Some questions concerning Indonesia’s 8,000 troops in Gaza |
At the inaugural Board of Peace meeting in Washington, President Prabowo Subianto pledged that Indonesia would send 8,000 or more troops to join an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza. Standing beside U.S. President Donald Trump, he expressed confidence that real peace could be achieved and that Indonesia was ready to help make it work.
Soon after, Indonesia was named Deputy Commander of the force. ISF Commander Major General Jasper Jeffers announced that Jakarta had accepted the role. Foreign Minister Sugiono said Indonesia’s leadership position would strengthen its contribution and help safeguard its troops. He stressed that established international standards would protect personnel welfare and that Indonesia would push for clear mandates and rules of engagement. He also clarified that the appointment had no connection to diplomatic normalization with Israel.
These assurances invite further questions.
Leadership titles do not substitute for legal clarity. Under what binding mandate will this force operate? The Board of Peace is not a United Nations body. There is no publicly confirmed Security Council resolution authorizing the deployment. If this mission sits outside a United Nations framework, what legal protections shield Indonesian troops if hostilities resume? Who ultimately defines the rules of engagement?
If Indonesia must still push for clear mandates, does that mean those mandates are not yet settled?
Indonesia’s peacekeeping record has relied on neutrality under United Nations command. This mission is different. It is driven by a U.S. initiated structure. Without a United Nations umbrella, reimbursement mechanisms remain uncertain. Under U.N. peacekeeping, part of the logistical and operational costs can be reimbursed through assessed contributions. Outside that system, Indonesia may bear the full financial burden.
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The fiscal context is tight. The 2025 state budget deficit has reached 2.92 percent, above the 2.53 percent target. The 2026 target stands at 2.68 percent. Defense spending has steadily increased. Deploying 8,000 personnel will expand it further.
What is the projected total cost?
Moving 8,000 troops requires large scale air and sea transport of personnel and heavy equipment, armored vehicles, medical facilities, tents and engineering tools. Sustained operations require fuel, food, water, spare parts and medicine.
Gaza’s infrastructure is heavily damaged. Indonesian forces would likely need to build independent systems, base camps, distribution hubs, field hospitals, temporary airstrips, warehouses, cold chain storage, generators or solar units and secure communications networks.
Gaza’s infrastructure is heavily damaged. Indonesian forces would likely need to build independent systems, base camps, distribution hubs, field hospitals, temporary airstrips, warehouses, cold chain storage, generators or solar units and secure communications networks.
These demand significant upfront investment and long term funding. Has the government released a detailed fiscal breakdown?
What is the political framework?
Has there been unified Palestinian consent? Gaza remains under blockade. Political factions have warned against foreign forces imposed without broad agreement. If major Palestinian actors reject this arrangement, would Indonesian troops proceed regardless? On what moral basis would Indonesia deploy into Palestinian territory without clear, collective approval?
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Indonesia has long supported Palestinian self determination. That support has centered on opposition to occupation and affirmation of equal rights. Any deployment must advance those principles. If stabilization simply freezes an unequal status quo, it risks managing conflict rather than resolving it.
What exactly will Indonesian troops do?
Will they guard aid corridors, supervise reconstruction or enforce disarmament? If stabilization requires confronting Palestinian armed groups, would Indonesian soldiers be placed in direct conflict with Palestinians? If coordination with Israeli forces becomes operationally necessary, how will that align with Indonesia’s consistent stance against occupation policies?
Will they guard aid corridors, supervise reconstruction or enforce disarmament? If stabilization requires confronting Palestinian armed groups, would Indonesian soldiers be placed in direct conflict with Palestinians? If coordination with Israeli forces becomes operationally necessary, how will that align with Indonesia’s consistent stance against occupation policies?
The foreign minister has stated that this appointment does not signal diplomatic normalization with Israel. That clarification addresses one concern. It does not resolve the broader perception risk. Because the initiative originates outside the United Nations and is closely associated with Washington, Indonesia may be viewed as aligning with a particular geopolitical framework. How does that square with the independent and active foreign policy doctrine that Jakarta has long upheld?
There are also strategic trade offs at home. Eight thousand personnel approximate a full brigade, potentially including elite units. Indonesia faces rising tensions in the North Natuna Sea and intensifying competition across the Indo Pacific. How will domestic readiness be maintained if substantial forces are committed to a prolonged mission abroad?
Solidarity with Palestine carries moral weight in Indonesia. That weight comes from consistency. Palestinians seek genuine sovereignty and equal political rights, not indefinite stabilization under external supervision. If this mission does not clearly anchor itself in a political horizon that ends blockade and secures full rights, Indonesia risks lending its name and soldiers to a process that preserves imbalance.
Before deployment begins, the government should publish the legal mandate, command structure, cost projections and explicit political objectives. Leadership roles and assurances of welfare are not substitutes for transparency.
Without those answers, 8,000 troops look less like a step toward justice and more like an open ended commitment whose risks, financial, strategic and moral, remain insufficiently examined.
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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.