‘Boots on the Ground’ In Iran: An Assessment |
Modern capabilities in airpower, including PGMs, long-range rockets, BVR missiles and drones, provide an unusually seductive form of military strength, enabling non-contact lethal military options. However, even without the goal of ‘regime change’ in Iran, the scope of the objectives set by both countries may require a level of ‘control’ that US /Israel forces, with airpower alone, may find difficult to achieve.
‘Operation Epic Fury’ and ‘Operation Rising Lion’ initiated on February 28, 2026, denote the most significant escalation of U.S. and Israeli military actions in the Middle East since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Unlike previous military actions, such as the twelve days of aerial strikes in June 2025 (Operation Midnight Hammer), the current campaign seems oriented towards weakening the regime and the permanent dismantling of the Islamic Republic’s strategic military capabilities.[1] In its fifth week, as the war outcomes remain unclear, the dilemma of US/Israeli planners to place boots on the ground to obtain a tangible marker of victory continues. This brief attempts to highlight the challenges of placing ‘boots on the ground’ to achieve the laid-down politico-military objectives in the ongoing conflict with Iran.
Politico-Military Objectives
To achieve the above end state in Iran, the likely politico-military objectives set by both countries are listed below:-
Weakening of the current clerical regime Deny Iran the ability to develop a nuclear weapon To destroy its missile arsenal, including its manufacturing and launchers To end the Islamic Republic’s support for terrorism and such proxies as Hamas and Hezbollah; to weaken the regime Unconditional Surrender (6 March 2026)[2] Destroy Iranian defence industrial base & protect allies in the region (21 March 2026)
Weakening of the current clerical regime
Deny Iran the ability to develop a nuclear weapon
To destroy its missile arsenal, including its manufacturing and launchers
To end the Islamic Republic’s support for terrorism and such proxies as Hamas and Hezbollah; to weaken the regime
Unconditional Surrender (6 March 2026)[2]
Destroy Iranian defence industrial base & protect allies in the region (21 March 2026)
End the threat from the regime in Iran; create conditions for the overthrow of the government
Prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon
To destroy Iran’s ballistic missile and drone capabilities
To weaken Iran’s regional military reach and to cripple/make inoperable Iran’s military command networks for a prolonged period.
The current U.S. administration has framed the ongoing operation as a ‘laser-focused’ mission[3] to destroy threats rather than a ‘utopian’ exercise in nation-building. Given the political and military objectives, two critical aspects must be addressed by strategic planners before deploying any ‘boots on the ground’.
Does the laid down politico-military objective require the physical presence of troops for its realisation and enforcing its will on the enemy? In the case of the Iraq War, the stated objective was the removal of Saddam Hussein & Ba’ath party from power, which necessitated the deployment of ground forces and the execution of Op Iraqi Freedom. In comparison, despite various rhetorical commentaries on Op Epic Fury, the official statements have not laid down regime change as its politico-military objective. This distinction is essential to understanding how the military force may be applied to achieve its end state. Despite this, the US President and the Secretary of the Department of War have also not ruled out the possibility of putting boots on the ground.
The second aspect is how much force levels are essential to achieve the given objective with minimum cost/risk to the state. Though purely a military matter in campaign planning, it requires greater consideration by both political and military strategic decision-makers. Any force levels below the required level may trigger a severe setback or shortfall in achieving the end state; however, the commitment of ground forces may also lead to a prolonged and increasing need for resources over time. The strategic prudence will lie in reducing both monetary and human costs to realise the objectives, as experience in the region reflects a high cost-to-benefit ratio for Washington.
The initial phases of the campaign in Iran have successfully leveraged stealth aviation and long-range precision-guided munitions to decapitate the senior leadership including the confirmed death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – thereby opting for low risk option however the plan (if any) for “regime change” will necessitate a ground component to ensure that the resulting power vacuum is not merely replaced by mid-level IRGC leadership or radicalized sectarian factions. Even without the goal of regime change, the scope of the objectives set by both Israel & the US may require a level of “control” that US forces, with airpower alone, may find difficult to achieve[4].
The quantum of forces is not the sole metric here, as the US buildup continues, but rather an indicator of the scope and feasibility of ground operations. A brief overview of the opposing forces in the region will be essential to understanding the likely military strategy and the options available to each side.
Analysis of Iran’s current military strength reveals a force designed for deterrence and regional contingencies with a mix of conventional and asymmetric capabilities.
The Iranian military structure is divided into two parallel organisations: the regular army (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), each with distinct roles and varying levels of loyalty to the surviving interim leadership.
The Iranian Armed Forces represent the largest active-duty military in West Asia. However,........