Japan’s Defense Lessons From Ukraine and the Middle East |
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Since taking office in October 2025, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has been busy reforming Japan’s defense policy. Her government is revising the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program to prepare for an era of heightened instability and growing uncertainty over U.S. engagement in the region. Notably, Tokyo raised defense and other security-related spending to approximately 1.8 percent of GDP in the 2025-2026fiscal year, up from around 1 percent in 2022. In April, Japan also revised its defense transfer policy with the aim of promoting exports of weapons and nonlethal military equipment.
Expanding Japan’s defense production capacity has been a central focus of these reforms. In its budget request for the 2027 fiscal year, the Japanese Defense Ministry singles out domestic military production as a critical element of deterrence. This reflects growing concerns that Japan may need to sustain military operations in a protracted, high-intensity conflict. In an analysis of the U.S.-Israel war against Iran that was published in August, the Defense Ministry explicitly recognizes the need to maintain adequate production capacity in peacetime—and to be ready to rapidly scale up weapons production in the event of a conflict.
Since taking office in October 2025, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has been busy reforming Japan’s defense policy. Her government is revising the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program to prepare for an era of heightened instability and growing uncertainty over U.S. engagement in the region. Notably, Tokyo raised defense and other security-related spending to approximately 1.8 percent of GDP in the 2025-2026fiscal year, up from around 1 percent in 2022. In April, Japan also revised its defense transfer policy with the aim of promoting exports of weapons and nonlethal military equipment.
Expanding Japan’s defense production capacity has been a central focus of these reforms. In its budget request for the 2027 fiscal year, the Japanese Defense Ministry singles out domestic military production as a critical element of deterrence. This reflects growing concerns that Japan may need to sustain military operations in a protracted, high-intensity conflict. In an analysis of the U.S.-Israel war against Iran that was........