Pakistan’s Diplomatic Pivot Makes It a Trump-Era Power Player

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Pakistan’s role in the peace talks between the United States and Iran would have been impossible just two years ago. The core U.S. grievance with its nominal, but always contentious, ally was Afghanistan. Washington believed Islamabad was offering partial help on counterterrorism goals while either tolerating or actively aiding others, especially the Taliban and the Haqqani network—the forces killing U.S. and Afghan allied troops.

Most stopped short of alleging full complicity. Not U.S. President Donald Trump, who in 2018 tweeted: “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit.” Most famously, CIA director and later Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta alleged that Pakistan was either “involved or incompetent” over the hiding of Osama bin Laden less than 800 yards from its national military academy.

Pakistan’s role in the peace talks between the United States and Iran would have been impossible just two years ago. The core U.S. grievance with its nominal, but always contentious, ally was Afghanistan. Washington believed Islamabad was offering partial help on counterterrorism goals while either tolerating or actively aiding others, especially the Taliban and the Haqqani network—the forces killing U.S. and Afghan allied troops.

Most stopped short of alleging full complicity. Not U.S. President Donald Trump, who in 2018 tweeted: “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit.” Most famously, CIA director and later Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta alleged that Pakistan was either “involved or incompetent” over the hiding of Osama bin Laden less than 800 yards from its national military academy.

But paradoxically, the final rift with the United States opened up room for change in Pakistan. Diplomacy in the region was upended following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. The main basis for cooperation had been removed, leaving only grievances and allegations. Some in Washington saw it as proof that Pakistan’s long game against the U.S. had worked. Pakistan’s deepening dependence on China, especially through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and defense technology, boded very ill for long-term relations.

Pakistan feared it would be seen as a fair-weather counterterror partner, not as an economic partner or trusted power broker. Following concerns about nuclear-capable Pakistan’s development of intercontinental missiles and the political persecution of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, sanctions came in 2024, and in March 2025, a bipartisan bill called for personal sanctions on Pakistan’s army chief, Asim Munir, among other leaders.

The position was intolerable for Pakistan for many reasons. It was becoming as concerned by Chinese dominance of its ports as the Americans were. It felt that Washington failed to appreciate how much loss Islamabad had itself suffered at the hands of terrorists. And worse still, from........

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