Gaza has become a scar on the conscience of the international system. With more than 72,000 Palestinians reported killed and over 1.9 million displaced at the height of the latest war, the strip stands as a symbol of immeasurable grief and diplomatic failure. In November 2025, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, backing a US-proposed plan and establishing a Board of Peace to oversee stabilisation, civilian protection, humanitarian relief and reconstruction. It is into this shattered and deeply contested landscape that Indonesia has stepped—measured, resolute, and anchored in principle.

Jakarta’s decision to join the Board of Peace has been described by its Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Yvonne Mewengkang, in precise terms: participation is not a normalisation of political relations with any party, nor a legitimisation of any country’s policy. It is grounded in the mandate of stabilisation, protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction of Gaza under Resolution 2803. That distinction matters. 

In a region where symbolism can eclipse substance, Indonesia has drawn a bright diplomatic line: engagement without endorsement; presence without capitulation.

Indonesia’s constitutional preamble declares that “colonialism must be abolished in this world because it is not in conformity with humanity and justice.” Since recognising Palestine in 1988, successive governments have anchored policy in that anti-colonial ethos. The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) has observed that Indonesian recognition of Israel remains explicitly contingent on the realisation of a Palestinian state. That position has not shifted. Instead, Jakarta argues that influence is sometimes best exercised from within the room where decisions are taken.

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Resolution 2803 envisions a hybrid body—part diplomatic forum, part planning mechanism, part fund manager—alongside a temporary multinational stabilisation force. Key Western and Asian powers hesitated to join, wary that the Board could evolve into a parallel mechanism to the UN system. Meanwhile, the UN Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territory warned that the resolution risks entrenching foreign control unless Palestinian self-determination remains central. The tension is unmistakable: can reconstruction proceed without political resolution, or does doing so risk cementing injustice in concrete and steel?

A harder question cuts through the rhetoric: who truly holds the power? If the Board decides, who guards the guardians? Palestinian agency cannot be symbolic. It must carry teeth — veto power over decisions that shape sovereignty, iron-clad control over budgets and contracts, and guaranteed seats for civil society at every table where Gaza’s future is carved up. 

These safeguards must be binding, transparent and time-bound. Without them, participation risks becoming endorsement. With them, it becomes a principle in action.

Indonesia has signalled readiness to contribute up to 8,000 personnel to a stabilisation force reportedly numbering around 20,000; these troops would perform non-offensive roles—engineering, medical support, demining, and protection of civilians. The emphasis is deliberate. In a landscape where humanitarian corridors have too often become theatres of suspicion, Jakarta insists that any deployment must be firmly anchored in international humanitarian law and transparent UN mandates.

Public opinion across the Arab world has hardened. Arab Barometer data cited in Foreign Affairs shows support for normalisation with Israel collapsing after the latest Gaza war — in Morocco alone, falling from 31 per cent in 2022 to just 13 per cent in 2023.

Public opinion across the Arab world has hardened. Arab Barometer data cited in Foreign Affairs shows support for normalisation with Israel collapsing after the latest Gaza war — in Morocco alone, falling from 31 per cent in 2022 to just 13 per cent in 2023.

Across the region, majorities still back a two-state solution, but reject diplomatic rapprochement that bypasses Palestinian sovereignty.

In this climate, Indonesia’s stance resonates beyond Southeast Asia. As the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracy, it projects an image of principled engagement that does not cross into formal recognition.

Comparisons sharpen the picture. Turkey, despite diplomatic relations with Israel, has faced resistance to any substantial role in Gaza’s post-war security arrangements. Egypt, bound by a 1979 peace treaty and sharing a border with Gaza, balances mediation with hard security imperatives in Sinai. Malaysia, like Indonesia, refuses normalisation absent Palestinian statehood, reinforcing a Southeast Asian bloc of moral consistency. Each case reveals a different calibration of power, proximity and principle.

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What distinguishes Indonesia is distance—geographical, but not emotional. Without a border or bilateral entanglement, Jakarta approaches Gaza not as a neighbour guarding its frontier, but as a middle power invoking global norms. Indonesian diplomacy on Palestine is both identity-driven and strategically calculated; it strengthens ties with the Global South, reinforces leadership credentials in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and signals that emerging democracies can shape post-conflict governance debates.

