Divergences in South Korea's Inter-Korean Policy and the Demilitarized Zone Problem |
Divergences in South Korea’s Inter-Korean Policy and the Demilitarized Zone Problem
In the previous text, we examined the disagreements within Seoul’s inter-Korean policy. However, a number of conflicts that have spilled into the public revolve around contradictions between South Korea and the United States. These deserve separate discussion, as they could lead to the cooling of relations between the two countries.
It is reasonable that these internal contradictions in Korean policy are starting to raise questions in Washington as well. The commander of the US forces in Korea advocates for proceeding with exercises, and Kevin Kim, who served as acting US ambassador to South Korea up until January 2026, carried out a specific meeting with Minister Chung Dong-young, reminding him of the need to maintain sanctions pressure on the DPRK. For Washington, preserving and even strengthening sanctions is crucial for restarting dialogue with Pyongyang and maintaining leverage in future negotiations.
Furthermore, while President Lee in his statements abroad, especially during his visits to the US, emphasizes the alliance with America, domestically he, as a pragmatist and populist, often speaks in the spirit of the “strategic autonomy” faction, delaying decisions that might appear as concessions to Washington. The problem is that Donald Trump, a former real estate developer, closely watches his counterparts’ actions and does not hesitate to apply pressure if he sees partners failing to deliver on promises.
The “Trump Tariff” Problem
Analyzing the outcome of the US-ROK agreement, we pinpointed that Seoul agreed to terms unfavourable to South Korea, and that conservatives even demanded the agreement to be ratified in the National Assembly as one imposing heavy obligations on the country. This also implied that the agreement had a different status, and violating it would be a more serious transgression.
However, after signing the agreement, the ruling Democratic Party put the issue on hold, hoping for it to slip the minds of the Americans. As a result, on January 26, 2026, Donald Trump announced on social media that the US was raising reciprocal tariffs on South Korean-produced goods, including cars, lumber, and pharmaceuticals, from 15% to 25%. As the US President indicated, trade agreements are “extremely important” to Washington. However, the South Korea National Assembly has not complied with the agreement’s terms and has still not ratified it, leaving the US no choice but to raise tariffs across the board.
Seoul was alarmed, but neither a visit by the trade minister nor a trip by the prime minister yielded positive results. Consequently, on February 5, South Korea’s six largest business organisations — the Korea Enterprises Federation, the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Korea Employers Federation, the Korea International Trade Association, the Korea Federation of SMEs, and the Korea Federation of Middle Market Enterprises — issued a joint statement in support of drafting a Special Act on Investment in the United States. They warned that should the US impose 25% tariffs on Korean goods, it would seriously impact all industries. The business groups urged the ROK National Assembly to pass the bill in February so that Korean companies could avoid the tariffs. In the statement, they also underlined that the special law would preserve the global competitiveness of domestic companies and that they, for their part, would “contribute to revitalizing the economy through active investment and export expansion.”
Sovereignty vs. Security?
But the most intriguing confrontation, from the author’s standpoint, concerns the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which is under the control of the so-called Joint Command (UNC). It is often called the UN Command, though de facto it is a joint command of South Korean and US forces where the leading role belongs to the American side.
The DMZ is a territory with a special status. However, the “strategic autonomy” faction and the Democratic Party believe that the Republic of Korea should reclaim sovereignty over this zone or, at least, gain the right to send its representatives there if it holds no military significance. Therefore, on August 26, 2025, Han Jeoung-ae, chairperson of the Democratic Party’s policy committee, introduced the bill of the “Act on Support for Peaceful Use of the Demilitarized Zone”. It aims to grant South Korean authorities the right to independently permit official access to the DMZ without prior coordination with the UNC.
Han argues that this requirement unjustifiably restricts peaceful use and infringes on South Korea’s sovereignty, especially since most of the DMZ south of the Military Demarcation Line is located on the territory that is under ROK administration.
In response, on December 17, the UNC pointed out that “civil administration and emergency assistance in that portion of the DMZ south of the Military Demarcation Line falls under the responsibility of the Commander, United Nations Command.” And “neither military personnel nor civilians are permitted to enter the DMZ except for persons specifically authorised by the Military Armistice Commission.” Moreover, the DMZ’s status is defined by the 1953 Armistice Agreement, which President Syngman Rhee refused to sign at the time.
The military and conservatives also oppose the bill. As noted by retired Lieutenant General and former commander of the ROK Army Special Warfare Command Chun In-bum, the DMZ was deliberately placed under the UNC control, outside ordinary sovereign jurisdiction, to prevent miscalculation, escalation, and accidental clashes. Furthermore, under the principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept), states are not entitled to unilaterally reinterpret or alter the implementation of the concluded agreements. And given that South Korea did not sign the Armistice Agreement, changing one of its key elements through domestic legislation would almost certainly be viewed by the international community as legally dubious.
But on December 18, Minister Chung Dong-young played his trump card, stating, “The United Nations Command’s complete control over South Korean land does not align with public sentiment.”
The ROK Ministry of National Defense is attempting to propose a compromise: the South Korean military would independently control access to certain areas located south of the barbed-wire fence within the DMZ; this territory comprises about 30 percent of the southern half of the DMZ. On February 5, Lee Kyung-ho, deputy spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense, announced negotiations with the UN Command regarding the DMZ management, but the results of these talks remain unknown so far.
According to a Russian historian and journalist, Oleg Kiryanov, the dispute over the DMZ takes more than what meets the eye, revolving around something that is more important — sovereignty or security under conditions of an unfinished war. The Ministry of Unification believes that the 1953 Armistice Agreement regulates military matters and should not automatically restrict civilian or humanitarian projects in the DMZ, especially on South Korean territory. The UN Command supposes that the DMZ is a high-risk area where any action, even formally peaceful, can have military and political consequences; hence, strict access control is a way to prevent incidents.
As a UNC representative clarified, “No one disputes that the southern half of the DMZ is the sovereign territory of the Republic of Korea. The UNC is a military organization, not a state, thus not being able to claim sovereignty.” However, “if an incident occurs inside the DMZ leading to the resumption of hostilities, responsibility will fall not on the President of the Republic of Korea, but on the Commander of the UN Forces.” Therefore, “if the law is passed, a rational, logical, legal interpretation would be that the ROK government has withdrawn from participation in the armistice and is no longer bound by it.”
The author also believes there is always an unpleasant risk that some fanatical pastor might enter the DMZ on a “peace mission,” then suddenly decide to hold a peace march or a prayer service for reunification, after which they might try to cross the border and get shot from the northern side.
As for the general prospects of Washington-Seoul relations, the author has noted that President Lee’s desire to “sit on two diverging chairs” could spark a crisis in relations between Washington and Seoul — despite all the flattery directed at Trump. Populism for the domestic audience can be perceived as attempts to scheme behind one’s back because politicians like the current US President take flattery and gifts for granted, and see excessive flattery as a sign of weakness, after which they can calmly apply pressure, expecting the opponent to retreat regardless of their rhetoric.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
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