“It’s about time,” Itamar Ben-Gvir was quoted as saying in response to the assassinations of the three Islamic Jihad leaders and at least 10 civilians, among them four women and four children. True to his word and satisfied he had gotten what he wanted, Ben-Gvir announced that his Otzma Yehudit party had decided to resume voting with the government “following the acceptance of our position and the transition from containment to attack in the targeted killings of senior Islamic Jihad figures.”
Ben-Gvir is a man of principles. But God forbid we should suspect the prime minister of ordering the assassinations to please Ben-Gvir and remove the threat of his quitting the coalition and bringing down the government. A coincidence, the hand of God, wonders and miracles, that is in truth what happened. The fact is that Netanyahu had not even invited Ben-Gvir to join the deliberations over the operation. Nor did he convene the cabinet – after all, there is no need for cabinet approval unless it is a military action whose probability of leading to war is close to certain. In this case, the army predicted that the assassinations would result in a limited response by Islamic Jihad.
It would be interesting to know what this assessment was based on. Reports say the Israel Defense Forces are already preparing for a very unlimited response, even a war encompassing several arenas. Did Israel get a signed promise from Hamas not to fire tens or hundreds of rockets into Israel? Has Israel decided not to respond to any retaliation by Islamic Jihad and make do with the assassinations?
It would be pointless to pull out of the archives the reasoning behind scores of assassinations Israel has conducted of Hamas and Islamic Jihad officials, starting with Ahmed Yassin through Abdel Aziz Rantisi, Yihyeh Ayyash, Abu Ali Mustafa, Ahmed Jabari, Baha Abu al-Ata, regional commanders and missile technicians down to tunnel excavators and ordinary fighters. Each one of these assassinations was supposed to bring us peace and security, stability and prosperity and, above all, deterrence – or at least restore the nation’s prestige or avenge the murder of Israeli civilians.
As for the usefulness of assassination, opinions inside the Shin Bet security service are divided, mainly because to date no assassination has served to change the facts on the ground, broken what is called “the cycle of violence” or reduced the motivation to stage terror attacks. What did Avi Dichter say back in 2008 when he was public security minister? “We have to be careful about seeking small solutions. Killing two or three terrorists is a solution that just brings rockets.” The Israelis living adjacent to the Gaza Strip are not in need of professional opinions on this; they live with these solutions.
This time the situation is different and more worrying. The judgments of security professionals are not relevant because of the political context surrounding the operation. Ben-Gvir’s threat to the coalition’s survival if he is not made party to military decisions, and his ability to bend the prime minister to his will on national security issues, will cast a cloud of suspicion over all military operations even if they are legitimate, absolutely necessary and justified. The stink of political calculation will accompany them.
Neither the results of the Gaza operation nor the IDF’s or Shin Bet’s recommendations will change that. The impression that has been created, even if there are not facts on which to base it, is that Ben-Gvir did to Netanyahu militarily what Defense Minister Yoav Gallant did to him politically. Except for one critical difference: Gallant acted with wide public support, Ben-Gvir acted as a bully. Gallant was ready to pay the price; Ben-Gvir set the price and he can do it again and again.
This time we are not talking about canceling a European Union event or a dispute between the Israeli and U.S. governments, but about real national security. Because even if Ben-Gvir is not invited to join in cabinet meetings, Netanyahu has made him a critical factor when he decides on army operations.