Despite international pressure preventing formal changes to the West Bank’s legal status, the Israeli government has pursued settlement expansion, outpost legalisation, administrative restructuring and legislative initiatives to transform the territorial and political status quo. These measures, driven by historical and religious claims, seek to prevent Palestinian statehood and advance the Greater Israel vision.

Since taking office on 29 December 2022, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu government, backed by the far-right Religious Zionism-Otzma Yehudit bloc, comprising 14 seats, has intensified settlement expansion, administrative control and security operations in the occupied West Bank. These developments have further accelerated after Hamas’ attack in southern Israel on 7 October 2023. This brief evaluates Israel’s policy towards the West Bank under the Netanyahu government, particularly since the 7 October attack, by examining settlement projects and institutional measures alongside the ideological and security considerations shaping government priorities. The brief further explores settler violence and its implications, assesses Israel’s security approach in the West Bank and the evolving dynamics with the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Settlements refer to Jewish communities established in territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 Arab–Israeli war that are not under Israeli sovereignty. Although Israeli communities previously existed in the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip until 1982 and 2005, respectively, recognised settlements, unauthorised outposts and farms are currently concentrated in the occupied West Bank. Since coming to power in December 2022, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu-led government, supported by Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionist party and Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit Party, has accelerated settlements and outposts across the West Bank.

Between 1967 and 2022, Israel established and legalised 127 settlements in the West Bank. Netanyahu government has scaled up this process, approving 103 additional settlements alongside around 259 new outposts, including 186 farms undergoing various stages of legalisation, between 2023 and early September 2026. The government has reportedly allocated around US$ 6.6 billion for settlement development and infrastructure and advanced plans for 63,311 housing units in 2025, i.e., 27,941 housing units in the West Bank and 35,370 housing units in East Jerusalem.[1] While Area C remains the principal locus of settlement expansion, activity has increasingly extended into Areas A and B, blurring the administrative demarcation lines.[2] The Israel Defense Force (IDF) through seizure orders also continues to appropriate land in Area A for military infrastructure, separation barrier, while requisitioning Palestinian homes for surveillance, interrogation and settlement connectivity.[3]

Religious-Nationalist and Security-centric Priorities

A significant segment of Israel’s settler movement views the West Bank, or Judea and Samaria, as part of the historic Israelite kingdom and considers Jewish settlement a religious entitlement. This religious-nationalist ideology underpinning the vision of a Greater Israel has shaped government policy, with far-right factions mobilising a disciplined electoral bloc, lobbying key ministers, and securing influential bureaucratic positions.[4]

The settlement movement, emboldened by greater political leverage and a fragmented opposition, has operated within the post-7 October security environment to transform Israeli policy beyond conflict management and reconfigure the status quo in the West Bank.[5] The broad approach envisages establishing facts on the ground, subduing Palestinian national aspirations, providing residency with partial political rights, incentivising emigration and laying the groundwork for extending Israeli sovereignty over 82 per cent of the West Bank.[6]

From Israel’s security perspective, settlements serve as a protective belt, consolidating territorial control, increasing the Jewish population, establishing spatial presence and enhancing security through infrastructure, military deployments, roads and checkpoints. Consistent with its approach in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and during the conflicts with Iran, Israel’s West Bank policy is guided by the concept of absolute security reinforced after the 7 October 2023 attack, prioritising proactive neutralisation of long-term and short-term threats, operational freedom and sustained security control, rendering restraint or political accommodation a strategic risk.[7]

Although most Israelis do not want to live in the West Bank or view settlements as vital to religious fulfilment, public opinion remains divided over their security value. While 40 per cent believe continued settlement-building helps Israel’s security, 35 per cent consider it harmful.[8] By intertwining the security logic with territorial and religious-nationalist considerations, Israel is undertaking a broad political-ideological transformation leading to administrative and legal restructuring.

Between 2023 and 2026, the Israeli government and Knesset enacted administrative and legislative measures to deepen control over the West Bank. Smotrich, as Finance Minister and an adjunct minister in the Defence Ministry, accelerated settlement planning approvals, eased funding, and retroactively legalised several unauthorised outposts.[9] In June 2024, planning and building procedures in Area C shifted from military-led civil administration to a new ‘Settlement Administration’, which resumed land-title registration, identified unauthorised Palestinian construction, and facilitated demolitions in designated reserves in Area B. Moreover, in August 2025, an E1 settlement project was approved between Jerusalem and the Ma’aleh Adumim settlement, potentially severing East Jerusalem from major Palestinian population centres and disconnecting northern and southern West Bank.[10]

In February 2026, the Israeli cabinet authorised immediate registration of Area C land as state-owned where Palestinian ownership could not be established; extended Israeli regulatory enforcement into Areas A and B over environmental, water and construction matters; transferred licensing authority over Hebron’s Jewish settlement from PA-linked municipality to Israeli control; and approved the repeal of Jordanian law restrictions on property transactions with foreigners, enabling Israeli and foreign Jewish citizens to purchase property in the West Bank directly.[11] Moreover, the Knesset passed resolutions opposing a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River in July 2024, called for Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank in July 2025, and approved a Sovereignty Bill extending Israeli law, administration and judicial process to settlements in October 2025.[12]

However, the approval of the 103 settlements adjacent to Palestinian population centres across Areas A and B, beyond established settlement blocs and defensive lines, reflects contradictions in Israel’s security logic. Israel’s security establishment has warned that protecting dispersed settlements, outposts, agricultural farms and access routes and checkpoints creates security vulnerabilities and imposes substantial operational costs. These demands can affect IDF’s readiness, necessitate repeated reserve mobilisation, divert troops from counter-terror efforts and border security and perpetuate long-term conflict dynamics.[13] To reduce the IDF’s operational burden and prioritise defence and counter-terrorism, Defence Minister Israel Katz’s August 2026 plan proposes transferring civilian law enforcement in the West Bank to the police under National Security Minister Ben-Gvir.  Critics fear this arrangement could help settlers establish outposts and farms with reduced military oversight.[14]

Additionally, despite the expansion of Israeli settlements and outposts in the West Bank, demographic trends raise questions about the strategic effectiveness and long-term sustainability. Shaul........

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