Not long ago, Tunisia was considered one of the biggest success stories in the Middle East and North Africa. Unlike neighboring Arab countries that experienced massive popular uprisings in 2011, Tunisia did not immediately revert to authoritarianism or descend into civil war. Instead, after its longtime dictator fled, an interim government held free and fair elections. The new, democratically elected regime adopted a liberal constitution and allowed civil society and independent media to flourish.
By now, however, that success has decisively unraveled. Last month, for the first time in 14 years, Tunisia held a sham presidential election, marked by extensive manipulation and repression. The incumbent, President Kais Saied, announced that he had won 90 percent of the vote. Tunisians have tried to protest Saied’s authoritarianism, kindling hope among observers that the country might return to its democratizing trajectory.
But the truth is that the collapse of Tunisia’s young democracy has been coming for a long time, and the problems that it encountered were a function of its early triumphs. Over time, the features that had helped the Arab Spring movement in Tunisia stand apart and bring real reform—most notably, Tunisian leaders’ willingness to share power—hamstrung the government and led to paralysis. The new democracy was unable to realize substantive reforms; the inability of Tunisia’s post-2014 power brokers to reform the economy in particular, combined with a growing sense among the electorate that elites were focused only on enhancing their own wealth, set the stage for an authoritarian takeover.
Saied, a scholar of constitutional law, was elected president democratically in 2019. But he soon began consolidating power by disbanding the parliament, suspending the constitution, and jailing opponents. In 2022, one of us wrote in Foreign Affairs that Tunisia’s model of democratic transition was “at death’s door.” It could be saved, we argued, only if foreign governments increased their support for Tunisian opposition and civil society and gave Tunisia enough money to “weather the painful side effects of the economic reforms needed to create long-term sustainable growth.”
Unfortunately, aid never materialized in the necessary quantity. And now it is too late for this kind of fix to make a big enough difference. Without outside support, pro-democracy activists inside the country faced increasing repression and were unable to convince the weary public that democracy was worth fighting for. Today, the wave of democracy in Tunisia that began with the Arab Spring is dead. To start a new movement, Tunisia’s civil society and its politicians must rebuild trust with the people and convince them, fundamentally, that democracy is more likely than autocracy to bring about the economic growth and stability the country needs.
Much of Tunisia’s success during the decade after 2011 can be credited to an active civil society and leaders who were willing to compromise. In short, a model of dialogue and........