Pakistan’s Approach and National Interests in the Iran Conflict and the Balance Between Iran and Saudi Arabia |
Pakistan’s Approach and National Interests in the Iran Conflict and the Balance Between Iran and Saudi Arabia
The balance between relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran remains a key element of Pakistan’s foreign policy, as the country seeks both to strengthen strategic partnerships and to preserve its role as a mediator in the tense geopolitical environment of the Middle East.
The position of Saudi Arabia and Iran
In recent years, the collaborations, consultations, and discussions between the two countries regarding ways and opportunities for joint and new cooperation have been accelerated. Pakistan’s economy is facing extensive economic bottlenecks such as the unemployment rate, lack of water and energy, and foreign debts. Pakistan’s leaders are aware of the importance of Riyadh’s investment. The population of skilled and unskilled Pakistani immigrants (nearly two million people) and their annual remittances of billions of dollars play an important role in relation. In the meantime, the recent protocol to accelerate the deployment of Pakistani skilled workers could have a role in Pakistan becoming closer to a $3 trillion economy.
Iran provided a lot of help in the Indo-Pakistan War (1965) and the crisis of 1971 AD. In 2025, Iran and Pakistan have adopted common positions on regional and international issues, from defending Palestine and promoting regional peace and sustainable development, etc. In the last year, Pakistan, along with Russia, China, and Algeria, has firmly supported and backed Tehran in the UN Security Council, and condemned the Israeli attack on Iran.
Pakistan’s national interests
In June 2025, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif described Israel as a state with “hegemonic intent” whose recent actions against Iran are “very dangerous for the region.” Even now Pakistan’s position towards Israel against Iran is sharp and critical.
Pakistan’s foreign policy is in transition from “defensive diplomacy” to “active diplomacy” in regional and extra-regional environments. Pakistan wants to take advantage of the strategic gaps between China and the United States, the Persian Gulf powers, and Iran with a multifaceted diplomacy without absolute dependence on one power. As a result, by taking advantage of its geostrategic position, it has sought to play a transnational and mediating role in geopolitical, security, transit, and energy equations.
By pursuing the role of a “mediator,” Pakistan is thinking of shifting its geopolitical weight, reducing its internal crises, and managing pressures by gaining foreign aid. From this point of view, Islamabad’s diplomacy chooses the cheapest path: maximization of flexibility and minimization of commitments searching for a set of risks. Pakistan also tends to the policy of non-commitments. Pakistan sees itself in a position to reduce the gaps and play a mediating role and reduce tensions between Iran and the United States. This role could enhance Islamabad’s international standing and have a positive impact on efforts to reduce regional tension.
It also seeks to establish superior security against China, establish networks of economic relations with the Persian Gulf, Iran, China, and the West for liquidity and investment, and become an “important geopolitical location” in the connecting routes of South Asia, Central Asia, Asia, and the Indian Ocean.
Pakistan has paid more attention to strengthening military security and security, defense training and equipment supplies, ongoing training, and commitment to further strengthen defense cooperation with Saudi.
Pakistan’s economy entered a critical phase in 2026. Heavy foreign debts, decline in foreign exchange reserves, and heavy dependence on international aid have put its economy in a fragile position. But despite its structural dependence on foreign financial resources, Pakistan does not want to be completely aligned with Saudi Arabia or the West.
For reasons such as receiving financial aid from the International Monetary Fund, Pakistan is forced to maintain these relations with the United States, but this relation will not be at the cost of weakening relations with China and Iran.
90% of Pakistan’s energy is supplied from the Persian Gulf. Pakistan is facing a structural shortage of energy, and both Iran and Saudi Arabia have supply advantages. The growing conflict in the region can affect Pakistan’s energy security.
In Pakistan, there are more than 250 million people, mostly Sunni, with a significant Shia minority. The negative effects of any regional conflict in Pakistan are significant.
Pakistan plans to create 800,000 job opportunities abroad. Any conflict and rising tension could send millions of Pakistani laborers to their home.
In 2025, one of the bloodiest years in Pakistan, the number of terrorist attacks reached almost 700; that means a 34% increase compared to the previous year. More than 95% of attacks took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan.
Any escalation of the war in the region can have a negative impact on the issue of drug trafficking, border security, and the presence of domestic radical groups.
In Pakistan, there are concerns about changing dynamics along the Pakistan-Iran border, the weakening of border control by Iran, the entry of new state and non-state actors, and Israel’s negative role in separatism.
The role of anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments in Pakistani society, confronting the “India-Israel axis,” and Iran’s popularity in Pakistan have led to wider domestic support for the prospect of mediation and diplomacy and government efforts.
The mutual strategic defense agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which was signed in 2025, in practice is not anti-Iranian.
But Islamabad does not want to be exposed to the risk of being dragged into a regional conflict and started mediating in the American war with Iran.
Sitting JD Vance (Vice President of the United States) and Baqher Qalibaf (Speaker of the Iranian Parliament) around the same table after decades of cutting off direct relations is the biggest diplomatic achievement of Islamabad.
Any escalation of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia has negative effects on Pakistan and is not in the interests of Pakistan’s regional interests.
Pakistan tries to be in a somewhat neutral position in relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan avoids being seen as pro-Saudi and anti-Iranian. Therefore, pursuing stable stability in the Persian Gulf is helping its interests.
Pakistan is still relatively trusted by America, Iran, and the countries of the Persian Gulf. Therefore, with the support of many, Islamabad is consulting with dozens of world leaders and senior officials of key capitals to achieve stability and peace in the Persian Gulf.
Therefore, it seems that Pakistan peruses Riyadh’s “self-restraint,” the necessity of “unity in the Islamic world,” maintaining sovereignty, territorial integrity, national independence, and security of Iran and the countries of the Persian Gulf, and ending the Iran-US war.
Although the Pakistan Air Force has been stationed in Saudi Arabia as part of the previous defense agreement, even in the case of Iran’s direct reaction to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan definitely does not want to be drawn into a conflict with Iran.
It seems that even if the regional tension escalates, Pakistan will try to take on defensive roles against Yemeni attacks.
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
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