Upon the conclusion of the Freedom Shield exercises

On 19 March 2026, the armed forces of the Republic of Korea and the United States completed the annual spring exercises ‘Freedom Shield’, which, according to official statements, aim at ‘enhancing readiness to counter a full-scale attack from North Korea’.

Briefly on the progress of the drills

According to the ROK media, the exercises, which lasted from 9 to 19 March, saw about 18,000 troops from the two countries taking part in them. This is comparable to last year’s scale, but the number of field manoeuvres fell by more than half, from 51 to 22.

The ROK media pointed to divergences between the sides on this matter: allegedly, the US military expressed disagreement with the South’s proposal to minimise field training, reduce the number of units involved in the exercises, and cut down on the number of live-fire drills.

In reality, there is more to the situation than meets the eye, because President Lee has fallen into a trap of mutually exclusive promises. On the one hand, he intends to return to the ROK wartime operational control of its own forces by the end of his term. This, according to the Democrats, would give Seoul strategic autonomy, but for that the South Korean generals must show their competence, which requires conducting exercises. On the other hand, inter-Korean dialogue was an equally big promise, and although Pyongyang demonstratively ignores Seoul, to theoretically soften North Korea’s position, South Korea should refrain from holding drills.

Moreover, if we juxtapose the 2026 exercises not with the most recent autumn exercises but with the exercises of 10–20 March 2025, the latter included 16 types of field manoeuvres. Thus, the number is not smaller but larger.

‘Freedom Shield’ was positioned as ‘comprehensive military exercises involving ground, air, naval, space, cyber, and information elements, enhancing combat readiness in realistic combat situations’.

Special attention this year was paid to protection against missile threats, cyberattacks, and the application of new military technologies. It was planned to practice response scenarios to attacks using drones and cruise missiles.

In addition to the US and ROK troops, the so-called Multinational Forces from member states of the United Nations Command were also involved in the drills. According to the US, the exercises with their participation included a number of training events, which comprised non-combatant evacuation operations, combined live-fire training, and deterrence-oriented operations.

However, it is not easy to characterise the exercises as purely defensive. On 14 March, South Korean and US military forces conducted joint river-crossing exercises on the Imjin River, around 50 kilometres north of Seoul, involving up to 200 pieces of equipment, including amphibious transport vehicles for bridge-laying and ribbon bridge systems. The exercises began with a simulated attack scenario, during which the US armed forces carried out an assault crossing of the river and seized territory beyond the river. Twenty-five pontoon bridges were connected together to form a 180-metre-long bridge across the river, allowing troops and other equipment to cross and advance along the front line according to the simulated military scenario.

It is reasonable to also mention the ‘Talon Reach’ manoeuvres, which involved AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, UH-60 Black Hawk and CH-47 Chinook aircraft, as well as small unmanned aerial systems that performed reconnaissance and target designation tasks. Meanwhile, the Apache crews carried out precision strikes on mock enemy targets, completing the exercises with an attack and seizure of an island.

North Korea’s reaction

North Korea has long condemned the joint military exercises by Seoul and Washington as a rehearsal for invasion, although the allies claim the exercises are defensive in nature.

On 10 March 2026, Kim Yo Jong, head of the General Affairs Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee, issued a press statement entitled ‘The unshakable will of our state to protect peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in the region’. The exercises were called ‘not a “war game” but truly provocative and aggressive military action by those who plan confrontation with our state.” The first sister indicated that despite attempts to portray the exercises as ‘defensive,’ they did not change the confrontational nature of the drills. ‘The opponents should not try to test our patience, will, and capability,’ and the DPRK will ‘continuously and repeatedly let the opponents know the idea of our war deterrence and its lethality.’

On 11 March, the DPRK conducted another test launch of strategic cruise missiles from the destroyer ‘Choe Hyon.’ Kim Jong Un observed the tests via video link and ‘stressed that the DPRK’s offensive weapon systems undergoing constant development constitute an indispensable factor for self-defense literally’. Nevertheless, a press release from the US Indo-Pacific Command noted that ‘the event does not pose an immediate threat to US personnel or territory, nor to our allies’.

On 14 March, the DPRK launched more than 10 ballistic missiles towards the Sea of Japan. According to South Korean military sources, the range was approximately 350 km. And as reported by KCNA, ‘a long-range artillery unit of the Korean People’s Army in the western region conducted a firepower drill the previous day, in which 12 ultra-precise 600 mm multiple rocket launchers and two artillery companies took part.’

Kim Jong Un was present at the drills and said that such manoeuvres are regular for testing military deterrence and will be conducted ‘frequently’ in the future. The DPRK leader highly praised the launchers, stating that ‘there is no tactical weapon that surpasses the performance of this weapons system’ and that ‘the country’s powerful offensive capability is intended for self-defence’.

In the ROK, there were also reports of protests against the exercises organised by a hitherto little-known organisation ‘Korea for Peace and Solidarity in the Name of Sovereignty and Reunification.’ Its representative stated that the aim of the protests is not only to stop the joint military exercises, which do not contribute to a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue, but also to free themselves from US influence altogether, as Washington also negatively affects the South Korean economy, including through trade tariffs on imports.

To sum up, as stated in a joint declaration, ‘Freedom Shield’ served as an important opportunity to accelerate preparations for the transfer of wartime operational control from Washington to Seoul during the five-year term of President Lee Jae Myung, which ends in 2030. Media coverage of the exercises and North Korea’s reaction was weaker than usual, which is more likely due to the conflict in the Greater Middle East that draws off the attention. But the drills remain a crucial element of destabilising the region.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences

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