Disagreements in Seoul's Inter-Korean Policy |
Disagreements in Seoul’s Inter-Korean Policy
The question of South Korea’s unified inter-Korean strategy has already been brought up before, but the events of late 2025 vividly illustrate the deep contradictions between the country’s power factions. This conflict has long ceased to be held behind the scenes, having become public knowledge.
Two Factions: The Roots of the Disagreement
The appointment of Chung Dong-young as Minister of Unification was his key personnel decision. Chung is a symbolic figure who oversaw inter-Korean cooperation under President Roh Moo-hyun and even ran for president, having lost as a representative of his political circle. The supporters of the inter-Korean policy in the spirit of Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in have rallied around Chung, failing to realise that their time is already a bygone and that the current president is a populist and pragmatist.
However, except for Chung, none of the “old democrats” managed to obtain posts, key for defining Korea’s international politics. As a result, National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac, Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, and even Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back — all three —a dhere to a more traditional, pro-American, and realist stance.
Hence, it is possible to speak of two factions, which South Korean and some Russian experts refer to as the “Alliance Faction” (with the USA) and the “Autonomy Faction.”
The factions are tangibly colliding in several issues, with the president not taking a clear position but rather throwing only verbal support first behind one side, then behind the other. According to the supporters of the pro-American course, in the current situation, relations with the US are far more important for Seoul than those with Pyongyang, especially in view of Soeul having extremely slim chances of improving its ties with the DPRK.
Three Key Disagreements in South Korea’s DPRK Policy
There are three main areas of disagreement that have emerged in South Korea’s policy towards North Korea, with each of them having its own arguments behind it and consequences.
Military Exercises: A Tool for Peace or an End in Themselves?
The first conflict flared up around military drills conducted by South Korea both solely and together with the US.
The Autonomy Faction insists on scaling down the exercises, perceiving it as a condition for North Korea to respond to the initiatives of the Ministry of Unification and come to the negotiating table. According to Chung Dong-young, “The South Korea-US exercises are merely a means to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula, not an end in themselves.”
The Alliance Faction puts forward several counterarguments:
Operational Control (OPCON): a goal, though considered less important than the inter-Korean dialogue, is the transfer of wartime operational control of troops to South Korea. To achieve this, the military must demonstrate capability in strategic planning and logistics, which is impossible without regular drills.
The threat from Pyongyang: North Korea continues to pose a threat to Seoul; hence, from the military’s perspective, lowering combat readiness levels is unacceptable.
The support from the US: the importance of joint exercises is also emphasised by General Xavier Brunson, Commander of US Forces in Korea and the ROK-US Combined Forces Command.
In this regard, as Wi Sung-lak stated on December 7th, South Korea is not considering any adjustments to its joint military exercises. “If we want to resume dialogue, we need to think about what cards we can play. Although there are many possible options, we are not directly considering the possibility of using the South Korea-US joint exercises as an ace up our sleeve,” he noted.
Who sets the agenda: the Ministry of Unification or the Foreign Ministry?
The second conflict revolves around the right to talk through the inter-Korean agenda, including contacts with the USA, and who enjoys this particular right. The issue became even more acute after North Korea officially abandoned the “unification” paradigm at the end of 2023, proclaiming the existence of two hostile states on the Korean Peninsula.
Admitting the new reality: representatives of the Autonomy Faction, including Minister Chung, acknowledged the need to recognize this new reality. However, the “two states” concept questions the very existence of the Ministry of Unification. This ministry was created as an entity independent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dealing with internal (national) dialogue, since North-South relations were viewed not as the relations between two countries but as an internal division of one people.
The constitutional question: formally, Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea declares the entire Korean Peninsula to be its sovereign territory. Should North Korea be recognised de jure or de facto as a separate state, the engagement with it should then fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Protest from the Autonomy Faction: the Autonomy Faction actively comes out against this approach. Chung Dong-young has repeatedly underlined that the Ministry of Unification must remain the key participant in discussions on North Korean policy.
