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For the past fifty years, Canadian governments have increasingly resorted to closure and time allocation procedures to pass their legislation. This trend is not solely explained by parliamentary obstruction; it primarily reveals the effects of partisan polarization on the functioning of the House of Commons. 

For several decades, House of Commons operations have undergone a significant transformation. Originally conceived as exceptional measures to counter parliamentary obstruction, closure and time allocation have become common tools for managing the legislative agenda, without this evolution being attributable to a proportional increase in legislative activity. 

This development raises a fundamental question: why have mechanisms that limit debate become normal in an institution whose legitimacy is based on deliberation and compromise? 

This normalization reflects profound transformations in Canadian parliamentarism. The increasing polarization of relations between parties has reduced opportunities for compromise and made it more difficult to reach agreements to organize the House’s work by consensus. In this context, governments are increasingly relying on procedural mechanisms to ensure the adoption of their legislative agenda, while the House of Commons is seeing its deliberative role diminish. 

Recent controversies surrounding the Carney government’s use of closure and time allocation motions clearly illustrate this trend. Since June 1, 2026, the House has passed two closure motions and six time-allocation motions. More broadly, since the beginning of this Parliament, thirteen motions limiting debate time........

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