The Abiding Question of the Iranian Bomb |
On February 28, U.S. President Donald Trump authorized a massive military campaign against Iran. Working in concert with the Israel Defense Forces, the U.S. military undertook strikes that first targeted the regime leadership, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and others, and then expanded to a broader assault on Iranian security forces. In the last few days, strikes have been launched against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Iranian missile program, the Iranian navy, and even local police buildings.
One asset, however, has been curiously absent from the target list published by U.S. Central Command: the Iranian nuclear program. As of this writing, Iran’s major nuclear facilities—at least those not destroyed by U.S. and Israeli strikes last June—have not been featured in any description of recent U.S. or Israeli military accomplishments. There have been reports of strikes on targets that are possibly related to Iran’s weapons research infrastructure and of some in the vicinity of significant facilities, but little of apparent consequence in comparison to June. This omission is especially surprising given that the nuclear program was allegedly one of the reasons behind the Trump administration’s turn to force.
It is unlikely that the United States or Israel is deliberately ignoring nuclear sites at Isfahan, Parchin, or Natanz—three locations that have housed and may still be vital to Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons. It is possible that they are simply farther down the target list; messaging from U.S. officials, after all, has emphasized the near-term risk of Iranian nuclear weapons. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said on March 2, “This operation is a clear, devastating, decisive mission: destroy the missile threat, destroy the navy, no nukes.”
Preventing Iran from producing nuclear weapons has been a U.S. policy priority for decades. It is therefore surprising that U.S. operations have, so far, not reflected it. Iran still retains the material needed to build multiple nuclear weapons, and it may also have the capabilities to turn that material into weapons components. It is unlikely that airstrikes alone can prevent this. If the United States is going to continue to attack Iran, it must ensure that Iran is unable to produce nuclear weapons. To achieve this, the United States has two options to choose from—cutting a deal or forcing the regime’s collapse—both of which are unpalatable and carry huge risk. But each is better than doing nothing.
The June 2025 strikes against Iran did significant damage to its nuclear program, but they did not end the threat it could manifest. Some analysts closer to the White House took care to emphasize the setback U.S. and Israeli actions dealt to Iran’s nuclear program, but few if any were prepared to subscribe to Trump’s initial assessment that Iran’s nuclear program had been “obliterated” or that “the last thing they want to do is enrich.”
Most eyes were instead on the stockpile of highly enriched uranium that Iran still had in its possession and to which international inspectors were denied access. Others noted the tremendous uncertainty around whether Iran still had centrifuge capabilities, which could allow it to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium quickly, or equipment for uranium metal production, which could be used to........