The global economy is under a cloud of uncertainty. Trade disruptions, wars, aid retrenchment, and geopolitical realignment have forced governments and investors to reassess risk. Africa is often portrayed as the weakest link—too dependent on external financing, too exposed to shocks, and too fragile to adapt. That assumption deserves a second look.

When the United States and other major donors slashed foreign aid last year, predictions of African economic catastrophe followed. Across much of the continent, however, economies have proved more resilient than the prevailing narratives suggest. Experts warned that Ethiopia, for instance, would be especially hard hit, but in early 2026, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed revised the country’s projected growth upward, from an 8.9 percent increase in GDP (predicted in June 2025) to a 10.2 increase. According to October 2025 projections by the International Monetary Fund, 11 of the world’s 15 fastest-growing economies in 2026 will be in Africa, making it the fastest-growing region in the world.

This resilience was predictable. Using data from the 2024 report on African economic development published by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), I compared how 54 African economies scored on two metrics: their exposure to external shocks and their structural vulnerabilities. I aggregated each country’s scores related to six types of shocks (political, economic, demographic, energy, technological, and climate) and six areas of vulnerability (economic, governance, connectivity, social, energy, and climate), to examine how countries score relative to the African median. These structural characteristics predate recent disruptions, but they serve as a real-world test of whether baseline strengths translate into adaptive capacity.

The analysis revealed that a majority of African countries have at least one relative advantage, providing nuance to depictions that often paint the continent’s overall prospects as bleak. Sixty-one percent of African countries are relatively insulated from global shocks, possess the domestic institutional capacity to absorb such shocks, or have both advantages. And those countries that perform well in one advantage can leverage their strength to build capacity in the other.

African economies still face many challenges. Volatility, state failure, humanitarian emergencies, and fragility continue to haunt countries across the continent. But a focus on crises obscures the more consequential story of African resilience. As the global economic order fragments, many African economies are well positioned to weather the storm. If policymakers recognized this variation, rather than treating Africa as a single risk category, they would concentrate their engagement with the continent’s most structurally resilient economies while tailoring their support to the others by investing in institutional capacity where governance is weak and in ways to reduce external exposure where institutions are strong.

In early 2025, the Trump administration announced the shuttering of USAID, ending foreign aid programs that provided health care, governance training, and development assistance. Major donors such as the United Kingdom and Germany followed suit, trimming their foreign aid by 39 percent and 27 percent respectively. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development projected that sub-Saharan African countries would be hit hard, estimating that they could see their foreign assistance cut by 16 to 28 percent over the course of 2025.

Some African countries do rely heavily on aid. Eight of the top 20 countries that receive the most net aid from foreign governments as a share of their gross national income are in Africa. Countries with a history of prolonged conflict such as Burundi, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Mozambique, Niger, and Somalia received a particularly large proportion. Government-funded aid in these countries acts as direct humanitarian support.

But the cuts have had very different effects in different countries. For example, analysts warned against the severe impact that aid cuts would have on the health sector. Malawi’s health-care system, for instance, had been sustained by U.S. programs whose funding amounted to double that of its own health budget in 2022, making it the fourth most dependent on the United States globally. When cuts arrived, the government struggled to replace the funding and services closed.

In 2025, African governments raised roughly $18 billion from international capital markets.

Many countries in Africa, however, found ways to adapt. Ethiopia, Ghana, and Nigeria acted quickly to blunt the impact of U.S. aid cuts, implementing policies to funnel more domestic resources toward health budgets. In 2024, funding from USAID accounted for about one-fifth of Nigeria’s health budget. But within a month of the Trump administration’s announcement that USAID would close, Abuja mobilized almost half that amount to cover shortfalls. Ethiopia, meanwhile, introduced a new tax to cover funding previously provided by USAID, and Ghana removed caps on its national health insurance tax and allocated more funding toward health and social programs. Strong governance, leadership, and institutions allowed these countries to react quickly.

​Similarly, when Trump’s harsh tariffs repeatedly disrupted global trade last year, African countries and industries that had concentrated commercial ties to the United States felt the sharpest pain. For instance, despite Lesotho’s relatively strong structural fundamentals, its garment industry was acutely vulnerable to U.S. tariffs because the American market absorbs the vast majority of its textile exports. Factories shut down and jobs were lost.

Yet other countries proved resilient. The U.S. market accounts for more than five percent of total exports in only 13 African countries; major economies such as Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, and Morocco had already diversified by expanding trade with regional, European, or Asian partners. In 2025, African governments raised roughly $18 billion from international capital markets, up from $12.85 billion the year before, while the average cost of funding fell by 100 basis points to an average of 7.7 percent—signaling that markets considered African debt to be less risky despite global turbulence. The credit ratings agency S&P upgraded seven African countries in 2025, citing improving growth prospects and momentum toward macroeconomic and fiscal reforms.

