Iraq’s militias cannot be understood as mere security actors or as simple extensions of regional power politics. Rather, they represent a fully formed political economy that emerged from the wreckage of the state and evolved into a cross-border network of interests. This network is not governed by ideology or loyalty, but by the logic of the market. 

Iraq’s militias are no longer part of the chaos; they have become its very architecture. From the moment they appeared as parallel forces to the state, it was clear that they were not founded on doctrine or political vision, but on the vacuum left by collapsing institutions. Starting as mercenaries carrying out sectarian killings and kidnappings, they grew into networks feeding on institutional decay and eventually transformed into autonomous actors accountable only to the opportunities available to them. What was once misread as ‘loyalty’ to Iran or ‘resistance’ against its enemies was, in reality, a misunderstanding of entities that recognise commitment only insofar as it guarantees profit.

The most telling irony is that Iran itself was the first to discover the limits of its influence over these groups.

When Tehran informed Baghdad that a Shia faction operating in Kirkuk had been involved in smuggling Israeli-made drones into Iranian territory during the twelve-day war launched by Israel and the United States, it was conceding that the network of proxies it had built no longer functioned as a loyal network so much as revealing a security breach.

When Tehran informed Baghdad that a Shia faction operating in Kirkuk had been involved in smuggling Israeli-made drones into Iranian territory during the twelve-day war launched by Israel and the United States, it was conceding that the network of proxies it had built no longer functioned as a loyal network so much as revealing a security breach.

The suspected faction — either Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, or the Badr Organisation, led by Hadi al-Amiri — used its security position in Kirkuk to cross into Diyala and conduct smuggling operations against the state it claims to defend.

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The shift is profound: the proxy created to serve its patron has become capable of acting against it when financial incentives lie elsewhere.

While Iran arrived late to this realisation, Turkey reached it earlier. Intelligence obtained by authorities in Erbil revealed that Turkey was involved in recruiting Shiite Turkmen factions in Kirkuk to provide Israel with targeting coordinates for strikes deep inside Iran. This demonstrates that militias are no longer the instruments of a single state, but rather tools available to any state. They are neither ‘loyalist’ nor ‘resistance’ forces — they are flexible security brokers offering services to the highest bidder. This is not a deviation from their nature, but rather the essence of their structure: entities without a centre, without doctrine and without binding commitments, moving according to opportunity rather than alliance.

Former Iranian foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, captured this reality with unusual candour at the Doha Forum, saying: ‘These groups never fought for Iran’s interests. Every bullet they fired was for their own interests”.

Former Iranian foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, captured this reality with unusual candour at the Doha Forum, saying: ‘These groups never fought for Iran’s interests. Every bullet they fired was for their own interests”.

This remark provides the analytical key to understanding the phenomenon. A militia is not an ideological organisation, but rather a security company born from state collapse that has gradually transformed into an independent actor. This is why these groups vanished during the recent Israeli and American strikes, leaving Iran to face unprecedented isolation. Militias do not die for anyone; they disappear when the market shifts.

This transformation did not begin today. Since 2003, militias have shifted from viewing violence as an identity marker to viewing it as an economic activity. They started with sectarian killings, then expanded into Syria as part of the war machine, before realising that trafficking drugs from Syria and Lebanon was more lucrative than fighting on the battlefield.

Ultimately, they realised that infiltrating Iraqi state institutions was even more lucrative than smuggling. Thus, the gun for hire became a cheque book containing contracts, protection rackets, money laundering schemes and influence inside ministries and border crossings.

Ultimately, they realised that infiltrating Iraqi state institutions was even more lucrative than smuggling. Thus, the gun for hire became a cheque book containing contracts, protection rackets, money laundering schemes and influence inside ministries and border crossings.

They no longer operate outside the state; they now operate from within it, using its institutions as a façade for a parallel economy.

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The visit of the US Special Envoy for Syria and Lebanon, Tom Barrack, to Baghdad this week signalled a moment of market recalibration. His message to Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani was clear: Washington will not engage with a government formed by Iran-backed militias or their political fronts. This is not merely a political stance, but a redefinition of the rules. The United States recognises that these groups are no longer merely instruments of Iran, but rather independent actors who can shift their allegiance to whichever power offers them protection or funding. So it is no surprise that Qais al-Khazali, who is listed on the U.S. terrorism sanctions list, has suddenly declared his support for ‘monopolising arms in the hands of the state’. Khazali has not discovered the virtues of the state; he has discovered the weight of pressure and the profitability of being inside the government rather than outside it.

Ultimately, Iraq’s militias are neither ideological projects nor strategic extensions of a regional state. They are transactions whose terms change depending on who is paying. Iran used them in Iraq and Syria, after which they turned to drug trafficking. They then embedded themselves inside state institutions to facilitate major corruption deals, and they are now preparing for a new phase: aligning with whoever can offer them protection or financial reward. Iraq is not a battlefield for militias; it is a marketplace for those who purchase their services. The core of this transformation is that the militia, which began as a gun for hire, has become a cheque book in a political economy that recognises neither loyalty nor principle, only profit.

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