There is increasing talk of Gulf monarchies entering a war with Iran. This prospect invites not admiration but scrutiny. It would expose, in stark and unforgiving terms, the difference between purchased power and actual capacity.

Frankly, a cynic of these regimes might be tempted to welcome such a development. It would strip away the carefully curated illusion that wealth can substitute for competence, spectacle for strength, and dependency for stability. It would force the harder question of what these regimes can actually do when confronted with real conflict. For decades, they have cultivated systems that appear formidable on the surface but are hollow at their core.

What, in real terms, would they contribute? These are not societies organised around production, resilience, or civic responsibility. They are systems engineered around comfort, insulation, and the systematic outsourcing of effort to foreigners. Routine functions are delegated. Expertise is imported. Labour is externalised. The result is a culture of entitlement that has not merely softened expectations but extinguished any serious demand for self-reliance. One is left to wonder whether even the most basic habits of independence have atrophied beyond recovery. War, however, is not an outsourced service. Nor is it a spectacle that can be managed from a distance by those accustomed to command without consequence.

Routine functions are delegated. Expertise is imported. Labour is externalised. The result is a culture of entitlement that has not merely softened expectations but extinguished any serious demand for self-reliance.

It is therefore difficult to see what the regimes of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, or Bahrain would add. The conflict is already defined by the overwhelming capabilities of the United States and Israel. The Gulf regimes do not expand capability. They merely increase the noise beneath it. Their record is instructive. The campaign in Yemen, prosecuted by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, stands as a case study in inflated ambition colliding with operational inadequacy. After years of bombardment, vast expenditure, and persistent posturing, they failed to defeat the Houthis, a far less resourced adversary. The failure was compounded by reliance on foreign fighters, including Sudanese forces. They prosecuted a war they were either unwilling or unable to fight themselves.

Dominance without legitimacy in a changing world: The decline of American power

If these states now choose to escalate against Iran, they would not be demonstrating strength. They would be removing restraint. They would hand Tehran both the justification and the opportunity to strike directly at what matters most: infrastructure. These are highly concentrated, infrastructure dependent economies. Energy facilities, desalination plants, ports, and financial centres are not peripheral assets. They are the system. They are also acutely vulnerable. Sustained disruption would not require territorial conquest. It would require precision, persistence, and time. All three are readily available to a determined adversary.

Oil wealth has not simply enriched these societies. It has distorted them. It has produced a model in which comfort substitutes for capability and consumption masquerades as achievement. It has fostered what can fairly be described as a catalogue of vices rather than virtues. This wealth has insulated them from the disciplines that produce resilience. It has allowed them to postpone indefinitely the development of human capital and institutions capable of enduring strain. War does not recognise such postponements.

Oil wealth has not simply enriched these societies. It has distorted them. It has produced a model in which comfort substitutes for capability and consumption masquerades as achievement.

There is also the question of who would fight. These regimes have long relied on imported manpower, including Pakistani, Sudanese, and other foreign soldiers, to absorb the risks for security.  It is a structural confession of incapacity. It is no secret that they paid the Americans for their protection. Beneath this lies a deeper uncertainty that is rarely acknowledged. One hardly knows whether the Muslim majorities in these societies would willingly fight for family dynasties that have made common cause with an expansionist, apartheid, Zionist settler regime, one that is credibly accused of carrying out an ongoing genocide in Gaza and threatening Masjid al-Aqsa. How can a state  unwilling to expose its own citizens to war prepare for victory?

A system cushioned by privilege but lacking depth is not built for endurance. War is not a choreographed display. It is a test of organisation, discipline, and collective resolve. These are not commodities. They cannot be acquired through contracts or compensated with stipends. Every meaningful competence in these states is, to varying degrees, imported. That may suffice in times of peace. It becomes a profound liability in times of war. Capability cannot be rented. Resilience cannot be subcontracted. Survival cannot be purchased at any price.

Closing air spaces and cracking alliances: Trump’s growing problem with allies

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

© Middle East Monitor