Ukraine’s Trump Tightrope

As with many other aspects of their war against Russia, Ukrainians have reacted to the outcome of the U.S. presidential election with a certain dark humor. The morning after the election, Ukrainian social media was full of jokes, including by soldiers commenting that they are “preparing to go home soon, since the war will end in 24 hours.” They were referring, of course, to President-elect Donald Trump’s long-standing claim that he could stop the war in a day if he were elected.

Ukraine has many reasons to be concerned about a second Trump presidency. Trump has not said how he would end the war, or even under what conditions. In his debate with Vice President Kamala Harris, in September, he refused to say that he wanted Ukraine to win. He has also repeatedly complained about the amount of military assistance that the United States has been giving Kyiv. In the background, there is his longtime admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Trump’s running mate, JD Vance, who was one of the first Republicans to embrace indifference to Ukraine as a policy position: “I don’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or the other,” he said in 2022. And in polling before the election, where a clear majority of Democrats agreed that the United States had a responsibility to support Ukraine, only about a third of Republican voters said that it did. All this has led many to fear that Washington—by far Kyiv’s biggest arms supplier—might cut off the flow of aid, or even allow Moscow to dictate the terms of peace.

But the reality of the war has made Ukrainians pragmatic: the situation can always get worse, but they still need to adjust and search for a way out to survive. Setting aside Trump’s campaign rhetoric, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is preparing to work with him. After all, Ukrainians lived through the first Trump administration and have some sense of what they are getting: dealmaking and attempts to flatter Putin, but also, eventually, a major sale of lethal arms, including Javelin antitank weapons, which have been critical in the fight against Russia. Zelensky’s task is and will remain to find ways to receive what his government needs to defend the population in the long run.

For Ukraine, then, the meaning of a second Trump administration is complicated. Even if the initial phase of Trump’s return to power is full of speculations, leaks, and disappointments—and even if Washington decides to slow or freeze military aid, causing even more casualties and losses of territory—Kyiv knows that Washington is unlikely to simply cede victory to Putin. It is indisputable that Trump dislikes long and expensive foreign wars. And Ukrainians themselves are ready to end the war—but from a position of strength.

Throughout the war, Kyiv has never taken American support for granted. In sheer magnitude, the United States has provided more military assistance than any other country, and in some crucial areas, like cyberwarfare, advanced air defense systems, and intelligence, U.S. resources cannot be substituted. Yet even a year ago, Ukraine began planning for a future of waning U.S. support. Following the unsuccessful counteroffensive in the summer of 2023, Ukrainian officials interpreted the increasingly negative assessments of the war in the U.S. media as a sign that Washington’s military assistance might shrink.

To prepare for this, the Zelensky government accelerated efforts to expand domestic weapons production and strengthened relations with other partners in Europe, as well as with Canada and Japan. Kyiv also began stepping up its efforts to sell the international community on its so-called peace formula—Ukraine’s multilateral initiative, first announced in September 2022, that aims at recruiting a large group of countries around key issues that will need to be addressed at the end of the war, including food security and environmental damage, as well as the restoration of energy infrastructure and nuclear safety. (So far, some 90 countries have endorsed the formula.)

Ukrainian officials have also tried to ensure that if they are forced to negotiate with Russia they will not be alone and that the Ukrainian vision of peace will already be on the table. Ukraine has made clear, for example, that humanitarian issues such as the return of Ukrainian children taken to Russia and the exchange of prisoners of war could become the basis for future negotiations.

But whatever the future of U.S. aid, Kyiv has long recognized the need to retain the support of both major parties in the United States. That lesson was learned during Trump’s first impeachment trial........

© Foreign Affairs