An incomplete ceasefire, stalled reconstruction efforts and non-operational civilian government characterise the current situation in Gaza. Hamas’ rejection of complete disarmament, Israel’s continued military actions and expansion of the buffer zone have led to an impasse in the Gaza peace plan’s second phase, prolonging the humanitarian crisis.

US President Donald Trump’s 20-point peace plan announced on 29 September 2025 facilitated an Israel–Hamas ceasefire, ending full-scale conflict. Despite the ceasefire, progress towards tangible peace and rehabilitation has stalled due to Israel’s ongoing attacks leading to around 1,000 Palestinian deaths between October 2025 and June 2026,[i] its refusal to withdraw and expand the buffer zone from the agreed 53 per cent to 64 per cent.[ii] During the same period, five IDF soldiers were killed, including one in a friendly fire incident.[iii]

Hamas continues to reject complete disarmament, while recurrent clashes between the group and Israel-backed Palestinian armed factions have aggravated the security situation. The humanitarian crisis has persisted amid repeated closures of key crossings, surging food prices, and restrictions on dual-use items, equipment, mechanical spare parts, and medicine, with 90 per cent of the population living in tent sites lacking reliable access to water, sanitation and electricity.[iv]

The US’ peace plan envisages a three-phase process for Gaza’s rehabilitation. The first phase encompassed ceasefire, hostages-prisoners swap and IDF retreat to Yellow Line controlling 53 per cent; the second phase is centred on Hamas’ demilitarisation, transitional government and Israeli pullback to 40 per cent and third phase is focused on Hamas’ complete disarmament, reconstruction, IDF’s security perimeter spanning 15 per cent, governance under reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) and pathway to self-determination and statehood.

On 16 January 2026, Trump announced the second phase of the plan to initiate Hamas’ disarmament and dismantle its military and tunnel infrastructure, facilitate Israeli withdrawal, establish a security mechanism and technocratic government and launch reconstruction. Israel consented to the plan after retrieving the last hostage, Ran Gvili’s return on 26 January 2026, formally fulfilling the first phase’s agreed-upon terms despite continuing attacks. The Board of Peace’s (BoP) Executive Board,[v] Gaza Executive Board,[vi] National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), and Office of High Representative for Gaza were established on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum summit in Davos on 22 January 2026.

The BoP and its sub-bodies are tasked with implementing the 20-point peace plan, consolidating the ceasefire and preventing renewed conflict, strengthening governance capacity-building, mobilising resources and investments, overseeing reconstruction, facilitating aid, and ensuring accountability for governance, reconstruction, and redevelopment until a reformed PA can assume its responsibilities in Gaza.[vii]

The board’s inaugural meeting in Washington, DC, on 19 February 2026 was attended by 50 states, with 27 joining the board and 23, including India, participating as observers. President Trump announced US$ 10 billion in funding commitments, in addition to US$ 7 billion from the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Qatar, Kuwait, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.[viii] The Palestinian-led technocrat committee, NCAG, led by Dr Ali Shaath, was established as an alternative to Hamas to restore essential services such as electricity, water, healthcare, and education, rebuild civil institutions, and support long-term, self-sustaining governance.

Most members are independent professionals from Gaza unaffiliated with Hamas or the PA, although some have ties to Fatah.[ix] Former Bulgarian Minister and UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Nickolay Mladenov, was appointed as the High Representative for Gaza. His office links the BoP with the NCAG, coordinates civilian and security tracks, and leads negotiations with Hamas on phased disarmament and with Israel on political transition parameters, including potential amnesty arrangements for Palestinian fighters.[x]

In the security arena, the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), headed by General Jasper Jeffers, was established to serve as the primary security force in Gaza to replace the IDF, conduct security operations, facilitate comprehensive demilitarisation through decommissioning, weapons buybacks, and reintegration programmes, and enable the safe delivery of humanitarian aid and construction materials.[xi] During the Davos summit, US Special Envoy Jared Kushner presented a ‘New Gaza’ master plan to facilitate economic transformation into a regional economic hub by 2035, focusing on coastal redevelopment, building 180 towers; new infrastructure including an airport, seaport, freight rail-line and tri-lateral crossing at Rafah, roads; industrial zones generating 500,000 jobs in construction, manufacturing, digital sectors, six-phase urban expansion.[xii] However, since the announcements in early 2026, the ISF is yet to materialise, funding commitments remain largely unmet, reconstruction efforts have not commenced, and the new Palestinian administration remains non-operational.

