Over the past few weeks, an all-out conflict between Israel and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah has begun to appear more likely. In May, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant suggested that the country might use expanded “military means” to quash Hezbollah, and according to media reports, the Israeli military has drawn up plans for a limited ground assault to enforce a buffer zone at its northern border with Lebanon. Both Israel’s far-right finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, and national security minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir, have openly called for an invasion of Lebanon. Outside leaders and analysts tend to focus on Israel as the actor whose policies provoke or avoid war. But given Washington’s limited success in influencing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s strategy in the war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, those seeking a route to de-escalation must look more closely at Hezbollah’s calculations.
The organization faces a dilemma that limits its choices. On the one hand, it must restore its ability to deter Israel. It lost some of that capacity in the months following Hamas’s October 7 attack. Soon after the offensive, Hezbollah lobbed missiles at Israel in a restrained show of support for Hamas, and Israel responded with an assassination campaign across Lebanon, including in the organization’s stronghold in Beirut’s southern suburbs. Owing to Lebanon’s fragility, however, Hezbollah still wants to avoid a full-blown conflict with Israel.
A permanent cease-fire between Israel and Hamas would likely forestall a war in Lebanon: Hezbollah remains committed to halting hostilities if Israel strikes a cease-fire agreement with Hamas in Gaza. And amid the long war there and increasing tensions in the West Bank, Israel would likely prefer a diplomatic resolution to the tensions on its northern border. A special U.S. envoy, Amos Hochstein, has made a half dozen trips to Lebanon since October to try to negotiate an end to the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. His game plan has been to ask Hezbollah to pressure Hamas to accept a cease-fire to break the region’s deadlock. Although Hezbollah has publicly denied it is acceding to Hochstein’s request, Hamas’s recent flexibility in negotiations with Israel suggests that his proposal has had some impact.
But a cease-fire deal in Gaza is unlikely to come before tensions at the Israeli-Lebanese border rise further. Hezbollah could take a cease-fire deal before Hamas does and avoid an Israeli invasion while restoring normalcy within Lebanon. But that would not be an easy choice. A deal with Israel that disregarded the fate of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank might put a temporary stop to the violence on the Israeli-Lebanese border and Israel’s strikes within Lebanon but would not prevent it from re-emerging in a year or two. Additionally, Hezbollah’s status both within Lebanon and the broader region rests on the leading role it plays in the Iranian-backed “axis of resistance.” It would lose credibility with its Palestinian and other Middle Eastern allies, especially as the Houthi movement—one of Hezbollah’s partners—has endures Israeli air strikes in Yemen. Israel wants to break that alliance.
Credibility would not be Hezbollah’s only loss in such a deal. A cease-fire could highlight the organization’s vulnerabilities. During its........