BNP's Return: Questions about Endurance amid Geopolitical Shuffles in Bangladesh |
BNP’s Return: Questions about Endurance amid Geopolitical Shuffles in Bangladesh
In an increasingly multipolar world, battleground “endurance” relies less on the diplomatic dance and more on the actual economic revival, the restoration of internal unity, and the management of regional frictions without any flare-up of a major crisis.
Historic? Sure. The thing is, an electoral win should not be mistaken for the actual ability to govern, nor should the people’s enthusiasm be taken for a long-term policy direction.
Tarique Rahman returns from long exile to inherit an economy teetering on the precipice. Inflation has spiked to 8.9 percent (South Asia’s highest), while foreign exchange reserves haemorrhage dangerously, hammering the ready-made garments sector that accounts for 85 percent of export earnings. BNP secretary-general Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir claims a supermajority triumph while attributing Jamaat-e-Islami’s* parallel surge to AL misrule: “Whenever democracy is obstructed, extremist forces rise… that is what Awami League wrought.”
This major change also requires an analysis from a standpoint that puts the focus on sovereign multipolarity, balanced partnerships with countries like Russia, China, India, and Pakistan, rather than on being subservient to a single hegemon.
BNP comes to power with the legacy of hyperinflation, 2.7 million unemployed graduates from the 2024 Gen Z uprising, a fractious Jamaat, a dependent coalition, and the necessity of a foreign policy recalibration.
The central question isn’t electoral success; that’s already established. The real question is, can this coalition deliver stability, or will it replicate the crisis-prone tenures of BNP’s 1990s and 2000s governments?
Economic Inheritance: When Debt Meets Delusion
The economic structure of Bangladesh, which has been largely dependent on the Ready-made Garments (RMG) sector that makes up 85 percent of exports, the constant inflow of remittances from workers overseas, agriculture, which is the main source of employment for the rural population, and a pharmaceuticals industry that caters to 97% of the domestic demand, has been plunged into a crisis following the political upheavals in 2024, which resulted in the removal of Sheikh Hasina.
International predictions for Bangladesh’s GDP growth in 2025-2026 are very low, only about 3.8-4.1 percent, which is a drastic drop from the nearly 6-7 percent yearly increases that had been enabling Bangladesh to steadily move up to upper-middle-income status.
BNP takes over a banking system that is almost paralyzed due to a high proportion of non-performing loans, which are more than 10% of total lending; sees the acquisition of a deeply corrupt political machinery that had been the legacy of the AL era; and faces post-LDC graduation tariff walls that threaten RMG competitiveness in key markets such as the United States and Europe.
The party’s grand manifesto outlines the roadmap to a $1 trillion economy by 2034, envisaging the pull of foreign direct investment into small and medium enterprises, fintech innovation, ICT freelancing, and massive infrastructure projects.
But is this plan based on a real fiscal foundation?
The 2022 Sri Lanka sovereign default route is reflected in the combination of expansionary monetary policies, provision of soft credits to politically connected borrowers, and debt-financed megaprojects, while political pressures make the dilemma grow exponentially. Student-led revolts in 2024 asked for instant job creation and new governance; however, BNP in the past disapproved of the main points of Muhammad Yunus’s interim administration governance charter, and thus, they favored patronage networks over systemic anti-corruption measures.
Political instability has already led to a 50% decrease in tourism arrivals and has negatively impacted remittance inflows, which are critical macroeconomic stabilizers, while the agricultural sector is facing input cost inflation, putting pressure on rural livelihoods.
If the authorities fail to stabilize reserves, there will be a real risk of acute import shortages of essentials such as fuel and medicine, which could lead to cost-of-living protests and quickly erode BNP’s mandate, which was mostly based on anti-AL sentiment rather than a detailed economic vision.
Historical precedents don’t provide much comfort: BNP governments under Khaleda Zia in 1991-96 and 2001-06 also struggled with inflation hikes, coalition breakups, and external shocks, frequently giving in to caretaker governments or army-supported takeovers.
So, does the BNP actually have the crisis management capacity Bangladesh requires?
Coalition Contradictions: Dancing with the Jamaat
BNP’s parliamentary supermajority hinges largely on Jamaat-e-Islami’s* breakout performance of 70-78 seats, turning the formerly barred Islamists into the main organized opposition and the coalition partner that no one can do without.
BNP’s pragmatic Bangladeshi nationalism is at loggerheads with Jamaat’s pan-Islamist orientation, especially over issues like social legislation, safeguards for minority communities, and different readings of Bangladesh’s secular liberation narrative of 1971.
What happens when the disagreements become so deep that no one can take the pain anymore? Tarique Rahman’s return from exile is sure to excite hardcore BNP supporters who dream of a Ziaur Rahman-era revival. But, on the other hand, it is also bound to bring back the old corruption allegations that dated from the era when he was the party’s vice-chairman.
Internal BNP factionalism, between long-time patronage veterans and newer protest movement entrants, also makes matters more complicated, as Jamaat’s better street-level discipline enables them to push for more moralistic policies on education, family law, and public conduct. Continual upsurges in violence against religious minorities or political opponents, which are often blamed on Jamaat sympathizers or related groups, run the risk of reviving the communal tensions that marred the 2001-2006 BNP/JI coalition era.
Bengali author and human rights advocate Taslima Nasreen, currently in exile, has unequivocally cautioned that if AL continues to be prohibited, “Jamaat-e-Islami* might end up as the main opposition party; no religious party should have power counterbalance in a republic that is constitutionally secular.”
In the absence of clear limits that can effectively keep the more extremist wings of the Jamaat in check, the BNP is on the path to losing its moderate partners, thus further dividing the already polarized society and paving the way for the breakdown of the coalition from within.
