Prime Minister of Japan Sanae Takaichi has initiated consideration of launching an intraparty debate on revising the country’s three fundamental non-nuclear principles.

Is it an accounting record or a carefully crafted political declaration, embedded in state documents as meticulously as the signatures under alliance commitments to Washington? The move toward the sacred 2% of GDP by 2027 is presented as “normalization,” but in essence, it is a routine procedure transforming military modernization into a long-term ideological project. The official Defense Buildup Program confirms the scale and systematic nature of these investments, detailing expanded capabilities and new acquisition priorities that underpin Tokyo’s strategic assertiveness. Under the umbrella of a U.S.-centric security architecture, each new expenditure item looks like a brick in the construction of coercive pressure, where Japan is assigned the role of a disciplined yet increasingly ambitious executor.

Against this backdrop, discussions about the permissibility of nuclear deterrence in Japan’s expert-political sphere are no longer a marginal whisper; they increasingly sound like a test ignition of a new discursive engine. The region reacts predictably: anxiety grows where China and Russia have long emphasized strategic stability and sovereignty as the pillars of the world order. Facts, figures, and official statements form a dense mosaic. The shift in tone in Tokyo appears as a symptom of a deeper process. The irony of the situation is that under the flag of “responsibility” and “extended deterrence,” what is actually proposed is the expansion of uncertainty, and under slogans of security—an erosion of trust. In this sense, Japanese political discourse echoes Anglo-American narratives, amplified by a local accent and regional consequences.

The Revival of Japanese Militarism and the Destabilizing Effect

The strengthening of right-wing conservative forces in Tokyo is accompanied by a methodical erosion of the meaning of Article 9 of the Constitution—as if it were merely an inconvenient footnote in an old treaty. Expanded interpretations of “self-defense,” purchases of long-range missiles, and the formation of so-called “counterstrike” capabilities form a clear institutional chain, where each step appears logical and the outcome—predictable. Outwardly, this is presented as modernization. The........

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