Horrors in Sudan Highlight Deterioration of Western Diplomatic Corps |
Foreign & Public Diplomacy
With no end in sight either to the war or its horrors, international discussion of Sudan has increasingly focused on criticism of the West’s failure to act and its apparent disinterest in doing so. This response is certainly valid: No Western government currently considers Sudan a priority, despite more than 120,000 estimated deaths since 2023, including as much as 60,000 since October 2025 in El Fasher alone. It also, however, obscures the painful truth that Western states’ options in Sudan are extremely limited. It is not just that there is little will to act; there is also little ability to do anything.
This is not just appalling for the Sudanese people. It’s also an indicator both of failures of analysis and, more critically, the parlous state of the diplomatic corps in many countries. The popular high-profile, relatively straightforward diplomatic tools—mediation, sanctions, diplomatic pressure and/or condemnation—have essentially no impact on these particular parties, in this particular case. The remaining options are difficult; complicated; risky; and, in a time when diplomatic corps are stretched painfully thin, possibly out of reach entirely.
With no end in sight either to the war or its horrors, international discussion of Sudan has increasingly focused on criticism of the West’s failure to act and its apparent disinterest in doing so. This response is certainly valid: No Western government currently considers Sudan a priority, despite more than 120,000 estimated deaths since 2023, including as much as 60,000 since October 2025 in El Fasher alone. It also, however, obscures the painful truth that Western states’ options in Sudan are extremely limited. It is not just that there is little will to act; there is also little ability to do anything.
This is not just appalling for the Sudanese people. It’s also an indicator both of failures of analysis and, more critically, the parlous state of the diplomatic corps in many countries. The popular high-profile, relatively straightforward diplomatic tools—mediation, sanctions, diplomatic pressure and/or condemnation—have essentially no impact on these particular parties, in this particular case. The remaining options are difficult; complicated; risky; and, in a time when diplomatic corps are stretched painfully thin, possibly out of reach entirely.
Western states have almost no direct leverage with the two primary combatant decision-makers in Sudan, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemeti”) of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Until 2019, Burhan had been a midlevel commander in the Sudanese army in South Sudan and Darfur. Hemeti led a group of government-backed janjaweed fighters, an official Border Guards unit, and finally the RSF. Burhan seized power in 2019, and Hemeti served as........