India Relations: From Deference to Determined Assertion
The BNP-India relationship is the most contentious geopolitical legacy that continues to cause the most conflicts, and it is based on a mutual distrust that goes back decades. New Delhi has always viewed BNP as close to Pakistan and lenient towards anti-India militants from the Northeast. On the other hand, India’s AL friendship was based on a common memory of the 1971 liberation war, the settlement of border disputes, and strong security cooperation under the Hasina administration.
Within Bangladesh, however, public perception hardened around AL as excessively India-aligned, with Delhi guaranteeing an illegitimate regime through manipulated elections. The “India Out” campaign crystallized India as synonymous with unpopular AL policies. Hasina’s flight to an Indian refuge intensified extradition demands. How much more symbolic could the optics get?
BNP now prioritizes reciprocal arrangements on Teesta-Ganges water-sharing, border fatalities, lopsided trade, and migration controls, rejecting AL deference for sovereign assertiveness. Indian security establishments harbor deep reservations about BNP-JI affording operational space to Pakistan-sympathetic or Islamist currents threatening Hindu minorities. Regional expert Constantino Xavier captures it: “A BNP government will harden positions on security files.” For the economically strained BNP, navigating this without escalation represents a persistent test.
So, can they actually pull this off?
Russia Relations: Historical Coolness Meets Pragmatic Opportunity
The Soviet 1971 intervention, UN vetoes, nuclear flotillas deterring U.S. carriers, and arms to Mukti Bahini cemented AL-Moscow bonds that eventually turned into Hasina-era milestones like the $12.65 billion Rooppur Nuclear Plant, arms packages, and a $2.6 billion bilateral trade peak.
BNP founder Ziaur Rahman’s 1975 pivot was a drastic break: outlawing pro-Soviet parties, fixing his eyes on the U.S., China, Pakistan, Arab alignment, and condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Today, confronting Bangladesh’s 8.9% inflation crisis and reserve haemorrhage, Russia extends pragmatic continuity rather than rupture: affordable energy exports circumventing IMF austerity strictures, Rooppur operational sustainment, Bay gas, and defense technical cooperation, all offsetting external pressures on Bangladesh without demanding AL-style ideological affinity.
BNP’s historically transactional posture aligns naturally here. Russia’s debt restructuring expertise, honed through its own crises, offers valuable tools for cleansing AL-era banking rot against Bangladesh’s relatively moderate 40% debt-to-GDP ratio.
This constitutes a steady multipolar foothold fortifying diversification. But will it actualize?
China: The Preeminent Multipolar Anchor
BNP’s longstanding China affinity positions Beijing for accelerated deepening. Whereas Hasina pragmatically accommodated Belt and Road megaprojects, while subordinating them to India-first priorities, BNP’s not-so-pro-India posture creates seamless synergy for expanded cooperation in pharmaceuticals, ICT infrastructure, and logistics, buffering RMG tariff vulnerabilities.
Chinese outreach to Jamaat leadership signals pragmatic debt-recasting as mutual strategic gain against “Quad” encirclement. The South China Morning Post captures the situation succinctly: “BNP set to balance ties… without crossing Beijing’s red line”— cementing China as Dhaka’s indispensable multipolar lodestar amid Western financial stringency. For resource-constrained Bangladesh, Chinese capital inflows enable breathing room, absent IMF-Western conditionalities.
Whether BNP can maintain strategic autonomy while deepening this dependency remains a big open question.
Pakistan and Western Relations: Calibrated Balancing
BNP-JI’s traditional Islamabad affinity promises a gradual 1971 war thaw. Yunus-era maritime connectivity and AMAN naval exercises preview expanded textile trade, counterterrorism alignment, and mutual Hasina extradition interest, counterbalancing Indian preponderance. While 1971 memories linger, economic pragmatism and shared sovereignty assertions foster deepening.
But, how far can reconciliation proceed before domestic resistance arises?
Washington arrives cautiously optimistic yet circumspect: Hasina-era sanctions created distance, but Beijing’s entrenchment provokes counterbalancing imperatives. BNP’s restoration appeals theoretically, though the Jamaat partnership complicates democracy narratives. All the while, IMF negotiations impose austerity that clashes with BNP populist pledges.
Whether this delicate balancing act proves sustainable is anyone’s guess.
Fragile Horizons: Endurance Remains Unproven
BNP faces a combination of serious problems: a shrinking economy that could lead to instability, the Jamaat using political leverage to threaten secularism, and tense great power balances putting the country’s endurance to the test.
In an increasingly multipolar world, battleground “endurance” relies less on the diplomatic dance and more on the actual economic revival, the restoration of internal unity, and the management of regional frictions without any flare-up of a major crisis.
History warns: the past BNP administrations have fallen exactly on the occasions when these very pressures, internal contradictions, external shocks, and coalition fractures have arisen.
During 1991-96, the government was paralyzed by political gridlock. The 2001-06 administration fell apart amid the tensions with Jamaat and military intervention. The trends are very clear: the BNP wins the elections by mass people mobilization, faces the economic crises with which it has no capacity to resolve, and relies on coalition partners whose interests lead to disunity of government and ultimately fragmentation of the ruling party.
It is not only Dhaka that is haunted by the question of whether BNP can break this long-standing pattern of history or simply repeat it with different actors; it is also all those who wish to see Bangladesh successfully navigate multipolarity rather than becoming another cautionary tale of wasted potential.
The decision lies with BNP’s leadership and the people of Bangladesh.
Which future will they create?
* a terrorist organization banned in Russia
Tamer Mansour, Egyptian Independent Writer & Researcher
Follow new articles on our Telegram channel