On 28 February, in the middle of ongoing nuclear negotiations, the US and Israel launched an attack aimed at regime change in Iran. They achieved some tactical objectives by extensively striking 13,000 civilian, political, economic and military targets, nearly 18 times more than when the US-led coalition attacked Iraq in the first Gulf War (1990-91).

However, the airstrikes did not achieve their strategic objective of regime change. Instead, the US shifted toward threatening to push Iran “back to the Stone Ages” by targeting key civilian infrastructure and trying to control over its oil resources. These ambitious goals remain unmet, and both Washington and Tehran have agreed to a 14-day ceasefire while starting a new round of negotiations in Pakistan, with both sides maintaining maximalist demands.

Both parts left Pakistan without any deal, signalling what William Zartman terms a “mutually hurting stalemate”—a situation in which both sides come to recognize that the costs of continued fighting overshadow any feasible gains. Until that point is reached, the conflict is likely to persist as a prolonged war of attrition. However, negotiations may continue in the days ahead.

A clear indication of the war of attrition is the imposition of a blockade. On Monday, Trump announced that the US military would initiate blockading all maritime traffic entering and leaving Iranian ports.

A blockade is a wartime naval measure that physically cuts off a country’s trade and access to goods, enforced by military force and regarded under international law as an act of war. Sanctions, by contrast, are non-military economic and financial constraints used to pressure states without direct armed conflict. However, cases such as Iraq, Cuba, and Venezuela suggest sanctions can sometimes pave the way toward blockades.

This raises the question: if airstrikes that reportedly killed 3,753 people in Iran—including women and schoolchildren—failed to bring about regime change, could a blockade practically achieve that goal?

This raises the question: if airstrikes that reportedly killed 3,753 people in Iran—including women and schoolchildren—failed to bring about regime change, could a blockade practically achieve that goal?

The Trump administration is using the blockade as a leverage to force Iran into reopen the Strait of Hormuz — a waterway that was freely open before the US-Israeli attacks began in February. Nevertheless, the blockade strategy is challenged by its own contradictions in both timing and scope.

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In terms of timing, the longer the blockade continues, the deeper its impacts on the global economy. The war has disrupted global trade, destabilized energy markets, and spread economic strain worldwide. Paradoxically, this dynamic works in Iran’s favour: by globalizing the pain, a prolonged war of attrition becomes a survival strategy rather than a weakness.

Covering the entirety of Iran’s coastline — including ports and oil terminals — and applying to all vessels regardless of flag, the blockade’s wide scope creates significant vulnerabilities. Intercepting ships bound for or departing from Iranian ports — including those of China, Iran’s largest oil buyer — risks provoking substantial diplomatic or even military escalation. At the same time it brings US ships within range of Iranian missiles and drones, putting American military personnel in direct danger.

Despite its strategic shortcomings, the blockade could still exert meaningful pressure on the Iranian economy already weakened by decades of devastating sanctions and the wartime destruction of critical infrastructure— by cutting off oil revenues vital for reconstruction and costing the country an estimated $150 million a day. 

Kpler data suggests that more than 180 million barrels of Iranian crude remain at sea by the shadow fleet, representing a source of substantial revenue. In a war of attrition where security remains uncertain, however, such funds are more likely to be directed toward state survival than for rebuilding damaged infrastructure.

This is precisely why the Trump administration has focused on Iran’s toll system. It is expected that Iran receives a fee of $1 per barrel on vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, potentially generating an estimated $70–80 billion annually. Iranian officials have stated explicitly that these funds would be directed toward rebuilding infrastructure damaged in the war.

Existing analyses of the US-Israeli war on Iran frequently overlook the sanctions-driven damage to Iran’s core infrastructure. The post–Gulf War Iraq case is instructive: strikes targeted civilian infrastructure Iraq could not repair without foreign help, amplifying the long-term economic and psychological effects of sanctions and crippling infrastructure essential to an industrial society, pushing Iraq’s economy back to 19th century.

Trump’s claim that Iran has been set back by decades highlights the intentional targeting of civilian infrastructure. However, this has not produced regime change. Instead, it is ordinary Iranians who bear the burden—enduring the daily hardships of sanctions while bracing for the compounded psychological impact of damaged infrastructure and the prospect of a blockade.

The blockade unlikely reopens the Strait of Hormuz, let alone bring about regime change. The shift from aiming for regime change to just reopening the strait says a lot—it appears less like a coherent strategy and more like a rushed move to escalate while trying to find an exit.

The blockade unlikely reopens the Strait of Hormuz, let alone bring about regime change. The shift from aiming for regime change to just reopening the strait says a lot—it appears less like a coherent strategy and more like a rushed move to escalate while trying to find an exit.

The blockade also suffers from a lack of the international backing necessary for and effective enforcement. Cuba and Venezuela show the limits of this strategy. Despite facing a US blockade since 1960, Cuba has remained socialist — while the case of Venezuela, where a US naval blockade led to the capture of Nicolás Maduro, looks more like regime management than any genuine change of political power.

Iran, with greater regional leverage, energy significance to major powers, and more sophisticated sanctions-evasion networks, presents an even less promising candidate for capitulation via blockade.

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