West Asia conflict: Pushing Pause to Permanent Peace amid Pessimism |
After 40 days of accelerating escalation and expansion of the war in West Asia -- with many red lines crossed -- the two-week ceasefire announced on Wednesday allows breathing space and hope. US President Donald Trump’s post threatening civilisational destruction and Iran’s response invoking regional annihilation threatened a nuclear-winter-like situation for West Asia and grave economic crisis for the world.
Iran rejected the 15-point US plan but acknowledged it in its statement. The US accepted Iran’s 10-point proposal as a workable basis for negotiations and said that “almost all the points of past contention have been agreed to between the US and Iran,” but they will now be finalised and “consummated”. Iran’s demands are maximalist -- non-aggression, cessation of war on all fronts, including Lebanon (Palestine does not find a specific mention); withdrawal of US combat forces from the region; retention of enrichment rights; termination of UNSC and IAEA resolutions along with all sanctions; payment of compensation to Iran; and, above all, control of the Strait of Hormuz, with fees for transit rights. There is no offer on limiting military and missile capabilities.
The negotiated package will be different. But wherever the framework settles finally, if it does at all, it will leave Iran in a better position than it was in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) -- popularly known as the Iran nuclear deal -- that Trump trashed in 2018, and what Iran was willing to accept before the US and Israel launched the war. It adds the Strait of Hormuz to Iran’s armour. Israel appears to have been informed about the ceasefire just before it was announced. The Gulf States may have been consulted, but will be passive participants -- as they were in the war.
Iran was battered physically, but retained clarity of objectives, coherence, unity, resolve and resilience. It was winning by not capitulating. As the war progressed, it gained strategic momentum and advantage; its resistance resonated across the world. But, among the shrewdest strategic actors, it would also have calculated the point of inflection in the trajectory and the cost of more lethal attacks from an unrestrained Trump. The US acted with shifting objectives and incoherent fury in the face of strategic failures and unanticipated Iranian capabilities and strategy. Trump, too, would have tallied the cost and casualties of a prolonged war and domestic political and economic consequences, if not increasing international alienation. Israel’s shield of impermeability was repeatedly breached.
It could be in a Lebanon-like quagmire as in 2006 and face growing internal dissent and eroding external acceptance. The Gulf States have suffered damage to assets, reputation and future prospects, and have learnt that using external power to balance regional power asymmetry is not a strong deterrent, but can be a liability. For major powers such as Russia and China which enjoy influence with Iran, an end to the war will consolidate their gains; a longer conflict could imperil them.
Wars start through the escalation of miscalculations and misjudgments. Negotiations break down for the same reason. Disagreements over details unravel broader understandings. There is still a wide gap in positions, and deep bitterness and mistrust on all sides. US long term interests will enter calculations. Some concessions may be unacceptable to the Gulf States, Israel, and even the world. Hardliners may see this as an opportunity to regroup for renewed attacks.
Talks can also be sabotaged, as the Russia-Ukraine settlement of April 2022 -- weeks after the war started -- was undone by third parties. One or more of the parties may continue shooting. Israel has rejected the inclusion of Lebanon in the ceasefire framework, and launched a huge wave of strikes. There is too much at stake for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to stop, unless the US restrains him.
If peace and settlement follow, West Asia’s power balance will change forever. Within the region and in Eurasia, Iran will matter more. The US’s influence will shrink, even if does not turn out to be like Britain’s Suez moment of 1956. China and Russia will gain in influence. The US might even work with Iran to retain presence and influence. Global fragmentation and diversification on trade, finance, payments and energy will grow.
This moment puts West Asia and the Gulf at a fork between a catastrophic cycle of forever war or a path towards what Trump called the “Golden Age of the Middle East”. History makes a case for pessimism. But post-World War II Europe and, more recently, Southeast Asia offer hope. SE Asia emerged from colonialism in the 1940s, only to enter a decades-long period of conflicts and wars due to anti-colonial struggles, external occupation, the Cold War, regional disputes, and ideological differences. The region has unmatched diversity of size, population, religion, history, languages and prosperity. Yet, today, 11 countries have come together in a shared journey of peace and prosperity in the form of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, managing their differences and balancing external powers.
As I have argued earlier, the long and unsettled arc of West Asia’s history has more complexity and churn than the simple equations that appear through the lens of the present. The Arab-Iran conflict is not inevitable. For centuries, the Turko-Iranian and the Ottoman-Arab spheres were two relatively distinct Islamic worlds. Even at its peak, the Safavid Empire, Iran’s first Shia’ite regime, did not extend into the Arabian Peninsula. Once Israel and Iran (including the Islamic Republic) cooperated against Arab nationalism and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Now, Israel and the Gulf States see a common cause against Iran.
The Gulf States perceive a threat not just from Iran’s power but also from concerns about the stability of their monarchies -- these lock them in a reciprocal security and economic pact with the US, which helped them avert the fate of many “nationalist” rulers in West Asia and North Africa during the Arab Spring. And, if Israel’s vision of territorial expansion and regional hegemony holds, the Gulf States cannot remain sanguine about the future. Further, the damaged foundations of their ambitions can be repaired only with assurance of regional peace. Iran’s peaceful regional reintegration will be good for all. Iran must be recognised for its power and stature. But, Iran, too, must assure neighbours that it harbours no hegemonic intention. All Arab States and Iran must unequivocally accept Israel’s existence as a sovereign and secure nation. Israel must accept the universally recognised two-State solution that grants Palestine statehood. In pursuit of its conception of security, Israel should not exhaust itself or lose its vitality and international backing. Equally, Lebanon and Yemen must be stabilised and regional proxies contained.
The region should be declared a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone and verifiable limits be placed on all parties on military and missile capabilities, with international guarantees. Confidence building measures, including economic and connectivity agreements, are needed. The trickiest will be the Hormuz Strait. Iran’s demand to regulate it based on non-ratification of UNCLOS and the location of the navigable channel in its overlapping territorial waters with Oman is complicated by customary international law and would not be acceptable even to its friends.
In India, the role of mediators and messengers should be less important than lasting peace and stability in the region. And, as argued earlier, India needs to assess and prepare for alternative scenarios in West Asia with the revival of its traditional equities, but also work with others for the restoration of norms over power in the world.
Jawed Ashraf, a former Ambassador, currently chairs ITPO. The views are strictly personal.