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Ever since the United States and Israel attacked Iran in late February, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have found themselves on the front line of a war they neither wanted nor started. As the ongoing U.S. and Iranian escalations demonstrate, neither the April 8 cease-fire nor the subsequent memorandum of understanding succeeded in stabilizing the region. But while Iran’s targeting of the Gulf states has not ended since the putative cease-fire, it has evolved. Tehran has pivoted from disproportionately attacking the United Arab Emirates to focus instead on two smaller states: Bahrain and Kuwait.

The commonality is that both before and after the cease-fire, Iran saw the Gulf as Washington’s regional center of gravity. But the intended strategic effect of Iran’s attacks changed: from inflicting maximum damage to the global economy and forcing a cease-fire to signaling resolve without provoking a return to hostilities. This was why Iran doubled down in targeting Bahrain and Kuwait. Yet this was not inevitable. Instead, inter-Gulf fragmentation and Washington’s strategic incoherency created the permissive conditions for Iran’s selective coercion. It was the lack of either a U.S. or Gulf response to these repeated strikes that set the stage for the current escalations between Washington and Tehran.

Ever since the United States and Israel attacked Iran in late February, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have found themselves on the front line of a war they neither wanted nor started. As the ongoing U.S. and Iranian escalations demonstrate, neither the April 8 cease-fire nor the subsequent memorandum of understanding succeeded in stabilizing the region. But while Iran’s targeting of the Gulf states has not ended since the putative cease-fire, it has evolved. Tehran has pivoted from disproportionately attacking the United Arab Emirates to focus instead on two smaller states: Bahrain and Kuwait.

The commonality is that both before and after the cease-fire, Iran saw the Gulf as Washington’s regional center of gravity. But the intended strategic effect of Iran’s attacks changed: from inflicting maximum damage to the global economy and forcing a cease-fire to signaling resolve without provoking a return to hostilities. This was why Iran doubled down in targeting Bahrain and Kuwait. Yet this was not inevitable. Instead, inter-Gulf fragmentation and........

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