By the time Gaza entered 2026, the numbers told a story that headlines could not contain. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reported that 64 per cent of mobile towers were out of service. Paltel, the territory’s largest operator, had lost roughly 80 per cent of its more than 500 cell towers. 

The telecommunications sector’s market value collapsed by 89 per cent in a single year, from 13 million dollars in 2023 to just 1.5 million in 2024. In Rafah, mobile coverage sank from near-universal access to just 27 per cent. Reconstruction of the sector alone is now estimated at a minimum of 90 million dollars, with total losses exceeding half a billion.

These figures describe a deliberate, systematic dismantling of Palestinian connectivity. They do not describe collateral damage.

Since the siege began in 2006, Israel has repeatedly bombed transmission stations, restricted the import of fibre optic cables and confined Gaza to outdated 2G mobile technology while permitting 4G in the occupied West Bank.

Since the siege began in 2006, Israel has repeatedly bombed transmission stations, restricted the import of fibre optic cables and confined Gaza to outdated 2G mobile technology while permitting 4G in the occupied West Bank.

The June 2025 blackout, which left more than two million people digitally isolated for three consecutive days, was not an anomaly. It was the logical extension of a policy that treats Palestinian communication as a privilege to be switched off at will.

And yet, somehow, Gaza stayed online. A new case study published in January 2026 by the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, in partnership with Global Communities and funded by the Swedish government, documents how. It is a story that deserves far wider attention than it has received, because it rewrites what we think we know about digital resilience under occupation.

When formal infrastructure collapsed, a sprawling network of informal internet service providers, or ISPs, stepped into the void. These were not tech unicorns or humanitarian start-ups. They were neighbourhood operators running rooftop antennas, displaced engineers rebuilding networks from inside tents, and reseller cooperatives that had previously operated at the margins of the licensed........

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