The resumption of Iran–US nuclear negotiations in Oman represents a pivotal moment for global nuclear safety. The airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan in June 2025 showed the vulnerability of global nuclear infrastructure. It is the need of the hour that the diplomacy goes beyond uranium enrichment limits and verification measures and includes enforceable legal, technical, and operational protections. The central question is whether the Oman negotiations can create a framework that ensures nuclear security, prevents coercive military action, and preserves the credibility of the global nonproliferation regime.

The Oman talks mark the significant diplomatic contact between Tehran and Washington since efforts to revive the JCPOA collapsed. Iran and the United States resumed nuclear negotiations in Muscat, mediated by the Omani government, after months without direct engagement following the 2025 strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Oman serves as a neutral intermediary with a long history of hosting quiet diplomatic contact between Tehran and Western powers, and Muscat has been chosen by both sides to keep the agenda focused on nuclear issues. The 2026 talks include senior diplomats and security officials from both countries, reflecting how closely nuclear diplomacy now connects with broader regional military tensions. Earlier rounds focused mainly on enrichment limits and sanctions relief.

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Past agreements such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) addressed technical limits on Iran’s nuclear program but failed to guarantee physical security. The JCPOA set a cap of 3.67 percent U-235 enrichment, reduced installed centrifuges from approximately 19,000 to 6,104, and limited enriched uranium stockpiles to 300 kilograms. It extended Iran’s breakout time from months to nearly a year and allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor declared sites and facilities. Yet, the agreement did not provide legal or operational safeguards against unilateral military strikes. The June 2025 airstrikes, conducted by Israeli and US forces, reportedly destroyed Iran’s key centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure. It gave the message that verification of enrichment alone cannot guarantee nuclear safety. Iran’s nuclear program is technologically sophisticated, with facilities containing sensitive materials that could cause widespread radiological harm if attacked. If strikes on safeguarded facilities become normalised, other states could also justify similar actions under a preventive doctrine. Hence, it is about time that negotiators embed explicit legal and operational protections for safeguarded nuclear facilities within a future framework to prevent the erosion of established nonproliferation norms. Oman negotiators need to embed facility protection into any future framework, and make nuclear safety a non-negotiable component alongside compliance and verification.

The 2025 Israeli strikes also underscore the urgency of integrating nuclear security measures into diplomacy as provided by international law. The United Nations Charter explicitly prohibits the use of force against a sovereign state without Security Council authorization, or a clear, imminent threat under Article 51 of UN charter. Preemptive strikes on nuclear facilities in the absence of an imminent armed attack are generally considered unlawful under international law. Under Article 51, self-defence is permitted only in response to an actual armed attack, provided that measures taken are reported to the Council immediately. The June 2025 strikes did not meet this criteria, and international law does not allow preventive or anticipatory self-defence based on hypothetical threats. The IAEA, and Iran’s UN envoy, as well as many legal scholars, condemned the strikes as violating Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and norms protecting nuclear installations. The Pentagon and Israeli claims that the attacks “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program are disputed, with evidence suggesting that significant components survived and enrichment could resume within months.

The Geneva Conventions, including Additional Protocol I, prohibit targeting “installations containing dangerous forces” such as nuclear facilities when attacks risk severe civilian harm.

The Geneva Conventions, including Additional Protocol I, prohibit targeting “installations containing dangerous forces” such as nuclear facilities when attacks risk severe civilian harm.

Israel’s attacks reportedly killed nuclear scientists and civilians, striking residential areas and violating the principle of non-use of force. The suspension of Iranian cooperation with the IAEA following the strikes further limited oversight. Attacking safeguarded facilities risks radiological releases, undermines verification regimes, and highlights the disproportionate use of force under the guise of preemption. These circumstances show the need for binding legal and operational safeguards. The Oman negotiations should explore mechanisms such as confidence-building measures, notification regimes, and reaffirming protections under international humanitarian law to strengthen nuclear safety and compliance.

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Global nonproliferation relies on the principle that restraint and compliance provide security. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty rests on a three-part bargain. Among them, the NPT-recognised non-nuclear weapon (NNWS) states agree not to develop weapons, and nuclear weapon states (NWS) commit to disarmament, while all states retain the right to peaceful nuclear energy under verification. This framework is under strain. The INF Treaty ended in 2019, Open Skies collapsed with U.S. and Russian withdrawals, New START expired in February 2026 without replacement, and the CTBT remains unenforced. Yet the problem is not regime decay alone, but the perception of selective enforcement and unequal application of nonproliferation norms.

Under these circumstances, attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure risk sending the message that compliance with non-nuclear commitments does not guarantee protection from coercion or military action.

Under these circumstances, attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure risk sending the message that compliance with non-nuclear commitments does not guarantee protection from coercion or military action.

Iran’s case reinforces the view that some states are penalised despite remaining within the NPT framework, while others outside it face limited consequences. The Oman talks must produce robust agreements linking compliance with safety, guaranteeing that peaceful nuclear activities cannot be disrupted by force. This is necessary for Iran and for preserving the integrity of the global nonproliferation regime.

The inclusion of military leadership in the 2026 Oman talks reflects the intertwined nature of coercion and diplomacy in modern nuclear negotiations. The presence of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) commander alongside diplomatic envoys, and the deployment of a carrier strike group in the region, demonstrates Washington’s intent to combine deterrence with negotiation. Despite that this integrated approach increases pressure on Iran, it cannot replace structural safeguards for nuclear facilities. If unilateral military action were normalised as a tool to enforce compliance, the risk of escalation would increase, and not only threaten Iran’s nuclear program but also the wider region. Physical attacks on nuclear sites could provoke retaliation, interrupt verification, and trigger broader conflicts with transnational consequences. Therefore, the Oman negotiations must incorporate technical, legal, and operational protections into a single framework that ensures that compliance is inseparable from security and risk reduction.

US and Israeli military assessments claim that the 2025 strikes degraded Iran’s nuclear program by one to two years, but satellite imagery and IAEA reports indicate that critical components survived, including uranium stockpiles which were perhaps displaced to underground locations. The strikes destroyed facilities under constant IAEA surveillance, and left the program in partial darkness by complicating international oversight. This reinforces the need for a negotiated framework that guarantees nuclear facility protection alongside verification, and ensures that compliance cannot be rendered meaningless by military intervention.

The Oman talks are about far more than uranium enrichment levels or sanctions relief. They test whether diplomacy can effectively protect nuclear facilities, reduce the risk of conflict, and preserve the credibility of the global nonproliferation framework. The JCPOA’s failure to provide physical safeguards allowed attacks that endangered people and regional stability. The June 2025 strikes demonstrated that technical compliance is insufficient without legal, operational, and diplomatic guarantees. Negotiators in Oman have a unique opportunity to create a framework that ensures nuclear safety, enforces verification, and integrates facility protection into global security norms. 

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