The Resilience and Internationalisation of ISIS Somalia |
Despite being territorially and numerically limited in scope, ISIS Somalia has emerged as a key enabler within the global terror ecosystem and a successor to ISIS Central. It has systematically exploited illicit channels, complex terrains, maritime insecurity and socio-political fault lines to sustain its relevance, despite sustained counter-terror pressure and jihadist rivalries.
ISIS Somalia has gradually expanded beyond the Puntland region and financed global terror attacks and operations through its al-Karrar Network (which oversees operations in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo, or DRC, as well) since the group’s inception in October 2015. The network itself was established in 2018. ISIS Somalia was formed as a faction from Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidin, or al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliate, with 30 fighters. It later established itself as a prominent ISIS affiliate, embedding itself within the administrative and financial framework.
As a localised group with a transnational threat profile, it has consistently attracted foreign fighters, primarily from the Arab world, thereby amplifying its visibility.[1] While the semi-autonomous state of Puntland appears to be its primary base, it also has some operational cells based out of Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital.
Notably, its contribution to reportedly financing the suicide bombing at the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul in August 2021 initially thrust it into the spotlight.[2] Considered one of the most reliable sources of revenue generation and distribution for the remnants of the central ISIS and its various affiliates, ISIS Somalia increased its monthly revenue from US$ 100,000 to US$ 360,000 between 2023 and 2024. By 2023, it had begun managing the monthly transfer of US$ 25,000 in cryptocurrency to the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Afghanistan.[3]
This leads to a defining question: how did a localised violent extremist outfit become the central node within ISIS’s transnational ecosystem?
The Transnationalisation of a Localised Terror Affiliate
The Al-Karrar network, which is responsible for overseeing the transfer of funds between different actors within the ISIS ecosystem and the procurement of arms and ammunition, has been viewed by observers as the key driving force behind Africa emerging as the primary ISIS logistical hub. This demonstrates an operational shift from its traditional bastions in West Asia, primarily Syria and Iraq.
After all, by December 2025, this network had built the capacity to transfer tens of thousands of US dollars monthly to various organisational members operating across different geographical regions.[4] The group sustained its terror financing momentum by generating approximately six million US dollars over a span of two years, despite sustained pressure from ideological rivals, state authorities and their international partners.[5] This strategy aligns with one of ISIS’s central doctrinal objectives of Bāqiyah wa Tatamaddad, or Remaining and Expanding.
One of the prominent ISIS Somalia leaders, Bilal al-Sudani, who was neutralised in an American strike in 2023, was instrumental in cultivating terror financing networks in South Africa before he was eliminated. Notably, South Africa has been developed as an informal ISIS hub to redistribute financial capital to Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, thereby expanding and sustaining ISIS’s reach. Some analysts have claimed that ISIS members have also used Tinder for terror financing operations, using fake profiles and photographs of lesser-known South African celebrities.[6] This has expanded the group’s use of unconventional illicit financing avenues.
However, it is important to recall that, despite diversification of terror financing avenues, hawala has remained one of the most sought-after and accessible means of raising and distributing illicit finances. Approximately US$ 325 billion is reported to have been transferred internationally (illicit and genuine remittances) using hawala networks.[7] Its dual-use nature has made it increasingly challenging for authorities to regulate this mode of monetary exchange, thereby creating an environment conducive to non-state actors evading scrutiny and financing extremist operations.
Moreover, recent reports about the dismantling of a cell associated with ISIS Somalia, with its operational zone ranging from Spain to Morocco in March 2026, point towards ISIS Somalia becoming transnational in its approach, inciting individuals to commit deadly attacks, especially in the wake of the latest phase of the Gaza conflict. Such an assessment must be contextualised within the perspective introduced by experts such as Lucas Webber.
Webber had recently argued that:
…the March 2026 Morocco-Spain cell could be read as part of the broader architecture through which IS-S content circulates into diaspora communities, sympathisers seek to move towards active combat zones, and intermediaries help connect would-be recruits to Islamic State nodes abroad, including in Somalia.[8]
…the March 2026 Morocco-Spain cell could be read as part of the broader architecture through which IS-S content circulates into diaspora communities, sympathisers seek to move towards active combat zones, and intermediaries help connect would-be recruits to Islamic State nodes abroad, including........