Eighteen months into his second U.S. presidential term, it may appear that Donald Trump has permanently altered his country’s relationships with its transatlantic allies. His rhetoric toward partners has been corrosive and his policies erratic; his administration’s overall approach has undermined the post–World War II settlement and the post–Cold War security architecture in ways that seemed unthinkable even during his first term. By denigrating NATO, threatening to annex its members’ territory, potentially violating international law, withdrawing defense aid for Ukraine, politicizing intelligence, and halting routine troop deployments to Poland, the second Trump administration has hemorrhaged American soft and hard power. Yet as bleak as the present state of the transatlantic alliance might look, it is also forcing a long-overdue transformation that could ultimately leave the alliance more capable and more balanced than it was before.

Writing in Foreign Affairs in February, the political scientist Stephen Walt rightly observed that Trump was wielding American power like a “predatory hegemon” to “assert dominance over friends and foes alike.” At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney observed a “rupture” in the rules-based international order, and the 2026 Munich Security Conference report scathingly described Trump as a “demolition man”; the implication is that there will be no going back. Although these characterizations accurately describe the current moment (and their pessimism is understandable), they also suffer from presentism. For beneath the mayhem and discord lies a counterintuitive possibility: the very crisis Trump created is forcing U.S. allies to develop military and intelligence capabilities that could eventually make Washington’s partnerships stronger than ever. The truth is that for decades, the transatlantic relationship had a real free-rider problem. Most European officials will concede that Trump’s second-term behavior—along with the rising threat from Russian revanchism—has finally convinced them to try to stand on their own feet in military and intelligence matters. European investments in satellite reconnaissance, air defense, drone development, and munitions production could augment U.S. capabilities by affording Washington more (and more diversified) intelligence, deeper joint stockpiles, redundancy in its communications systems, and a strengthened eastern flank. In short, the United States would no longer have to be the default provider of every critical element in a response to a European crisis. Capability, however, is only one part of the alliance equation; a harder question is whether its political and moral foundations can be repaired. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told the Munich Security Conference this winter that fundamental shared values still bind the United States and its historic allies in Europe. But that trust is now in tatters. Mending it is urgent because the threats facing both Europe and the United States are formidable: revisionist states such as China and Russia, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and even the national security implications of climate change.

Washington will have to restore trust through a mix of action and restraint. Beyond changing their tone toward Europe, future U.S. administrations must recommit publicly and repeatedly to NATO’s Article 5 guarantee and consult allies before launching major military operations, regardless of the theater: the Iran war has demonstrated the global repercussions of seemingly localized conflicts. They must support Ukraine’s sovereignty and enhance their deterrence posture on NATO’s eastern flank. And Washington must stop treating allied territory as an expansion opportunity and allied elections and domestic politics as opportunities for political interference.

Long before 2025, Europe’s free-rider problem was a source of frustration for Washington. Especially after the Cold War ended, many European countries underinvested in defense and intelligence, seizing on a peace dividend to expand social programs and relying on the United States for high-end warfighting capabilities, intelligence, and military mass. Successive U.S. administrations tried to cajole European countries into sharing more of the burden of ensuring the continent’s security. But they never really succeeded. Trump’s consistent threat to withdraw from NATO, as well as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression, has finally lent legitimacy and urgency to European rearmament.

The most obvious way Trump has ruptured the transatlantic relationship is with his rhetoric: beyond his threats to leave NATO—or seize its members’ territory—he has persistently harangued Europeans for failing to adequately help the United States during its so-called global war on terror and now during the prosecution of its war against Iran. In fact, NATO fulfilled its Article 5 duty after the September 11 attacks; many European countries contributed, and lost, troops in Afghanistan. So these broadsides have made Europe more reluctant to stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States in war.

Beyond its rhetoric, the........

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