President Donald Trump, in his second term, has severely tested the U.S.-Indian relationship. The president has slapped tariffs on India, threatened to impose secondary sanctions, gotten considerably closer to Pakistan, and enthusiastically engaged with China—the country India considers its biggest long-term military threat. Yet these strains have not led to the rupture that some observers had predicted. Nor have they forced a fundamental reorientation of Indian foreign policy. Instead, New Delhi has adopted what might be called an “America plus” strategy, in which it seeks to sustain partnership with the United States while widening its engagement with other powers, namely U.S. allies.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has responded with unusual restraint to Trump’s provocations and has resisted demands to pull away from Washington. With the United States, India has continued trade negotiations, increased defense cooperation, and expanded technological and commercial ties. In addition, he has sustained the Quad, a regional security organization that also includes Australia, Japan, and the United States, drawn closer to U.S. allies, preserved relations with Russia, and sought to lower tensions with China. These efforts do not represent a retreat from the United States or a strategy of multialignment. India is trying to reduce its exposure to American volatility, but it still recognizes that Washington is its most important partner.

After all, when it comes to cultivating a great-power patron, India doesn’t have better options. China and Russia will never buy Indian goods and services on the scale that the United States does, nor can Russia help India balance China. These realities have protected the U.S.-Indian relationship so far. But if Trump continues to bully India, public opinion could force Modi to abandon his restrained approach.

Through 2024, Modi and his ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) were excited at the prospect of Trump’s return to power. Modi had established an unusually warm personal relationship with the president during the latter’s first term. In 2019 and 2020, they headlined rallies together in Houston and Ahmedabad, expanded bilateral cooperation on defense, and developed a common approach to Asian security.

At the start of Trump’s second term, it seemed the friendly personal relationship between the two leaders would continue. At a White House meeting in February 2025, they announced an ambitious agenda for trade, defense, energy, and technology. To signal goodwill, the Indian prime minister accommodated Trump by slashing some of India’s tariffs on U.S. products and accepting a planeload of deported immigrants.

But the relationship soon soured. Trump took credit in May 2025 for ending a brief military conflict between India and Pakistan. While the Pakistanis hailed Trump’s intervention, the Indians refused to acknowledge that the president had done anything of the sort, sticking to New Delhi’s standard position that its disputes with Islamabad are purely bilateral and do not require outside mediation. Trump then took a shine to Pakistan’s army chief, Syed Asim Munir, and elevated Pakistan in the White House’s diplomatic priorities by using Islamabad as a mediator in negotiations with Iran and blessing the trilateral security pact between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Modi has largely avoided confrontations with Trump.

Trump also became friendlier with China, another Indian rival. In his first term, he sought to build stronger partnerships with Australia, India, Indonesia, and Japan to construct a new regional architecture in Asia to balance China. But in his second term, he has spent a significant amount of time engaging with Chinese leader Xi Jinping—even talking loosely of establishing a “G-2,” under which China and the United States would meet regularly to hash out global problems. Trump has also failed to hold the annual summits of the Quad, raising doubts that the United States is committed to that security partnership and to preventing Chinese dominance across Asia.

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