Why Somaliland is a red line for African sovereignty |
The question of Somaliland is not a footnote in African politics; it is a raw nerve. It cuts through history, law and memory, exposing how easily powerful states can reopen wounds they never had to live with. To write about Somaliland is to write about Somalia itself – a country fractured by war, famine and foreign interference, yet still recognised, without ambiguity, as a single sovereign state by the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union and Australia. That consensus is not cosmetic. It is the thin legal skin holding a traumatised body together.
Somaliland declared independence in 1991, as Somalia collapsed into civil war. Since then, it has built a functioning administration, held elections and maintained relative stability compared with the south. These facts are real and deserve respect. But facts alone do not make a state. Sovereignty is not a reward for competence; it is a legal status conferred collectively, because the alternative is chaos. This is why, more than three decades later, not a single UN member state – until Israel’s recent move – had formally recognised Somaliland. The EU has been explicit: Somaliland remains part of Somalia. So has the AU, repeatedly and unequivocally.
Numbers matter. Somalia is home to more than 18 million people. Somaliland accounts for roughly 4 to 4.5 million of them. Recognition of secession would not affect only Hargeisa; it would reshape the political psychology of the entire Horn of Africa. Ethiopia alone has more than 80 ethnic groups and several restive regions. Kenya has its own Somali-inhabited areas with historical grievances. Djibouti balances on delicate clan politics. Once one border is peeled open, others begin to itch. This is why the AU, born out of the trauma of colonial partition,........