​This variation in outcomes reflects fundamental structural differences between African nations. Two key factors play into a country’s economic resilience: exposure and vulnerability. Exposure is the degree to which an economy is susceptible to external shocks, including geopolitical instability, supply-chain disruptions, demographic pressures, energy-import dependence, technological change, and climate hazards. Vulnerability captures a country’s ability to deploy policy tools during uncertainty and depends on the strength of its domestic economy, the quality of its institutions, its physical and digital infrastructure, its population’s access to electricity and social services, and its resilience to climate change. Countries need to excel in only one dimension—to possess either low exposure or low vulnerability—to be able to build capacity in the other and strengthen their resilience. A well-governed country with strong institutions can work effectively to reduce its exposure over time; a country that is relatively insulated from external shocks has breathing room to invest in strengthening its institutions.

​Measuring African economies by their exposure to external shocks and their vulnerability reveals four categories, each named for the trajectory their economy can or needs to take. The Trailblazers (resilient economies with low exposure and low vulnerability) have the most near-term room to grow. The Builders (low exposure and high vulnerability) have strong potential so long as they address institutional weakness. The Adapters (high exposure and low vulnerability) have space to grow but need to remain flexible in times of international economic instability. And the Stabilizers (high exposure and high vulnerability) are the most fragile countries, ones that need to secure peace before they can develop; nevertheless, a number of them are performing well economically in the face of challenges. Mauritius, for example, scores 68 on total exposure and 111 on total vulnerability, both below the African median, placing it in the Trailblazer category. South Sudan’s score of 299 on exposure and 481 on vulnerability, both above the median, categorizes it as a Stabilizer. These classifications reflect structural baselines, not vulnerability to any specific shock such as aid retrenchment or tariffs; they capture the underlying capacity countries can draw on when disruptions arrive in any form.

Overall, my analysis shows that most African economies possess at least one considerable structural advantage and that 21 have both. This helps explain why Africa’s overall resilience over the past year has exceeded expectations. The 21 Trailblazers benefit from strong domestic resource bases, diversified economies, and robust institutions that provide multiple buffers against external shocks. They appear in every African region and include countries facing a variety of circumstances. Rwanda, for instance, is a postconflict nation focused on developing its public institutions to streamline investment. In Mauritius, innovative policies (such as simplified work permits and strong public-private partnerships) have transformed geographic constraints into advantages. Algeria and Botswana are examples of how effective governance can turn natural resource wealth into a boon.

South Africa is a particularly strong example of how low exposure and low vulnerability augment each other. Its complex, sophisticated economy prevents dependence on a single export or commodity and its strong financial markets and institutions allow a variety of policy tools to be deployed during disruptions. In 2024 and 2025, when global trade shocks proliferated, South Africa was able to maintain currency stability and redirect exports to other markets within and outside Africa. Between 2024 and 2025, its agricultural exports grew by ten percent, and its government has worked to strengthen ties with other partners, such as by inking a new trade deal with China that grants some South African products duty-free access to Chinese markets and secures Chinese investments.

The Builders face more institutional or structural constraints but benefit from limited external exposure, which provides breathing room. Consider Madagascar: its large domestic market and natural resource diversity create the potential for self-reliant growth, yet weak governance and limited infrastructure have constricted the country’s ability to take full advantage. When global foreign aid diminished starting in 2024, Madagascar’s economy continued to function as normal but political instability left opportunities unseized.

When global trade shocks proliferated, South Africa maintained currency stability.

The six Adapters are dealing with the opposite dynamic: their economies have significant external exposure, but relatively strong institutions or governance makes them more agile in responding. Despite the fact that Ghana faces high exposure to shifts in commodity prices and pressure from debt, its effective bureaucracy allowed it, in May 2025, to complete a debt restructuring under the G-20’s Common Framework—exiting selective default status after finalizing its Eurobond exchange with creditors—and to receive a further credit upgrade in November on the back of rising gold and cocoa export revenues. Côte d’Ivoire, meanwhile, has used its cocoa export revenues to diversify and fund manufacturing, limiting problems posed by its high exposure. Strong leaders can use an advantage in one factor to help build on the other.

Libya—which is generally known abroad for weak governance—may seem to be a surprising inclusion among the Adapters. But Libya’s oil revenues historically funded infrastructure and social services that can still be effective today, even as political fragmentation has eroded them. Once, nearly all Libyan households had access to electricity, for example, but 73 percent can still access it. Libya illustrates how structural buffers can be built even under political stress. But without carefully calibrated investment and accountable governance, they may slip into the Stabilizer category.

