For the last two months, Iran and the United States have carried out fitful, unsuccessful peace negotiations. After striking a very shaky ceasefire agreement at the beginning of April, officials from both countries have traded- and then rejected- long-term proposals. They have announced that they are nearing some kind of deal, and then hit each other with a volley of drones and missiles. "I don't care if they're over, honestly,” Trump said on Monday, when asked about the reports that Iran was cutting off talks. The discussions, he declared, had “started to get very boring.”

Tehran and Washington may still reach some kind of agreement in the coming months; neither side’s top leaders seem to be itching for a return to intensive combat (although within Iran, some senior officials are). But even if they do reach a deal, Iran and the United States will remain locked in a broader conflict, trading barbs and perhaps kinetic attacks. That is, in part, because the countries remain far apart on their core disputes. Washington is still demanding that Tehran completely dismantle its nuclear enrichment program, surrender all enriched uranium, end support for regional allies, and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Iran, however, has repeatedly refused to give up on enrichment. It says it will probably consider Washington’s other demands only after the United States recognizes Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, compensates Iranians for wartime damages, ends Israel’s war in Lebanon, and unfreezes Iranian assets.

But there is another reason why the sides won’t make real peace: Iran has concluded that conflict is preferable to diplomacy. The war, after all, seems to be helping Tehran increase its international power. By striking Arab states that host American bases, Iran has succeeded in driving a wedge between U.S. officials and their Persian Gulf partners, who desperately want a lasting settlement. By closing the Strait of Hormuz, it has forced a collection of countries around the planet to acknowledge its power and negotiate over the fate of their ships. Previous agreements with the United States, meanwhile, have always unraveled.

The Islamic Republic’s strategy, then, is not merely to survive and outlast the United States, as is commonly assumed. The country is not even really trying to resolve its disputes with Washington. Instead, it wants to fundamentally alter how Tehran is dealt with by the United States, U.S. allies, and indeed, the wider world. It aspires to be a pole in a multipolar order, and it believes that the war is helping it achieve that goal.

The Islamic Republic is no stranger to conflict with Washington. Indeed, from its earliest days, the regime has centered much of its foreign policy on confronting the United States. But traditionally, the country’s internal political competition constrained that impulse and periodically compelled the regime to pursue diplomatic........

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