The Gaza Technocratic Committee will fail. Why? |
It is clear that the current situation in Gaza, and what is being planned for the post-war period, goes beyond temporary administrative arrangements. It is part of a broader path related to governance and future control in the Gaza Strip. Instead of the next phase helping to stop the violence, empower Palestinians, and improve living conditions, there are increasing signs of a direction that could turn local actors into symbolic figures rather than real decision-makers.
In this context, the National Committee for Administration of Gaza (NCAG) was announced in January 2026 as a temporary Palestinian technocratic body to manage civilian services after the war. Although the idea may appear to organise daily life and begin recovery, the facts related to the committee’s formation and powers raise serious questions about its real ability to govern or even operate from inside Gaza as a key local actor.
The committee’s authority is still limited to service provision, while security and political matters remain outside its scope. Its entry into Gaza is also tied to security arrangements and to the Rafah border crossing which is controlled by external forces. This makes independent administration more theoretical than real. Even the committee’s request for full civil and judicial powers shows the gap between its declared role and its real ability to act.
The deeper problem is not only about powers, but about the framework in which the committee was designed. This framework does not prioritise empowering the committee, reconstruction, or ending the violence. Instead, it keeps the committee as a symbolic governing body outside Gaza’s territory that can be used to carry failures and pass policies. At the same time, work is underway to create a new governing structure managed through security and military coordination rather than independent Palestinian civil organisations. This model is known in political literature as civil-military transitional governance.
What has been achieved so far focuses on international representation offices and externally led security coordination centers, while the committee itself lacks a real administrative system, funding, or operational capacity.
What has been achieved so far focuses on international representation offices and externally led security coordination centers, while the committee itself lacks a real administrative system, funding, or operational capacity.
Even if these elements become available later, it is unlikely that the committee will become a real center of power. And also, it may remain an international framework operating under imposed arrangements.
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Control also appears in managing financial resources and salaries, creating economic dependency and reshaping the administrative system according to new political standards. In political science, this is called financial capture of institutions. This may include administrative and financial screening of employees, allowing the exclusion of some and the inclusion of others, reshaping the administrative structure to serve new control arrangements.
In the same direction, there are fears that Gaza’s economic and administrative planning will be designed according to imposed security and political restrictions rather than the real needs of the population. Moreover, resources are being used for media promotion and for building legitimacy for this framework through what can be described as engineering legitimacy, which is an attempt to reshape public awareness and push society to accept a new reality under the title of stability and order.
The most difficult development for Palestinian society may be the discussion of creating restricted residential environments in Rafah, based on caravan camps with harsh control conditions similar to forced isolation. This reflects a trend toward managing the population within a controlled and temporary space instead of rebuilding normal and stable life in Gaza.
In conclusion, the real challenge is not only the committee’s name or its members, but also the question of power, sovereignty, and who truly holds decision-making power.
Gaza does not only need service management; it needs a clear political path that ends the violence, guarantees reconstruction, and gives Palestinians real ability to govern themselves.
Gaza does not only need service management; it needs a clear political path that ends the violence, guarantees reconstruction, and gives Palestinians real ability to govern themselves.
So, without this, any administrative arrangements will remain only a new layer over an old reality of control, not a real beginning for a different future. No matter how organised or technocratic they appear.
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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.