Twenty-one African countries, the Stabilizers, face both severe external pressures and institutional limitations. But many of these countries are more resilient than crisis narratives suggest. Major economies such as Nigeria and Ethiopia fall into this category, but their swift actions in response to aid cuts demonstrated adaptive capacity that emerged under pressure.

CHANGE FOR THE BETTER

​Resilience is not a static characteristic of an economy. Countries can use existing strengths to address constraints and create upward trajectories—for instance, their ability to mobilize domestic resources. The most resilient African economies, which includes the highest performers among the Trailblazers, exceed the World Bank’s recommended 15 percent tax-to-GDP ratio. This fiscal capacity affords flexibility when external financing or investment wavers. Countries that can maintain public investment during external financing disruptions can stave off the kinds of infrastructural decay or service-delivery pauses that compound economic vulnerability. Tunisia meets the OECD average of 34 percent, and Morocco, Seychelles, and South Africa come close. Eight African countries have a higher tax-to-GDP ratio than the average among Latin American countries and nine exceed the Asia-Pacific average.

Many of Africa’s most resilient countries are also transforming their economies. Morocco, for instance, has shifted its manufacturing base toward higher-value industries such as automobile and aerospace manufacturing, and renewable energy. By making human capital and wellness drivers of economic productivity, Mauritius has achieved a notably high score—56 out of 171 countries—on the 2026 according to the 2026 Global Social Progress Index. Other countries, such as Tunisia, have worked to diversify their economies. Successful diversification patterns vary across countries, but they share some common characteristics. Some economies have leveraged existing comparative advantages while building new capabilities. Morocco’s automotive sector is a good example: it has built on existing manufacturing capacity and deepened its access to European markets while developing supplier networks that now serve global markets.

Regional integration is also increasing. Although the share of the continent’s total trade that is intra-African trade remains relatively low, at 14.4 percent as of 2024, the value of intra-African trade increased 12.4 percent between 2023 to 2024, enabling economies to develop by serving regional markets before competing globally. Nigeria, for instance, increased its intra-African exports by 14 percent in the first six months of 2025. And the World Bank predicts that intra-African export will grow by 109 percent by 2035 if the African Continental Free Trade Area, an African Union initiative launched in 2019, is fully implemented.

Weak governance can clearly constrain African economies. But across the continent, governance capacity varies enormously. Cape Verde ranks roughly five times better than the continental median on UNCTAD’s 2024 governance vulnerability ranking, and Mauritius scores an extraordinary 26 times better. Many African countries have the fundamental capacity to translate policy decisions into real economic responses when shocks arrive.

Africa’s resilience represents one of the most significant yet underrecognized developments in the global economy. The right way to understand Africa in this moment is to unpack the differences among countries, which reveals the surprising advantages that many of them are using to navigate global economic upheaval. Moving forward, countries can build on their strengths. The Trailblazers can leverage their existing stability to drive productivity growth, develop new technology, and lead the way in regional integration; the Builders will need to strengthen their institutions; and the Adapters must deploy their institutional strengths to actively reduce external exposure.

Countries affected by active conflict—the Stabilizers—need basic peace and security before economic resilience strategies can take hold. But even in those places, citizens living abroad send money home in volumes that often exceed the amount of foreign aid those societies received before the recent cuts: for instance, Nigeria received $20.93 billion in personal remittances in 2024, compared to $3.37 billion in aid from foreign governments. Regional bodies such as the African Union can do more to channel funding across borders, including reducing the cost of sending money by advancing technological innovations for cheaper cross-border payments and quickly implementing the African Continental Free Trade Area’s Digital Trade Protocol so that conflict-prone countries do not have to depend on institutional donors.

If policymakers outside of Africa recognized the continent’s resilience, they would direct more capital toward Trailblazer countries whose stable institutions and diversified economies offer genuinely lower risk than prevailing narratives suggest. They could work with Adapter and Builder economies to address weaknesses holding them back. When it comes to Africa, they ought to recalibrate their risk assessments entirely: the majority of the continent’s countries demonstrated that external financing is a supplement to domestic capacity, not a substitute for it—and that economic opportunities await for those willing to put long-held presumptions aside.

You are reading a free article

Subscribe to Foreign Affairs to get unlimited access.

Paywall-free reading of new articles and over a century of archives

Six issues a year in print and online, plus audio articles

Unlock access to the Foreign Affairs app for reading on the go

Already a subscriber? Sign In

© Foreign Affairs