The Gulf Goes Backward |
In the weeks since the United States and Israel launched their war on Iran, the Middle East has witnessed a dramatic and unprecedented escalation by Tehran. For years, Iran has conducted hostilities in the region in restricted ways: through proxy militias, limited missile exchanges, maritime harassment, and carefully calibrated attacks designed to signal deterrence without triggering a full regional conflagration. Now, however, that pattern appears to be breaking down. No longer limiting its military retaliation to strikes against Israel or U.S. military installations, Iran has expanded the battlefield dramatically by directly targeting vital infrastructure in neighboring Gulf states.
Recent developments illustrate the scale of this shift. In the first two weeks of the Iran war, the United Arab Emirates’ Ministry of Defense announced that it had detected the launch of hundreds of ballistic missiles, and over 1,600 drones, directed toward Emirati territory. Although the country’s air defense systems managed to intercept the vast majority of these projectiles, about five percent of the fired missiles and drones still got through, resulting in civilian casualties and damage to critical infrastructure. Saudi Arabia has also faced sustained attacks, with Iranian drones and missiles targeting oil facilities and key economic sites, such as refineries in Ras Tanura and business centers in the capital. Although Riyadh reported the interception of many of these attacks, the mere fact that energy infrastructure is now directly under threat marks a dangerous escalation. Oman, a traditional mediator known for its strategic neutrality, has endured similar attacks by Iranian drones on ports and coastal cities, some of which struck oil tankers and injured workers. Comparable incidents have been reported in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, indicating that the entire Gulf region has been drawn into the expanding theater of conflict.
Tehran’s decision to assail political and economic targets across the Gulf is creating a geopolitical environment unseen in the Middle East for decades. The attacks do not merely represent another episode of regional escalation; they signal a structural transformation in the region’s security dynamics. The possibility of building a stable regional order based on dialogue, multilateral diplomacy, and collective security appears increasingly remote as the realities of insecurity and conflict once again shape the political landscape. Assuming that the regime of the Islamic Republic doesn’t collapse in the near future, these developments will likely reshape security relations in the Middle East and redefine regional geopolitics for years to come.
Until the outbreak of the current war, Iran and the Gulf states had been growing closer. Over the past decade, most Gulf countries have cautiously explored pathways for managing tensions with Tehran through diplomatic engagement and economic ties. This included de-escalation efforts between Iran and Saudi Arabia to limit hostilities in Yemen in 2022–23, and the rapprochement between the Islamic Republic and its Arab neighbors in the aftermath of the war in Gaza. Embassies were reopened, communication channels were restored, and limited cooperation was pursued on issues such as maritime security and trade. Pragmatism drove these initiatives: reducing friction with Iran could help stabilize the region, protect energy exports, and allow Gulf states to devote more of their resources to economic diversification efforts anddevelopment plans.
But with the outbreak of the ongoing war and Iran’s attacks on its neighbors, the prospect of strategic coexistence between Tehran and the Gulf has collapsed. By targeting the territory, infrastructure, and economic hubs of Gulf countries, Tehran has turned from a difficult but manageable regional rival into an immediate and direct threat to national security. This transformation carries profound political consequences. Gulf governments are no longer confident that dialogue with Iran is practical or even beneficial, and Gulf leaders who once advocated careful engagement with Tehran will now find it politically and diplomatically untenable to defend that approach. Instead, Gulf governments are likely to adopt a harder and more security-oriented stance toward Iran, with particular focus on reducing Iran’s military capabilities, containing the threat of its missiles and drones, and strengthening bilateral defense agreements with the United States. They may well abandon the conciliatory idea that Iran could be integrated into a stable regional order through multilateral frameworks, instead recognizing that deterrence and containment are the only viable strategies.
