IMEC vs INSTC: The emerging battle over Middle Eastern energy corridors |
The Middle East is no longer merely a producer of energy; it is fast becoming the epicentre of a new geopolitical contest over corridors, connectivity and control. The launch of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) has signalled more than an infrastructure project. It represents a strategic attempt to redraw trade and energy routes in ways that could alter the region’s geoeconomic balance for decades.
At the same time, the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), in which Iran plays a pivotal role, offers an alternative model of connectivity linking India to Russia and Europe via Iranian territory. What we are witnessing is not simply competition between logistics networks. It is a corridor war with profound implications for energy diplomacy, regional influence and strategic autonomy.
IMEC, backed by India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and supported by Western powers, is designed to connect Indian ports to the Gulf, then onward via rail and maritime routes to Europe. Although officially framed as a trade and infrastructure initiative, its deeper logic lies in energy and strategic realignment. The corridor is expected to facilitate the movement of clean energy, hydrogen exports and potentially electricity interconnections between the Gulf and Europe. In doing so, it embeds Gulf producers more firmly into Western supply chains while offering India an alternative to routes passing through Iran.
READ: India to buy oil from Venezuela, not Iran: Trump
INSTC, by contrast, runs through Iran and positions Tehran as a central transit hub linking South Asia to Eurasia. It shortens shipping times between India and Russia and offers a land bridge that bypasses chokepoints such as the Suez Canal. More importantly, it enhances Iran’s geoeconomic relevance at a time when sanctions have constrained its energy exports. By transforming geography into leverage, INSTC has been one of Iran’s most significant strategic assets.
The tension between these two projects is not necessarily direct confrontation but structural competition. IMEC reduces reliance on routes that involve Iran, thereby weakening Tehran’s transit leverage. If Gulf states increasingly align with IMEC infrastructure, Iran risks marginalisation from emerging trade and energy networks that could shape the next phase of regional integration.
Energy diplomacy sits at the heart of this rivalry. Gulf states are repositioning themselves as leaders in green hydrogen, renewable electricity exports and strategic logistics. Saudi Arabia’s NEOM project and the UAE’s renewable investments are not isolated initiatives; they are part of a broader strategy to secure post-oil relevance. IMEC complements this by embedding Gulf energy transitions within a larger geopolitical framework that aligns with Western and Indian interests.
Iran, meanwhile, retains structural advantages that IMEC cannot easily replicate. Its geography provides the shortest overland access between the Gulf and Central Asia, as well as between India and Russia. Its ports, including Chabahar, offer strategic depth that remains attractive for India, particularly in balancing Chinese influence in Pakistan’s Gwadar port. Moreover, INSTC aligns with Russia’s pivot towards Asia following Western sanctions, strengthening Tehran’s partnership with Moscow.
However, Iran faces internal and external constraints. Infrastructure gaps, financial limitations and sanctions-related risks reduce the full operational capacity of INSTC. Without accelerated investment, regulatory reform and diplomatic engagement, the corridor’s potential may remain underutilised. The corridor war is therefore not merely external competition; it is also a test of domestic policy coherence.
READ: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey seek regional defence pact amid fears of Israeli domination
Another dimension of this contest lies in security. Maritime chokepoints in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz have demonstrated vulnerability in recent years. Alternative corridors are not only economic instruments but also hedges against geopolitical disruption. IMEC offers diversification away from unstable routes, while INSTC provides resilience through overland connectivity. In an era marked by supply chain shocks, redundancy equals power.
The corridor rivalry also intersects with great power politics. For the United States and Europe, IMEC reduces reliance on routes linked to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and diminishes Iran’s strategic leverage.
The corridor rivalry also intersects with great power politics. For the United States and Europe, IMEC reduces reliance on routes linked to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and diminishes Iran’s strategic leverage.
For Russia and, to some extent, China, INSTC complements efforts to construct a multipolar trade architecture less dependent on Western-controlled systems. The Middle East thus becomes a chessboard where connectivity itself is weaponised.
For Russia and, to some extent, China, INSTC complements efforts to construct a multipolar trade architecture less dependent on Western-controlled systems. The Middle East thus becomes a chessboard where connectivity itself is weaponised.
Yet framing the issue as a zero-sum struggle may oversimplify reality. There remains potential for pragmatic coexistence. Energy markets are expanding, not contracting. Europe’s transition away from Russian gas, India’s growing energy demand and the Gulf’s diversification strategies create space for multiple corridors to operate simultaneously. The key question is whether political mistrust will override economic rationality.
For Iran, the policy implications are clear. First, accelerating INSTC implementation must become a national priority. Infrastructure bottlenecks, customs inefficiencies and regulatory uncertainty undermine strategic credibility. Second, energy diplomacy should integrate transit diplomacy. Gas exports, electricity interconnections and hydrogen cooperation can reinforce corridor relevance. Third, engagement with Gulf states should not be viewed solely through the lens of rivalry. Selective cooperation may reduce isolation and open space for hybrid connectivity models.
For Gulf countries, IMEC offers strategic depth but also risk. Overreliance on a single geopolitical alignment could expose them to shifting great power dynamics. Balancing corridor participation with diversified partnerships will be essential to maintain autonomy.
Ultimately, the battle between IMEC and INSTC is about more than transport. It is about who shapes the architecture of regional integration. In a world where energy flows increasingly intertwine with digital infrastructure, supply chains and geopolitical alliances, corridors define influence.
The Middle East stands at a crossroads. It can become a passive transit zone shaped by external powers, or it can leverage geography to craft a more balanced, multipolar connectivity order. The outcome will depend less on announcements and more on execution, coordination and political will.
Energy diplomacy, once confined to oil contracts and pipeline routes, now encompasses logistics, data flows and green transitions. The corridor war is the next chapter in this evolution. How regional actors respond will determine not only trade routes but also the future balance of power across the Middle East.
OPINION: After oil, before stability: The Middle East’s energy dilemma in a multipolar world
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.