe. The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s seaborne oil normally flows, has been effectively closed or rendered unusable by Iranian actions and the threat of further strikes. Attention has therefore shifted southward to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (literally “gate of tears” in Arabic), the narrow gateway between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden that funnels approximately 10-12% of global trade and millions of barrels of oil daily toward the Suez Canal.

Any sustained disruption here would compound the existing crisis, forcing tankers and container ships to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, which is an additional 3,500 to 6,000 nautical miles and up to three weeks of transit time. Insurance premiums, already elevated, would spike further; freight rates would surge; and oil prices, which have already climbed above $110 per barrel, could reach levels not seen in decades. The convergence of these two strategic chokepoints, Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, has analysts speaking of a potential “double chokepoint” crisis with repercussions for inflation, supply chains, and energy security worldwide.

Rhetoric, speculation, and renewed threats

Against this backdrop, Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis have moved from rhetorical solidarity to direct action. On 28 March 2026, the group launched ballistic missiles toward Israel – their first such strike since the onset of the US-Israeli campaign against Iran. Houthi officials framed the move as coordinated support for Tehran and Hezbollah, part of a broader moral and strategic commitment to the Palestinian cause and the “axis of jihad and resistance”.

The language has grown markedly sharper on the maritime front. Mohammed Mansour, Houthi Deputy Information Minister, told Al-Araby on 29 March that the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Bab el-Mandeb Strait “will be among the options” available to increase pressure on Israel and the United States. He stressed that any decision would be “carefully calculated” and would depend on the scale of Israeli and US escalation, particularly any preparations for ground operations. “We have extensive experience in naval and land operations,” Mansour added, referencing the group’s earlier campaign against Red Sea shipping in support of Gaza.

A senior Houthi figure, speaking anonymously to Reuters on 26 March, went further: “We stand fully militarily ready with all options. As for other details having to do with determining zero hour, they are left to leadership, and we are monitoring and following up with the developments and will know when is the suitable time to move.” The same source noted that the Houthis would act if Iran “is needing them the most.”

These statements echo the group’s earlier actions. Between November 2023 and October 2025, the Houthis conducted more than 100 attacks on commercial vessels, sinking two ships and forcing major carriers to divert around Africa. Although a partial ceasefire linked to the Israel-Gaza truce had paused operations, the current war has revived speculation of a full or partial blockade.

Iranian officials have added their own warnings; an unnamed military source told the Tasnim news agency that if Washington sought “stupid measures” to solve the Hormuz problem, it risked “adding another strait to their problems”.

Shipping companies have already reacted. Maersk and others paused Red Sea transits earlier in the year; the US Maritime Administration reiterated on 27 March that the Houthis “continue to pose a threat” to vessels in the Bab el-Mandeb corridor despite the lull since October 2025.

How likely is a full blockade?

A complete, sustained closure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is not the most likely immediate outcome, but the risk of severe disruption is real and growing. The waterway is narrow (only 29 km at its tightest point), yet it will not be easy to seal by a non-state actor operating without air or naval superiority. The Houthis possess an arsenal of drones, anti-ship missiles, and small boats honed during their previous campaign, and they control Yemen’s western coastline and the capital of Sanaa, just north of the strait. Their demonstrated ability to strike vessels as far north as the Saudi port of Yanbu (site of the July 2025 sinking of the “Magic Seas” bulk carrier) shows geographical reach.

Nevertheless, analysts highlight practical and political constraints. A total blockade would invite direct naval retaliation from the United States, the United Kingdom, and coalition partners already present in the region under Operation Prosperity Guardian. The US Navy has repositioned assets, including the USS Tripoli task force, to the Gulf of Aden precisely to ensure free navigation. Moreover, the Houthis have historically favored calibrated disruption, i.e. targeting Israel-linked or Western-flagged ships, over a full shutdown that could alienate Gulf Arab states or trigger a broader international intervention.

Farea Al-Muslimi, Chatham House, described the Houthis’ entry into the wider conflict as “a serious and deeply concerning escalation,” warning that the potential impact on commercial routes “cannot be overstated.” Ahmed Nagi, International Crisis Group, added that renewed attacks would “further push up oil prices and destabilize all of maritime security,” though he stopped short of predicting a hermetic closure.

In short, the Houthis possess the capability and stated intent to make the strait dangerous, but whether they possess the political will or the military capacity to impose a genuine blockade remains an open question. The answer will depend on the trajectory of the Iran war and Sanaa’s calculations.

Scenarios for the strait

Four broad pathways present themselves.

Scenario one: calibrated disruption. The Houthis resume selective attacks on vessels perceived as supporting Israel or the US-led effort, mirroring 2023-2025 tactics. Traffic slows but does not stop; insurance costs rise sharply; some carriers continue to reroute. Oil prices climb into the $120-140 range, but markets adapt through higher Saudi output via Yanbu and alternative pipelines.

Scenario two: attempted blockade and naval confrontation. In response to a major Israeli or US escalation – perhaps an attempted landing or intensified strikes on Iranian nuclear sites – the Houthis declare the strait closed to hostile shipping. Mines, missile barrages, and drone swarms render passage untenable for days or weeks. The United States and allies mount an escort operation or limited strikes on Houthi launch sites. A short but intense naval clash ensues, with significant economic fallout before the corridor is forcibly reopened.

Scenario three: deterrence and de-escalation. Diplomatic back channels, possibly involving Saudi or Omani mediation, persuade the Houthis that the costs of closure outweigh the benefits. Iran, facing its own pressures, signals restraint. The Houthis limit themselves to symbolic missile launches toward Israel while keeping Red Sea traffic under threat but not under blockade. Markets stabilize as the perceived risks recede.

Scenario four: regional conflagration. A blockade triggers cascading responses: Israeli strikes on Houthi infrastructure, Iranian attempts to interdict shipping elsewhere, and possible involvement of additional proxies. The Bab el-Mandeb becomes one theater in a multi-front war stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean. Global energy markets enter uncharted territory, with oil potentially exceeding $150 per barrel and widespread supply-chain paralysis.

Each scenario carries different probabilities and timelines, but all share one certainty: the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is no longer a peripheral concern. It has become a pressure point whose fate will help to determine whether the current crisis in the Middle East remains contained or spirals into a broader conflict with global economic consequences.

The coming days will be decisive. As one Houthi leader put it, the timing of any move “will be known when it is the suitable time.” For shippers, traders, and governments alike, that moment cannot come soon enough.

Vanessa Sevidova, post-graduate student at MGIMO University and researcher on the Middle East and Africa

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