Iran’s escalation will also almost certainly compel the Gulf states to restructure their national security doctrines in ways that make strategic alignment with the United States unavoidable. In recent years, some Gulf countries have sought to diversify their international partnerships in an effort to reduce their exposure to an increasingly capricious Washington. Although they maintained their long-standing security ties with the United States, they simultaneously expanded economic and diplomatic relationships with rising global powers such as China and Russia. China mediated between Iran and Saudi Arabia to de-escalate in Yemen, and Russia increased its arms sales and trade exchanges with Gulf countries to secure their neutrality in the war in Ukraine. This diversification strategy was motivated in part by concerns about the reliability of U.S. security commitments to the region, particularly following years of perceived U.S. retrenchment from Middle Eastern conflicts.
The current crisis, however, is rapidly altering that strategic calculus. Faced with sustained missile and drone attacks from Iran, the Gulf states recognize that their national defense capabilities are insufficient to establish credible deterrence. Even heavily armed militaries such as those of Saudi Arabia and the UAE cannot independently maintain the layered missile defenses, early-warning intelligence networks, and logistical infrastructure required to counter continued, large-scale aerial assaults. As a result, Gulf states are becoming ever more reliant on U.S. military capabilities—notably, advanced air defense systems, intelligence sharing, and the U.S. forces based in the region.
This dynamic is reasserting the United States as the primary security guarantor in the Gulf. Although Gulf countries will undoubtedly maintain economic and defense relations with China, Russia, and other non-Western powers, they will rely to a greater extent on Washington for security cooperation. Attempts by Gulf states to diversify their military and economic partnerships and move away from the United States will become increasingly unrealistic in the context of direct Iranian military threats. In this sense, Tehran’s actions may in fact strengthen the very U.S. presence in the region that Iranian leaders have long sought to weaken.
Even with support from the United States, the cost of security in the Middle East is rising dramatically, and the implications extend far beyond the region. Iranian attacks on Gulf infrastructure are not simply military operations; they are strikes against the backbone of the global energy system. The Gulf region hosts some of the world’s most important oil and gas production facilities, export terminals, and shipping routes. The Strait of Hormuz, for instance, a narrow strip of water between Iran, the UAE, and Oman that transits about 20 percent of the world’s oil supply each day, is one of the most critical and vulnerable chokepoints in the global economy. There is a real risk that Iran could take complete control of the strait through military means, and Iranian attacks targeting energy infrastructure, ports, and vessels in the surrounding region raise the possibility of prolonged instability that could disrupt energy flows and commercial shipping. Even limited interruptions to production or transport can reverberate through international energy markets and fuel inflationary pressures worldwide. This is already evident; since the war began on February 28, global oil prices have increased by almost 40 percent, and the International Energy Agency released a historic 400 million barrels from its reserve oil supply in a bid to offset the spike.
At the same time, the economic consequences for the Gulf states themselves may be significant. High energy prices can temporarily increase export revenues, but prolonged instability makes investors nervous and undermines long-term economic diversification strategies, such as expanding the tourism and transportation industries, strengthening financial markets, and making large-scale investments in artificial intelligence technologies and renewable energies. Many Gulf countries have pursued these goals over the past decade to reduce their dependency on fossil fuel revenues. These diversification efforts depend on outsiders perceiving the region to be stable and secure. A sustained military conflict would hurt all these sectors and frustrate the plans and ambitions of most Gulf states.
Moreover, the war’s escalation will likely force Gulf governments to allocate greater portions of their national budgets to defense spending, a measure they would likely continue even after Israel and the United States cease their offensive. Resources that might otherwise have been invested in economic and technological development, social programs, and infrastructure will increasingly be diverted to missile defense systems, military procurement, and security partnerships. Over time, this shift could reshape domestic economic priorities, moving them away from diversification strategies and policies focused on citizen and resident welfare. This would place new pressures on a region that has no living memory of economic hardships or protracted social tensions.
Tehran’s actions may in fact strengthen the U.S. presence in the Gulf.