Fate of Palestinians in Gaza

Palestinian representation within BoP’s framework remains confined to NCAG, with limited autonomy, influence and enforcement mechanisms.[xiii] The NCAG may face significant operational constraints and pressure to align with Israeli and US preferences, including endorsing real estate initiatives that prioritise investment interests over Gaza’s rehabilitation and economic development. Major uncertainties persist regarding NCAG’s capacity to build public trust, secure funding, cover reconstruction and operational costs, support economic recovery, and ensure timely on-the-ground implementation. Moreover, armed groups and competing political actors operating under fragmented security conditions in IDF- and Hamas-controlled areas could undermine the NCAG’s authority, obstruct implementation, deepen instability and weaken public legitimacy. These challenges are compounded by doubts over Hamas’ genuine willingness to transfer power and Israel’s limited interest in NCAG’s governance process, necessitating withdrawal from Gaza.[xiv]

Israeli opposition to interim Palestinian governance and unresolved questions over Gaza’s political status have constrained reconstruction efforts. Currently, NCAG’s stationing in Gaza remains uncertain, as committee members reject operating under IDF’s security arrangements, cooperating with Israeli-backed militias, or entering Gaza before ISF deployment.[xv] Given the limited scope for Palestinian self-governance, a ‘reformed’ PA accepted by Israel would operate within a constrained administrative framework managed by regional and international actors. At the same time, a lightly armed Hamas assumes an internal regulatory role, and Israel retains overall control.[xvi]

The New Gaza plan promises economic transformation and urban development by erasing the numerous existing neighbourhoods, historic sites and landmarks integral to Gaza’s identity and history. The key issues remain unresolved, including property and land rights, house allocation policy, population relocation from existing buildings and engineering feasibility. The proposal in its current format has prioritised investment-led redevelopment over local reconstruction and spatial restructuring through demolition and rezoning, replacing existing communities without consultation. Critics fear the possibility of the creation of exclusive zones transforming Gaza’s social and urban fabric and gradual demographic and economic reconfiguration that normalises population reduction as a redevelopment imperative.[xvii]

Israel is unlikely to accept key elements of the New Gaza Plan, including a port and an airport, given its security concerns. Moreover, the proposed high-rise buildings could provide vantage points overlooking Israeli border communities and IDF bases. The port’s feasibility is contingent on Israel’s consent, requiring close coordination with the IDF and robust supervision and enforcement mechanisms to curb smuggling and infiltration of militias.[xviii] Notably, the Rafah crossing under the plan would be relocated to Gaza’s southern tip and redesigned as a “trilateral crossing” connected to both Egypt and Israel, potentially expanding Israeli oversight of Gaza’s external access, trade flows and strategic connectivity.[xix] In case of ISF that remains non-operational, key challenges include scope of its mandate to enforce disarmament rejected by Hamas, alongside Israel’s continued troop deployment, expansion of buffer zone, and reluctance to commit to a withdrawal timeline.[xx]

For Israel, security gaps persist due to Hamas fighters’ refusal to disarm and its power consolidation post-October 2025 ceasefire. Israel’s stated strategic objectives, i.e., an end to Hamas’ rule, disarmament and destruction of the group’s military capabilities, remain relevant. Since the launch of the second phase, the Netanyahu government has resisted transitioning from military operations to a political settlement by continuing attacks, delaying, hardening terms and creating new circumstances.

Israel has increased control by unilaterally moving the concrete blocks marking the Yellow Line into Hamas-controlled territory and conducting demolitions, expanding to 64 per cent with plans to reach 70 per cent.[xxi] Between 11 October 2025 and 9 June 2026, Israel reportedly carried out 3,201 military actions in Gaza, including air, artillery and direct shootings. Across the 243 days following the October 2025 ceasefire, military activity occurred on 218 days, alongside the detention of around 83 Palestinians. Aid access remained inconsistent due to Israeli........

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