On December 15th, the Ministry of Unification stated that it would not participate in regular US-South Korean consultations, which, in its opinion, restrain or even completely hinder the development of inter-Korean relations. On the same day, six former heads of this Ministry published a statement expressing disagreement with holding the “Joint ROK-US Meeting on DPRK Policy Coordination.” They emphasized that the South Korean side at such meetings should be represented precisely by their department, not the Foreign Ministry, and publicly verbalised their support for Minister Chung, insisting on the Ministry of Unification continuing to hold the leadership in the policies regarding North Korea.
The third aspect where the stances collide centres on the sanctions against the DPRK. The “Autonomy Faction” insists that to stimulate dialogue with North Korea, it is needed to refrain from increasing pressure and, perhaps, to even ease some existing restrictions.
In this regard, Chung Dong-young has repeatedly hinted that South Korea, striving to improve relations with the North, might begin to turn a blind eye to UN Security Council sanctions or seek their relaxation. From his standpoint, international sanctions imposed on the DPRK due to its nuclear and missile programs have basically lost their efficacy. Chung is convinced that specific steps are required to demonstrate Seoul’s sincere desire for dialogue (and the author fully shares this view); otherwise, any talk of cooperation will remain lip service.
Furthermore, Chung Dong-young proposed reviving the ideas that he put forward during his previous tenure as minister. These included building a modern high-speed railway connecting Seoul and Beijing via Pyongyang and the whole North Korean territory, as well as developing tourist routes covering South Korea, North Korea, and China. Therefore, if lifting international sanctions is impossible, then at least unilateral measures introduced on May 24, 2010, should be reconsidered.
These statements provoked a reaction from the US: Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the US Embassy in Seoul, Kevin Kim, met with Chung specifically to emphasise the need to maintain sanctions against North Korea.
There is another curious moment. On December 22nd, the Ministry of Unification refuted reports from several media outlets on the alleged proposal by President Lee Jae Myung to amend the Constitution in order to provide for recognising North Korea as a separate state. The reports were dubbed “groundless and false” by the Ministry.
President Lee Jae Myung: Seeking Balance Amid Inter-Factional Disagreements
Active debates in the media, including among conservative newspapers, have not bypassed the disagreements within the ruling factions. Many place the responsibility for the current situation on President Lee Jae Myung. Critics argue that “the presidential administration must demonstrate leadership by restoring balance between coordinating actions with the North Atlantic alliance and maintaining political independence. It is necessary to correct the Foreign Ministry’s tendency to excessively follow in the allies’ wake while simultaneously reining in the unilateralism of the Ministry of Unification.”
President Lee Jae Myung himself, however, insists that each ministry having its own stance “expands the room for choice” in foreign policy. He emphasises that the key task in the inter-Korean direction is cutting down on the level of hostility between the two Koreas, even if “the room for maneuver has shrunk to the size of a needle’s eye.” At the same time, on December 19th, President Lee Jae Myung noted that “in a divided country, the role of the Ministry of Unification is extremely significant.”
Nevertheless, insider information from the administration of the President of the Republic of Korea indicates the absence of a final decision on inter-Korean policy. The President and his team “are in the process of searching for the right path, listening to various points of view.” In this context, debates and open discussion of all sides’ arguments are encouraged.
Who Will Emerge Victorious from This “Battle of the Towers”?
The jury is still out on what the outcome of this internal strife will be. Minister Chung is an influential figure, uniting those who believe that President Lee Jae Myung will ultimately fulfill his campaign promises. For the minister himself, this is perhaps the last chance to put his vision of an inter-Korean settlement into practice.
However, supporters of the Alliance Faction outnumber their opponents. The overall geopolitical situation is also on their side: on the one hand, it forces Seoul to follow in the US wake, and on the other, Pyongyang constantly declares the inability of the regime in Seoul to negotiate and calls any dialogue initiatives deceitful. From this point of view, Chung Dong-young and his supporters seem stuck in the past, failing to grasp the scale of changes in the modern world. Moreover, we should not neglect the position of Washington, which we will examine in the next article.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
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