Another casualty of the Gulf’s being ensnared in the current conflict is the elusive concept of collective security that many states in the region have pursued. A collective security framework would foster cooperation among states based on shared interests, mutual trust, and institutionalized mechanisms for conflict management. The Middle East, plagued by incessant wars and other chronic forms of militarized conflict, has long struggled to establish such structures. But there have been periodic attempts to encourage regional dialogue, cooperative security arrangements, and multilateral diplomacy. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have participated in all the efforts to end the war in Gaza. Those same countries have worked to reduce regional tensions and to contain both Israeli and Iranian aggression in the Middle East.
Direct Iranian attacks on Gulf states severely undermine the foundations necessary for any collective security architecture to function. Trust—an essential element of multilateral cooperation—is rapidly eroding as Gulf governments scramble to defend their territories from Iranian missiles and drones. States that feel directly threatened by Iranian military actions will prioritize bilateral defense arrangements and external alliances, particularly with the United States, over broader regional frameworks. Instead of investing political capital in building multilateral institutions that can manage regional tensions, Gulf governments will likely focus primarily on protecting their own borders and strengthening military deterrence through U.S. security guarantees, leaving the region full of inward-looking states.
Regional security threats have not historically compelled Gulf states to align more closely, and the Iran case is unlikely to change this pattern. In the wake of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, for instance, Gulf governments, armies, and security institutions accumulated vast experience in cooperating with Washington on defense and deterrence matters but had hardly any success in working together or looking toward one another for security guarantees. Ongoing rivalries compound this imbalance. In 2017, for example, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE broke off diplomatic relations with Qatar and blockaded the country on the basis that Doha was supporting regional terrorism. The blockade lasted until 2021. The feud between Saudi Arabia and the UAE has also been worsening, particularly with regard to competing interests in Yemen, where local factions backed by each country clashed in December 2025.
This retreat from collective security carries long-term risks. Without functioning regional mechanisms for dialogue and crisis management, misunderstandings and miscalculations between Gulf countriesbecome more likely. Conflicts can spiral more rapidly when states lack institutional channels for communication and resolution. In such a volatile environment, the probability of recurring crises and open military confrontations increases significantly.
Iran’s escalating attacks also reveal a strategy that extends beyond traditional military objectives. The Gulf targets chosen by Tehran—civilian infrastructure, economic facilities, and energy production sites—suggest an attempt to impose cumulative pressure on Gulf societies and their governments. By striking oil depots, ports, and critical infrastructure, Iran is generating economic disruption and political anxiety across the region that could limit growth and induce instability.
Tehran likely hopes that sustained attacks will raise the costs of the conflict for neighboring Gulf states, forcing these countries to demand a rapid diplomatic settlement from Washington. In essence, Iran may see the spreading of the war’s consequences across the broader region as a way to help it end the conflict faster. Yet this strategy carries profound risks for Iran itself. Rather than dividing the Gulf from the United States, the attacks are likely to produce the opposite effect. As Gulf countries face direct military threats, their reliance on U.S. security guarantees will deepen rather than diminish. Thus, instead of weakening regional alignment with Washington, Tehran’s actions may indeed reinforce it. The attacks also risk accelerating Iran’s regional isolation. Economic and diplomatic ties that once served as channels for de-escalation will gradually disappear, replaced by hardened security alignments and containment strategies against Iran.
As a result of Iran’s escalation, the Middle East now appears to be moving away from a recent period of cautious de-escalation that was marked by an uptick in multilateral diplomacy and greater consideration of regional frameworks based on the principles of collective security. In its place, a more confrontational geopolitical environment is taking shape—one defined by renewed military competition, hardened alliances, and diminished prospects for diplomatic accommodation and security coexistence between Gulf states and Iran. In this sense, the Middle East may be witnessing a return to an earlier era, one in which security dilemmas dominated regional politics and cooperation became increasingly difficult to sustain. Unless a major diplomatic breakthrough halts the current escalation, the Gulf and the broader Middle East may be entering a prolonged period of instability marked by persistent military confrontation, rising economic uncertainty, and the steady narrowing of any space for regional cooperation. The clock, in many ways, seems to be turning backward.
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