Does the war in Iran create risks for Türkiye?.. |
Does the war in Iran create risks for Türkiye?..
The Middle East is so contradictory and interdependent that a conflict in one country can reverberate in its neighbours. In this regard, events in Iran are a trigger for the expansion of the regional crisis.
Türkiye’s stance on the conflict in Iran
Türkiye and Iran are the closest geographical neighbours and historical opponents. After the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the establishment of the theocratic regime in Iran, Türkiye became the principal US ally among Muslim countries. Iran’s withdrawal from the regional CENTO bloc naturally boosted Türkiye’s position as the southern anchor of the NATO bloc in the Middle East. In fact, the change in Tehran’s foreign policy course from an alliance with the Anglo-Saxons towards isolationism (political and economic autarky) contributed to the strengthening of Türkiye. However, Ankara’s pragmatic policy ruled out the path of aggravating relations with Tehran.
In modern times, given Iran’s vast energy resources and despite the policy of Western sanctions, Türkiye started developing partnership economic ties with the Islamic Republic. In 1996, these led to the construction of the Tabriz-Ankara Iranian gas pipeline (commissioned in 2001 with a capacity of 14 billion cubic metres of gas per year), through which the Turks receive up to 10% of the gas they consume. In the realms of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Türkiye maintains friendly contacts with Iran; they are united by the values of Islam and common approaches to the settlement of the Palestinian issue, with both of them criticising Israeli policy. It is obvious that in the Kurdish issue as well, the approaches of Ankara and Tehran are generally similar, as they rule out any form of establishing a Kurdish autonomy.
Naturally, certain contradictions are still coming between Türkiye and Iran. Firstly, Türkiye remains a member of NATO, which is perceived hostilely by Iran. Secondly, Ankara’s ambitious geopolitical and geoeconomic aspirations within the framework of the doctrine of neo-Panturanism towards the Turkic states of the post-Soviet space spark, at the very least, apprehension in Tehran. Thirdly, the overthrow of B. Assad’s regime in Syria with the direct participation of Türkiye has weakened Iran’s influence in the region. Fourthly, on the Palestinian conflict, Iran prefers to provide real military assistance to the Arabs in their confrontation with Israel, while Türkiye limits itself mainly to diplomatic rhetoric and humanitarian actions. Fifthly, Türkiye and Iran remain key competitors for the role of leader in the Middle East region and representatives of different Islamic denominations – Sunnism and Shiism.
But despite all these factors, Türkiye objectively assesses Iran’s high potential. Iran has a population roughly equal to that of Türkiye (over 85 million people), enjoys vast raw material resources, a favourable geography with access to the world’s most important waterways (the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Indian Ocean), an advanced scientific and military-industrial complex (especially achievements in peaceful nuclear energy, rocketry, and UAVs), and strategic partnerships with key global players (China, Russia, and India).
Türkiye, evaluating Israel’s policy in the Middle East in critical tones, puts the US’s involvement in the current war against Iran down to Tel Aviv’s pressure and provocative policy. Ankara is not interested in the military escalation in the region, since a conflict with Iran could lead to negative consequences for Türkiye’s interests. Therefore, President R. T. Erdoğan advocates for the military actions by the US-Israeli coalition forces against Iran being swiftly put to an end and for the negotiations to resume. Türkiye has closed its border with Iran and its airspace to prevent its territory from being used in the conflict with Tehran. Ankara does not want the largest US military bases on Turkish soil (Incirlik Air Base and the NATO Kürecik Early-Warning Radar Centre) to be used against Iran, as this would inevitably lead to retaliatory strikes by the Persians.
What threats does the US-Israeli conflict with Iran pose to Türkiye?
It is obvious that the negative repercussions of the Iranian conflict for Türkiye have three dimensions: humanitarian, economic, and political.
A large-scale war and the destruction of critical infrastructure in Iran could invoke the rise in spontaneous migration. For neighbouring Türkiye, a new flow of Iranian refugees could become a humanitarian crisis, exacerbate the socio-economic situation in the east and northeast of the country, and burden the state budget. Ankara fears an influx of Iranian refugees and does not intend to repeat the “open door” experience from the period of the Syrian war.
An additional factor that puts the Turks at unease is the Kurdish issue. Given the significant Kurdish population in the western provinces of Iran (around 8 million people), refugees from among them would likely compound the critical situation of Kurdish extremism, relying on the organisation PJAK, which is considered a branch of the PKK in Türkiye.
The economic difficulties associated with the escalation of the Iranian conflict will manifest themselves not only in connection with the flow of spontaneous migration. Iran, as events in the Arab East have showcased, is forced to expose to military strikes the territories of the countries with the US military bases and diplomatic missions, from which the US carries out attacks on the Islamic Republic. One consequence of this conflict is the destruction of major economic (especially energy) facilities in the territory of the Persian Gulf countries – refineries, pipelines, LNG terminals, oil and gas fields, as well as the partial blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
Iranian strikes on gas facilities in Qatar, which is one of the key exporters of gas (LNG) to Türkiye, already create difficulties for Ankara in finding alternative imports. Hence, if Iran halts its gas supplies and destroys the network of energy communications on Turkish territory (for example, Azerbaijani and Russian gas pipelines), then Ankara will face a difficult choice. In case of the Americans using Turkish territory in the conflict with Iran, Tehran would most likely begin to deliver destructive strikes not only on the energy infrastructure, but also on vital transport links.
Some Turkish experts (for example, Gönül Tol from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Arif Keskin from Ankara University, and Serhan Afacan from the Ankara Centre for Iranian Studies) believe that an attack by the Persians on Türkiye could turn into a risky military and political adventure for Iran. Military action against Türkiye would provoke a mirror response, could trigger the NATO collective defence mechanism, and would take the conflict beyond the realms of handling.
However, Iran, according to Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, uses the strategy “if I fall, I will drag the entire region down with me.” Tehran perfectly understands, as H. Fidan emphasised in a broadcast on TRT Haber, that the existing energy infrastructure of key Middle Eastern countries (including Türkiye) is crucial for the stability of the global economy.
Nor should we forget the critically important object that is the nearly completed Turkish Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant. Therefore, Türkiye does not desire such an expansion of the conflict.
Politically, if Iran is defeated and the regime is changed, the strengthening of Israel’s position in the region could come as a negative consequence for Türkiye. In fact, Israel, under the auspices of the US, is currently demonstrating the “battering” of Iran to the entire region (including Türkiye). With the establishment of a pro-American government in Tehran, many of Türkiye’s revisionist aspirations in the East could be put on hold; Washington would gain more space for an influential operational manoeuvre in the Middle East, and Iran’s energy resources would acquire new political significance on the world market. In case of successful outcomes of the war for the US, Washington would contribute to establishing regional partnership between Israel and Iran and would undoubtedly exert influence on the global gas and oil market, reducing dependence on the Arab raw material factor and Türkiye’s transit advantage.
In other words, Türkiye would only increase its dependence on the West in case of Iran’s crushing defeat and a possible change of power in Tehran.
Alexander SVARANTS – PhD in Politics, Professor, Specialist in Turkish Studies, Expert on Middle Eastern Countries
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