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has cautioned that if reconstruction proceeds without genuine Palestinian agency, Gaza could slide into a technocratic trusteeship.

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has cautioned that if reconstruction proceeds without genuine Palestinian agency, Gaza could slide into a technocratic trusteeship.

That prospect would erode not only Palestinian rights but also trust in multilateralism. If the Board of Peace becomes sponsor-driven, sidelining the Palestinian Authority or civil society, legitimacy will fray. If stabilisation blurs into securitisation, humanitarian neutrality could suffer.

Then comes the deeper test — the quiet danger of external capture. Reconstruction must not slide into a securitised, donor-driven administration that buries Palestinian political rights beneath layers of polished bureaucracy. 

It requires a mandate that is razor-sharp and firmly anchored in the United Nations, bound by strict rules of engagement and watched over by independent human rights monitors. It demands money that moves with integrity — channelled through Palestinian-led trust mechanisms, transparently audited, spent locally, and accountable to the people rising from the rubble. And it needs a clock that cannot be ignored: clear, binding exit triggers that return authority and resources to Palestinian institutions, or bring international involvement to a halt. 

Without these guardrails, stabilisation risks hardening into control; with them, it can safeguard the fragile space where sovereignty finally has room to breathe.

Indonesia’s stated intention is to prevent precisely that outcome. Officials have pledged to use their seats to advocate for Palestinian Authority involvement and to ensure that every stage of the process remains oriented towards a two-state solution. The language is careful but firm: cease violence against civilians, repeal violations of international humanitarian law, guarantee humanitarian access, and realise two states living side by side in peace and security.

The stakes extend beyond Gaza. From Sudan’s fragile transition to contested territories elsewhere, the model adopted in Gaza may shape future post-conflict governance. If external boards can administer reconstruction without embedding self-determination, a troubling precedent will take root. Conversely, if the Board of Peace becomes a platform where donor coordination reinforces—not replaces—local sovereignty, it may offer a template for rights-centred recovery.

This is not the reckoning of one nation; it is a test for the entire international community. Across continents and institutions, those who champion a rules-based order now face a defining question about what those rules are truly worth. 

Decades of peacekeeping missions, stabilisation efforts and post-conflict reconstructions—from the Balkans to Afghanistan, from Southeast Asia to parts of Africa—have delivered a painful lesson: force without legitimacy is brittle, and reconstruction without justice is hollow. Stability cannot be engineered through security frameworks alone; it must be anchored in dignity, rights and political inclusion. 

If Gaza is rebuilt without restoring Palestinian agency, the foundations will crack again. The world knows this truth. The question is whether it will finally act on it.

In the end, Indonesia’s presence on the Board of Peace is neither capitulation nor a cure-all. It is a wager—that principled participation can bend outcomes towards equity; that reconstruction can proceed without erasing claims to statehood; that diplomacy need not be binary. Whether that wager pays off will depend less on rhetoric than on structures: who holds authority, who controls funds, who writes the rules.

Gaza does not need another layer of bureaucracy. It needs dignity restored, homes rebuilt, schools reopened, and a horizon that stretches beyond checkpoints and ceasefires. If the Board of Peace becomes a stepping stone to that horizon, Indonesia’s gamble will have been justified. If it becomes a substitute for sovereignty, history will judge it harshly.

Gaza does not need another layer of bureaucracy. It needs dignity restored, homes rebuilt, schools reopened, and a horizon that stretches beyond checkpoints and ceasefires. If the Board of Peace becomes a stepping stone to that horizon, Indonesia’s gamble will have been justified. If it becomes a substitute for sovereignty, history will judge it harshly.

For now, a middle power from the Indo-Pacific has chosen to stand in the tension between engagement and endorsement, seeking to anchor stabilisation in law and reconstruction in rights. In a world weary of grand declarations, that quiet insistence on principle may prove more radical than it first appears.

OPINION: Indonesia must not let Gaza’s reconstruction bypass Palestinian rights

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